Europe Divided? Dealing with a Resurgent Russia
Ortwin Hennig
I welcome you all to this panel discussion on Europe Divided? Dealing with a Resurgent Russia. Indeed, everyone has rediscovered Russia, Russia polarizes, Russia splits Europe as well. In the 90’s European integration and economic reform seemed irreversible and Europe seemed to be on its way to become world democratic power. Today, Europe can hardly unite on anything, neither on energy policy vis-à-vis Russia, nor on NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia, nor on ballistic missile defense. So the Europeans can give the impression of being pushed around by Russia. Russia indeed is back in the game. It is Russia that no longer thinks ideologically, but capitalistically. It is Russia that place growing political and military confidence as well as economic cloud. Russia’s two decades of geopolitical decline have obviously come to a hold. This recovery is due to a number of reasons but it is real. How real is it?
Like in Soviet times Russian power rests on fragile bases, its economy lacks sufficient investments, technology updates and infrastructure expansion. It is little to export beyond gas, oil, metals and arms. We need to have a clear appraisal of Russia as a country that is a key partner for Europe and the US for that matter on a whole series of issues: Iran, terrorism, non-proliferation, local conflicts, global warming, energy security and of course trade. How do we overcome disillusionment, misunderstandings and frustration that now characterize our relationship? Do we consider isolating Russia sustainable long range policy? If not, how do we rebuild strategic trust and engage constructive living with each other? How can the EU member countries strengthen their most powerful tool for dealing with Russia, mainly unity? And what should be the guiding principles for the European Union and developing strategic approach towards Russia and vice-versa? These and other questions will be dealt within the next 90 minutes or so and I am happy to welcome four distinguished personalities and experts on European and Russian affairs.
Let me start out with Mr. Borys Tarasyuk who is a Member of Ukrainian Parliament, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Committee on European Integration. He used to be an ambassador in Brussels, representing his country to the BENELUX, NATO and the Western European Union. He used to be Deputy Foreign Minister and he served two terms as a Foreign Minister. He is chairman of the party "People's movement of Ukraine" since May 2003, member of the political leadership of Our Ukraine Block. Borys Tarasyuk is the Founder and Director of the Institute of the Euro-Atlantic cooperation, which is an independent analytical center and a think-tank. And I am happy to say that he is also an old standing friend of this West institute and a former Board Director. Sitting next to me is Oksana Antonenko. Ms. Antonenko is a graduate of Moscow State University and J.F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She worked on a research project on Russian-US relations and co-edited the book Russia and the European Union: Prospects for a New Relationship. She facilitated track two meetings between Georgian and South Ossetian senior officials and experts with the aim of promoting conflict resolution in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. Currently, she works as a senior researcher of the Russia and Eurasia program in the International Institute for Strategic Studies on number of projects. James Sherr is a Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London. He is a Senior Visiting Fellow the Defence Academy and in January 2008 he published a book Russia and the West: A Reassessment. Since 1993, Mr. Sherr has also been a member of the Faculty of Social Studies of Oxford University. He has been a consultant to NATO on Ukraine and regularly advises the British government and parliament about Russia as well as security problems in the Black Sea region. I understand you hold both British and US citizenship. And our last panelist is Dmitriy Talanov, he is a Russian-Korean diplomat, right now is Senior Counsellor at the Head of NATO Section, Department of All European Cooperation at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Borys Tarasyuk
I am very glad to participate in this very important conference which has got together lot of my friends. I would like to commend the Slovak Atlantic Commission for initiating this conference, this is very interesting and important gathering. So I listened with great interest to the other speakers from the previous panels and I enjoyed very much the level, the high level of presentations and the discussion. I will begin with following words and guess whose words are those: Russia has returned to the world or global stage as a strong state, I will stress this is a strong state with the position on which many other countries are taking interest. Well, this is the message which was send by former President of Russia, currently Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. So I would like to draw your attention to two major elements of this message: strong state and the state views of which other countries are taking into consideration. Nothing bad but how this message is being translated into the real politics? By the way, in one of his remarkable comments, my good friend Pavol Demeš expressed and used such a phrase. Russia - we will discuss on the other panel Russia - Ukraine and other challenges to us. Let me disagree because Ukraine is not challenge to the European Union. Ukraine is a contributor to the common European security and common European values unlike other challenge. With this introduction I would continue.
What have we seen in January this year? Well, I mean Ukraine and the European Union – majority of the countries of the European Union felt upon themselves the new quality of Russia, the monopolist of gas supply. It was said in the previous panel that for all in the European Union what happened the gas crisis between Ukraine and Russia was taken as a wake-up call. But let me remind you that this similar wake-up call was sent to you three years ago, in January 2006. Have you learnt any lessons? No. Do we have a common energy security strategy for the European Union? No. So, are you going to wait for another lesson, for another wake-up call? And I would like to say that Russia has a quiet since the beginning of 2006 a new quality using the monopolism on gas supply to the united Europe as an instrument of their geopolitical aims to use this instrument as a pressure as an instrument of pursuing its own strategic global quest. And what happened in August last year? August last year, Russia demonstrated another new - forgotten by the democratic Europe - quality as an aggressor against the neighboring country - Georgia.
Divide and rule, this is relevant to Russian policy and this with regard to united Europe and with regard to certain countries Ukraine including. Former Soviet Union tried to divide united Europe using different methods, remember Pershing missiles. And Russians are now trying to do the same. The instruments for dividing Europe are numerous: Iraq, antimissile defense, Kosovo, energy supply, enlargement of NATO, so called new European Security System, war in Georgia and we may continue this list. So these are the major issues which Russia is being using to divide Europe, to divide Europe and the United States to damage transatlantic links. I would like to say that my good friend Adam Daniel Rotfeld referred to the necessity of keeping transatlantic links because this is not only the asset of the post war Europe, this is the asset of today as well. What to do in this situation? I think that we need Russia economically prosperous, we need - I mean Ukraine first of all and the rest of Europe - Russia politically stable, democratic a cooperative. These are the qualities which current Russia is lacking, unfortunately. And it is not the case, so that is something we have to encourage Russia to behave itself in such a manner which we expect. We need Europe to be united with common foreign and security policy, European security and defense policy and common energy security policy. Is it the case? No. This is not the case, unfortunately. So this is the answer, indirect answer to what has to be done. And finally, I would like to say that for us - Ukraine and rest of Europe - we have a lot of challenges and we have to cope with those challenges together, so one of the challenges is the energy security. And I think that we have to establish a mechanism of settling these challenges. This is only to unite together the supplies, the transistors and the consumers. That is Russia, Ukraine and the European Union.
Ortwin Hennig
Borys you have given us a statement that contains a lot of thoughts for discussion later on. Key words how strong Russia really is in the light of independence on the exports of raw materials and declining population, maybe this can be discussed later on. Lessons learned, would not it be naive from us to expect that Russia might not want to make use of the oil and gas to promote foreign policy? Objectively other major powers in the world do pretty much the same. Then you called Russia an aggressor and so on. There are lots of interesting questions for the discussion.
Oksana Antonenko
When I am usually asked to talk about Russia, I very much like to quote George Robertson who usually gives this anecdote about his meeting with Boris Jelcin, the former President of Russia. When Jelcin was asked: Can you say how is Russian economy doing in one word? And of course it was in 90’s when the economy was doing really badly and Jelcin said: Good. And Robertson said, well, this is very impecunious. Can you say it in two words? And he said: Not good. I think when we talk about relationship within Russia and NATO, Russia and the European Union I think this is very similar story here. I think on the surface everything is good. We have Strategic Partnership between Russia and the European Union, between Russia and NATO, well, with a sort of small glitch over Georgian war, there is Russia-NATO Council, there are multitudes of varies working groups and we are no longer seeing each other as enemies. But I think when we look in the detail, unfortunately, I have to say that the relationships are not good.
And then let me focus on five main points. First of all, I want to deconstruct this term “Resurgent Russia”, so what kind of Russia are we dealing with today? The second point I want to look at, what in my view went wrong in relationship within Russia and NATO and Russia and the EU. Then I will propose some ideas how I see those relationships developing in the future and what I think need to be done. And finally I just want to say few words about the current financial crisis, what kind of opportunities it offers for changing the relationship.
So first of all, what does the Resurgent Russia really means? I think, you know, everyone depending, I would say - mostly from what generation we all come from - put very different meaning in words Resurgent Russia. For some Resurgent Russia means Russia reemerging as a threat, for some Resurgent Russia really means nothing much, I mean Russia - as the previous speaker said - is being very weak and stating it is about its power, but not really. For some it is Russia which they cannot simply understand and that is particularly Russian’s neighbors. But I think, if you look objectively at what Russia today is, I think, it is important to emphasize, first of all that Russia is not the Soviet Union. Secondly, that it is not moving in a direction of becoming anything assembling the Soviet Union, nor that it is capable of developing into inadversary which A) offers a coherent ideology which is competing to the one of the West and B) possesses the capabilities and resources which is able to present a real threat or challenge to Europe and Transatlantic Alliance. Secondly, there is a big discussion - is Russia a new imperialist or is it post imperialist? I think there is no doubt in my mind and I spent lot of time traveling in post Soviet region that Russia has not come to terms with its recent history and it will take long time, probably several generations until the memories of Soviet Union are really not any longer decisive factor in the way Russia looks at its neighbors. But it seems to me that Russia is not demonstrating any real capacity or intention to build a new empire but it is post, I think it is post imperial and its transition in post imperial direction is very difficult, indeed.
Secondly, I believe that Russia has an ambition of becoming an important player, as Borys has just mentioned. It has remained to be an extremely weak player, particularly on the international scene. Russia has no allies and very few partners that can rely on. I watched almost every minute of the UN Security Council discussions after Georgia crisis, not a single member of the Security Council, including non-permanent members supported Russia’s position in these discussions. I think this is very much an indication what real diplomatic way Russia has at the moment. It has very limited military capabilities, of course at one the war with Georgia but I think we all know how much it exposed, the real limitations that Russia’s armed forces now have to conduct expeditional operations and I think the type of profound reforms which were pronounced by President Medvedev in aftermath after Georgia war really indicates that Russia is now accepting the fact that it still needs a fundamental overhaul of its military to be able to operate even on very limited military campaign.
And finally I would say that Russia remains still kind of marginal player in addressing key fundamental global issues starting from climate change to health issues, to many others that we have now been struggling with civilization. And, unfortunately, I do not see Russia in the future being able to take a lead in addressing any of those issues. Therefore, even if we are talking about Resurgent Russia, we have to put it very much in perspective what Russia really is today.
The second, very brief point about the history of the EU-Russia and Russia-NATO relations. In the case of Russia-NATO relations, I think we have fallen into a trap of creating a myth a kind of what I often call “Potemkin villages” of the relationship. Where we have a multitude of institutions of working groups there is something at some point, there was something like 45 different groups meeting under the ages of the Russia-NATO Council relationship and creating Russia-NATO Council and the rest and believing that the more conversation we have between Russia and NATO the better this relationship is going to be. Well, the bad news is it has not happened. And I think many of those working groups and formats etc. only contributed to create mutual disappointment, new mistrust and missed opportunities. I think on Russian side I was fortunately the part of the group which meets with Russian leaders every year. And every year we hear from Putin, from Medvedev last year that NATO did not fulfill its commitment to Russia, that Putin was promised that Russia-NATO Council has been formed that everybody will sit around the table in their own capacity while now NATO comes to the table with united position and then face Russia in kind of challenge and lecture Russia. Of course from my point of view and anybody’s point of view who knows how NATO operates it is not realistic to imagine that Russia-NATO Council can provide a platform in which no NATO coordination can take place because being member of the Alliance is completely different quality then simply being part of the OAC for example. But I think it is very difficult to explain to Russia which is not at the moment, or in fact has never been member of the Alliance which has that type of dynamic. On NATO side, there is also feeling that there has been disappointment because again there has been expectation that Russia-NATO Council will produce some sort of approximation of the perceptions between Russia and NATO. Their logic was more or less following: if only we are going to repeat to the Russians hundred times that NATO enlargement is good for Russia, finally, they should get it. They simply do not get it, the Russians, you know, they do not understand that NATO enlargement is good for them. So let’s just meet again and again and explain to them again and again that NATO enlargement is good for them. Unfortunately, it did not work out. Russians still believe that NATO enlargement is not good for them and that is not predicated on the numbers of meetings we have, it is just the perception that Russia has and this fundamental perception in none of these fundamental perceptions to change. We do not need meetings and councils, we need totally different relationship between NATO and Russia. On the EU side the history was to some degree similar but somewhat different. I think for some time - Borys mentioned that Russia was dividing Europe - I think for a long time Russia simply did not recognize, very much similar to the United States by the way, that European institutions such as European Commission or Solana’s Office really matter. They believe in realism, they believe about speaking to the big member states and that is what they did, they spoke to the French, they spoke to the Germans, they spoke to the Italians and the rest and they never paid attention to the European institutions. And again it created the situation where, on one hand, there was a huge frustration in the relationship on the kind of working level and on the political level there were divisions. I think, things have changed to large degree during the Georgia conflict. For Russia the intervention by Sarkozy on behalf of the EU during the August events has been a really wake-up call. I have heard from the number of very senior people in Russia saying that this is the first time we have really discovered EU as a political and security player. And the fact that you have managed to deploy 200 strong-observer mission in Georgia so quickly, that the EU is able to follow through both negotiating process under the very difficult cease fire agreement negotiations but also now is able to pull off something which was extremely difficult - Geneva meetings which followed the Georgia conflict. Really has emphasized to Russia that they need to engage with the European institutions as well and I think this is now going to be different type of relationship. And I am very glad that this has happened.
The second issue is of course also that falling the gas crisis this time around which is very different to some extend to the previous crisis, you know, Russia also now wants the European Union to be more involved and I think this is again very different from the previous one and this is also potential area where the EU and Russia can cooperate. Now as the time is running out, just a few words about financial crisis and what opportunities it presents. There is no doubt that the financial crisis had hit Russia very hard. The Russian leadership has been denying for a number of months - you all heard statements coming from both Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev that Russia is a land of stability in the ocean of a storm but now of course things have changed, Russian’s stock market has declined 75%, Rouble depreciated almost 30% and will continue to decline. Russia has spent almost 400 billion of its reserves, 400 billion still left, but if the crisis goes on for another two years I think Russia could be in fundamentally problematic position. So I think this is now a new window opportunity for us to start talking to Russia about forming a different type of strategic relationship. This is the time when Russia is no longer in the position of grand standing and it understands, finally, that interdependency is not just a word, interdependency is a reality which could have and is already having a strategic impact on the prospect of Russia’s own development. And unfortunately of course now everyone is preoccupied just like in 90’s when we made a huge mistake of not developing a separate strategic towards bringing Russia closer to Europe but in that time everyone was busy with NATO enlargement and the EU enlargement. Now when the EU enlargement and NATO enlargement happened and we have the crisis, now is the time to try to draw Russia together with China into the global system and try to draw Russia also closer to the Western values and principles. And here - something that I mentioned before - G 20 could be very effective mechanism in which I believe both the European Union and the United States should make an effort to give Russia a role and also responsibility, including in the area of energy security which could produce a new relationship. I believe that as a post Soviet generation is emerging in Russia and the middle-class is emerging, Russia is changing and in 20 years time it will be completely new Russia.
Just final joke closing my remarks, I do not know how many of you have watched the recent BBC documentary about Russia but there was very interesting episode for me as someone who was born in Russia. There was a BBC journalist interviewing one of the teenagers in one of the Russian regions standing next to the statue of Lenin and asking him who is this man and no one could answer, not a single person. So I think we are facing now a new post Soviet generation of people who could potentially look at the relationship with the West in completely different way and we should not waste this opportunity.
Ortwin Hennig
We should not make a mistake of equating Russia with the former Soviet Union. I could not agree more to this statement. I understand that we have to make a plea towards to acknowledge that Europeans and Americans have not always been sensitive to how the world looks from Moscow. From my own personal perspective I get the feeling that yes, indeed, when talking about Moscow and new resurgent certainness of Moscow we are not dealing here with aggressive military giant but with Russia hurt and humiliated that we have really assertive and boat only vis-à-vis the former Soviet Republic.
James Sherr
As we all know this panel takes place and entire discussion in the shadow of the gas crisis and I just want to make two direct comments about that, one at the very beginning and one at the end. In the recent crisis the Russian Federation conspicuously behaved like a country which is not a member of the Euro Atlantic community and has no wish to be part of it. Ukraine on the other hand conspicuously failed to behave like a country that does wish to be part of it. And that must be the starting point for examining of where we are at the moment.
Is it wise to isolate Russia? The problem today is that Russia’s leadership and much of the leaders of the country are isolated despite our attempts not to isolate Russia. And increasingly what is happening is that narrow circle of people who share similar premises, prejudices, resentments and very clever but distorted views of the outside world and people thinking of breathing one another’s oxygen to the point that there is very little oxygen left in the room and making decisions there are more and more disturbing to others and which in my view will sooner or rather than later prove to be very much damaging to Russia itself. And that is to large extent our fault. It is not because we have tried to isolate Russian but because we have lost the ability to communicate effectively. And if we are going to restore it, than we have to try to restore two things. The first always very difficult for us is clarity, particularly important in communicating with Russia. I do not mean clarity about our priorities or even our principles or even about areas of common interest we think or we have we would like to have. Clarity about our differences and why they are there as far as possible what we propose to do about them or what we will not do about them. And the second thing is - restore respect. Russia is profoundly irately with the EU today but I believe for all sorts of reasons I would not go into that Russia does not have the respect for the European Union today. And the result of this is what we see. Again and again repeating Stalin’s refrain all the time, we have heard it once already: Whole world is against us. Very unhealthy.
If we are going to regain respect and if we are going to be able to act effectively in our own interest, the first thing we need to understand what has happened and why. It was not at Munich Conference in February 2007, it was in 1991 for the first time that you have in the most authority people: Russia must be leader of stability and security through our former Soviet space. Nothing has changed except that sentiments have hardened. Oksana is perfectly right that today Russia is without coherently ideology but what it has is very powerful sentiment and that sentiment is nationalism and that sentiment has hardened. And one reason we have ignored it is because of our own ideological illusions based on liberal universalism, based on a faith that more prosperous Russia became, the trade developed, the more investments there was, the more self-confident Russia became, the more middle-classed develop, all of these ideas about security sphere and influence belong in the pre 1914 world would resist and the gap of thinking and values would resist as well. Well, the first set of things has happened and what sort of Russia do we have. And the second reason we were not paying attention was simply because we used few words being formulated that Russia was weak. And so we did not have to and today, I am afraid, we have and we are dealing with a country which is motivated both by very strong sense of injury and insult and a sense that now they can do something about. And that is where we are.
So let me come back to the energy issue again because we have very little time. If we are going to begin to do something about this, several things are important for the EU to understand to do. Firstly, the EU has to understand that the separation between the commercial, the political and the geopolitical aspects of kind of disputes we have seen is simply impossible. Secondly, we have to understand that to separate artificially Russia, Ukraine, and the EU gas relationship is also impossible and thirdly we have to understand that Ukraine and Russia are simply incapable of solving any significant disputes between them on their own. Finally and I think most importantly those who make policy in the EU and those who matter in the EU need to, we need people in the European Union who are able both to recognize and address the political dimension of the problem we face, not just the business, the commercial, the technocratic and the technical and the procedural and the legal but the political dimension and who are able to develop the tools to influence it in Europe’s interest.
And my last point is that until we show the willingness and the capacity to implement our own policy about energy matters and other things and implement our own principles here, we will not have the credibility and the authority we need to do so elsewhere. Today the danger is not that we are failing to spread Western models of accountability and transparency to the East. What we are progressively seeing even in this country is the spread of post Soviet models of opacity and convert behavior in business and politics to the West. On that chapter I will end.
Ortwin Hennig
Two things that you focused on: communicate with Russia with guarantee and you talked about restoration of respect. The problem for Europe in the dealing with Russia is not simply a question of leadership but one of profoundly different historical and cultural experiences and political and economic dependencies on part of the EU member countries. So this remains to be difficult thing.
Dmitriy N. Talanov
We discuss rather critical issues here. I would like to speak on another one, inter Russian relations. Actually, our relations with NATO are at crossroads. Last year after the meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministry on August, the Alliance has taken decision to freeze cooperation with Russia at the framework of the NATO-Russia Council. Responding rigorously without constructive flexibility on Russian military actions in the caucuses NATO has made a mistake. The political dialect was stopped right in the eve of the plan visit to Moscow by the NATO Secretary General. Mechanisms of the anarchy, well on bodyful consultations on security issues were not activated. We have not lived in such a situation in our relationship with NATO from the period of Kosovo crises in 1999 but we established the anarchy format in 2002 in order to avoid such situations to discuss issues including those that divide Russia and the Alliance and to take mutual accepted decisions.
There is a feeling that the Alliance is seeking to forget the wrong declaration. Hence, last year in August, NATO has thrown off the cooperation with Russia, yes back, particularly in military field. It raises questions regarding the most of achievements we worked out jointly from the Cold war period. In Euro-Atlantic politics after the caucuses’ crises, it obviously will not be possible to carry on as if nothing happened. We have recently restored a formal dialogue with NATO in Brussels on Ambassador Level and constructive conversation has taken place. But honest conversation and discussions I had regarding critical issues for Russia, crisis in relations to the CF, plans to deploy elements of US global antimissile system in Eastern Europe and agreeing to uniform standards in approaches to conflict settlement. So we should adopt a constructive agenda of our relations. And recently the NATO Secretary General Scheffer mentioned also that we need constructive agenda. Beyond our current situation with NATO we are doing it, actually, I am responsible for practical cooperation and, actually, we try to activate our arrangements on Afghanistan transit. And I do understand that it is one of issues that could be in future agenda. Of course, we would like to propose old questions to our partners, enlargement is not excluded. The result of post NATO continues to enlargement. From the interest of our security and regional security in Europe, enlargement is crucial problem in our relations with the Alliance. It is very old problem. And now, especially, process of drawing Ukraine and Georgia in NATO. It is extremely sensitive issue for us. And no advantages of the further expansion to these can outweigh the related risk of destabilization, lack of trust and confidence and shared goals. We are in favor of strengthening confidence in our relations and against drawing year declines in Euro. On the whole, we have entered into very responsible, critical period on transformation of the international system.
A few more thoughts in this connection, last year we made our proposals how to regularize the process of this transformation. Our President suggested concluding European Security Treaty judging from our context with key partners, we feel growing understanding of binding rules of behaving for all. And doing so, we are not trying to drive an edge in transatlantic relations. We suggest expanding these transatlantic relations in compass all the branches of European civilization: Russia, the European Union and the United States. On the based on the enlargement and practical application of the key principle of unserviceable security is possible today to conduct discussions on stability and the Euro-Atlantic space and as a world as a whole.
Ortwinn Henning
It is provocative, but maybe not so provocative question for you, for all of us. Can you think of Russia being a NATO member in the next 15-20 years? Maybe it is a provocative question, maybe it is not. Because Russia, EU and American interests are more aligned, speaking strategically. This is question to discussion. Are there any questions addressed to the panelists?
Rastislav Káčer
After sixteen years spent in Slovak diplomatic service I am still puzzled. In the year 2000, in our NATO pre-accession era, I visited Moscow in my capacity as a State Secretary of Defence. I wanted to explain that we want to get reintegrated into the transatlantic concept, because we want to join the stability zone. And all my experience from Moscow, when I met Mr. President Putin’s advisor. This was all very positive experience. It took me about twenty minutes to explain all the rational reasons. I was stopped after twenty minutes. Then my partner said, „Mr. State Secretary, do not join NATO, because if you join NATO, we will put you on the list of enemies.“ It knocked me off for a couple of seconds, I did not know what to respond. The only thing that came on my mind was that I said to him, „Mr. Advisor let ME assure you that when we join NATO we will not put YOU on the list of enemies.“ Several years have passed since then. I have been to several intimate discussions about various NATO bodies from the highest to the lowest expert level, of various formats – bilateral, multilateral. And I never met among these people anybody labeling Russia enemy. Honestly, believe me, I am not fantasizing. Maybe I was in the wrong places, but I have been to those. There is still one thing that puzzles me and I would like to hear your explanation. To me, the Cold War was not the war of Russians against Americans, or Germans or French, or anybody else. It was the war, in my opinion, the war of ideology, of concepts - of concept of freedom of choice and the concept of the dictate of choice. I always believed that the end of the Cold War was the good news for the people who wanted freedom of choice. I am puzzled now. Maybe because I am getting older. I would therefore like to know, what is the opinion of our distinguished speakers.
James Sherr
Rhetorical question: Can you imagine a vegetarian lion? No. For the same reason I would suggest that the Russian military establishment cannot imagine NATO which is not intrinsically anti-Russian. This is Russia founding, defining purpose of NATO. And I agree with Oksana, much as we can talk about transformation not only of its purpose but culture. This message does not get through. And so my answer now to the chairman’s question. Is for what the chairman was talking about to be possible would require revolutionary thinking. But let us just bear one thing in mind – NATO stands or falls as a community based on common interest, common values and collective capacity. To say that we, by virtue of our position, should have a seat at the top table of NATO, but you have to respect that our interests in some respects are special and our values are different, is something that alliance cannot accept and still remain an alliance.
Dmitriy N. Talanov
From early nineties, the question if Russia can ever join the Alliance is opened. To be more practical and to answer more clearly, NATO is a military organization that was established to keep Russia outside Europe. If you asked me if Russia would like to join it, I would answer that it is unthinkable. If one day NATO became another kind of organization, we would reconsider it. One other remark, my personal experience of NATO from 1997 is that we have serious problem with each other, because we have not reached mutual understanding. This is also what former NATO Secretary General used to repeat. And we still have not achieved it. It is a big deal, an important task, that one day we come closer to it. Today the Alliance trains Russia to be ready for any crisis we can imagine. If we proceed this way, I cannot imagine that Russia can think about this in fifteen or twenty years. Recently this question was asked by one German official. And I would like to state that we treat this question as a provocative one. Let us be realistic. Now I would like to speak about establishing our common agenda with NATO. It is very hard for the Alliance. It was not our initiative to stop the political dialogue. It has a very important role in our relations. Now it is the Alliance who should restore this dialogue. It is now in a very complicated position.
Borys Tarasyuk
Whether it is possible and considerable that Russia joins NATO, I think that two conditions should be made. First, either NATO would abandon its values, commitments and principles it is based on – then Russia may join it. Or Russia has to leave, according to the values and standards which are the conditions for each country to join the Alliance. I do not see any other possibility. Talking about the possibility of Russia joining NATO, let me that the former Soviet Union in the mid fifties sent an application to join NATO. Of course, it was done with propagandistic purposes, but it was done. And, according to my knowledge, it was repeated during the independent Russia in 1992. The letter expressing interest was sent by Jelzin. In both cases, Russia was playing with the Alliance. So Russia has not an intention to join the Alliance with the appropriate commitments. As to the other issues rose relevant to NATO and Russia. Our colleague said that Russia is deeply preoccupied with Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. I remember the Munich conference of February 1999 where the Russian representative was saying that „the former Soviet Union is the red line. Do not dare to thing about accepting any of the former Soviet countries to the Alliance.“ Three Baltic countries joined the Alliance. What happened? Nothing. As to the issue of NATO as an enemy. For me it is very strange to hear that Russian leader consider NATO enemy. Or the country that is daring to join this alliance as the object of a threat. This is exactly the case of Ukraine and Georgia. Let me remind you that the Russian leader assumed commitment not to consider NATO enemy. It was an agreement of mid-nineties. Is this commitment of Russia valid no more? Russian leaders even threatened Ukraine. If Ukraine joins NATO or if NATO bases – which is nonsense as well - emerge on Ukrainian territory, they will consider using their nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which is also nonsense. This is something that Russian leaders have to be very careful about. And the last issue. European security treaty was mentioned. Russian idea. Do we need another treaty? Or we have to expect Russia to implement their commitments under the OEEC documents, which is not the case with regard to Moldova, which is not the case with regard to Georgia. The idea is not to create a new document about the imaginable European security. We have to play according the rules of the game.
Oksana Antonenko
I would like to say that it was not only Jelzin, but also Putin when he was asked, he said that why not, about the prospects of the NATO membership. I agree here with Boris that in the current state there is no possibility at all for them to join NATO. We have to be realistic and realize that in the next ten years there will be fundamental changes happening in NATO and in Russia. So when talking about the ten year perspective, it is very hard to judge. We have to be open-minded not in terms of bringing Russia to the Alliance, but in terms of identifying the motto in NATO-Russia relationship. It should be: „Less is more.“ Creating numerous groups of working groups etc. is in my opinion completely useless. We have to identify, one, two or three areas which NATO and Russia can really cooperate in. What we need to is to develop a habit for the open relationship. I agree completely with James. We cannot change mentality and perceptions that have been in people for so many years. It may be rational for you that many Russian consider NATO a threat, but that is how they perceived NATO in their whole life. We will need a generational change here. We have seen in Balkans and Bosnia, when Russia and NATO operated side by side for the first time. We have spoken to many Russian officers who went through that time serving along with NATO soldiers and officers. Their perception has changed completely. We need more of that. There are at least three opportunities for that. First, Russia has just sent a ship of their coast for the antipiracy operation. This is the opportunity to try to cooperate side by side in the naval operation. In Afghanistan again, there is a very opened discussion now opening the northern logistical route. But I think beyond that, there is a very serious discussion now of engaging NATO troops in fighting drug trafficking and drug production. And this is where Russia has clearly articulated that it feels this is an interest that it sees it is very important for it. Because Russia suffers a lot of it. We need to develop an operational dimension of that sort of relationship. And finally the third area – the tactical missile defense. Also here has been a lot of progress done. I hope that nowadays discussion about it is going to be cooled a little bit. We can still make a progress in a tactical missile defense issue. On a very practical level. I submit to you that we need to make changes not through diplomatic channels, but through very operational, very concrete. And we need to be very patient and wait for a new generation. I am sure that in ten years from now, nobody is going to say that NATO is a threat if they know what NATO really is.
Alex Hersi
My name is Alex Hersi, currently working for the newly established National Centre for European and Global Studies at the University of Economics. Since Oksana has just answered my question of how to fix or address a lack of trust between both sides, between the West and Russia. My second question is – Do you agree that the current financial crisis unfolds it will likely impact also political development in Russia, both within Russia through a challenged relationship between society and authorities and political elites and outside or abroad when it comes to geopolitical ambitions of Russia at stake.
Pavol Demeš
I would like to ask something our Russian colleague, because you are the only one from Russia and Russia was articulated and discussed all day. Two questions for you. You saw in the first and in the second panel that by both EU and NATO citizens it is viewed that we are having serious problems, even without Russia. And we are naming them, trying to find out how to deal with the security threats, how to strengthen transatlantic relations, how to be better in what we are doing. Could you name any issues in the Russian debate where you feel that you are not doing so well? When it comes to relations with the EU and the US. Are there any, where you are having serious difficulties similar to ours? We do not have unified energy policy, we do not have consensus on Afghanistan. Do you have anything that your public thinks that Russia is not doing so well? And the second. Are you happy with recognition – I am not going to ask about Georgia, whether it is right or wrong – question that I would like to ask you, since you are a diplomat. Are you happy with recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia if nobody else somehow follows your pattern?
Tomáš Valášek
Question originally for ambassador Talanov, but I see you have a lot of agenda, so I pose it broadly to everybody else. One of the popular theories that one hears in London, Berlin and Paris, perhaps because of the Russian opposition to NATO enlargement we try to anchor Ukraine, Georgia and other countries through enlarging the EU. Then we should stop trying expanding NATO. That poses to me two questions. Do NATO and EU memberships have the same value in terms of anchoring countries of the East to the West? Or are they really interchangeable? What are Russia’s views on EU enlargement? We heard about opposition to NATO enlargement. But what are Russia’s views on EU enlargement. I understand that the EU is not about to offer Ukraine a membership. But if that was likely to happen, what sort of reaction could we expect from Russia? Would it look upon it favorably or as at a civilizational zero-sum game in which Ukraine would be ceased to be a part of the Russian orbit and therefore Russia would not view EU enlargement favorably?
Martin Bútora
Two very short questions. One for James Sherr and one for ambassador Talanov. James you mentioned that we should not consider this gas crisis as purely technical problem as it has an evident political dimension. Could you elaborate a bit here, sitting here in Bratislava, just neighboring Czech capital Prague, what you were having in your mind or perhaps what was the behavior of Slovak, Czechs and some other Center European countries in this regard? And, ambassador Talanov, could you tell us – Oksana said that Russia almost does not have any allies – can you tell us a bit more about it? Whom do you consider Russia’s ally?
Dmitrij Talanov
Six questions. I am going to answer them as I feel. First two. I begin from the second. Yes, I am happy about those two states being independent. It was a very good solution of this old conflict. First question. You mean I should be critical to myself or to my government? It is an amusing question for me. I am Professional, so it is very hard for me to answer it. I can be critical to myself, but not to the official politics. Many questions have been about enlargement of the EU and the Alliance. These two are very different processes with very different impacts. I am convinced that everybody in this audience knows the difference between them. NATO is a military organization – not political – and the EU, economical and political organization with some power in defense and foreign policy, which does not have a military body but is preparing to have one in future. Regarding to the enlargement of the EU as such, it is not our problem, it is the problem of Europe. It is a very complicated process, but if you would like to understand our feeling about Ukraine and its accession to the EU and NATO, you should know that we have two different attitudes. Because of the differences between these two organizations. My personal opinion on future accession of Ukraine to the EU is that Ukraine wants to be a member of the EU, of course. But it is much more complicated process than to become a NATO member. But I cannot explain why it is so and what purposes are for that. Speaking about Russia’s allies. If I should answer this question in terms who NATO allies are - Member countries of course. We are a member of something similar, but not quite the same kind of organization. I mean the Organization for Collective Defence, which has six members. We also have an economic alliance. But maybe you would like to know if we have some friends. Could you answer my question? Can you have friends in politics? But this is just my way to answer this question. I apologize if I have not answered your question.
James Sherr
With an eye on the clock, let me be disciplined and not talk about several issues I would like to talk about. But first very direct question about the political dimension, just confined to us, not Ukraine and Russia and their dimension. The structures of the European Union, its internal structure has for a long time, and to some extent continues, to be one that approaches problems in a generic, a political and rather a historical way. You would hear in the EU circles that Russia and Ukraine have similar level of economic development so they should be integrated together. Well forgive me; Great Britain and Germany have similar level of economic development, both before 1914 and before 1939. People who think politically or geopolitically do not think like that. My concern is that now the whole political generation of people in Central Europe have jumped headlong into this culture and have been so deeply socialized so determined to shut the door of the past behind them and their own history memory that they are acting like a parody of the views I just described.
Oksana Antonenko
I think it is unfair to ask diplomat to criticize the government. The interesting thing about Russia is their public debate about the important foreign policy issues. And I would say that this public debate does exist. Of course it is in no way as profound as it is in the West. We have seen, particularly in recent years, very interesting development in Russia. For example during the Georgia war, there has been general consensus about the use of force. And even the most liberal parties, including Union of Right Forces, have supported Russia using force. But there was a huge debate about recognition. I would say 50:50, or even a majority of experts saying that Russia had made a big mistake by recognizing early, by recognizing the way they recognized etc. So I mean there were lots of debates. In terms of the relationship with the West, there is a big debate now going on, not that much about the relationship with NATO, but about the relationship with the EU. There are very many views expressed. Some people from the expert community are saying that Russia should strive towards integration. That means approximating their legislation towards EU standards etc.
Some advocate special energy union between EU and Russia. This is very popular view for example at the Institute of Economy. And there is a view that says Russia does not have to do anything with the EU at all. There is a debate. Unfortunately over the last eight years the system has emerged where this public debate is not so much influencing the policy making process. I think that with president Medvedev the things are changing. There are a number of think-tanks and expert groups that are regularly speaking with Kremlin officials and there is a demand for expertise. For example, just a few weeks ago Medvedev had a real economic council to debate what the government is doing about the economic crisis program. The people who were invited, even some prominent members of the opposition, were listened to. Even a document was drafted afterwards, which was then sent to the Prime Minister Putin. Things are changing, although very slowly. But you cannot say that there is no debate at all.
The last thing I want to say is about the economic crisis. In term of the Russian domestic political picture, the economic crisis has changed situation a lot. In April/May last year when president Medvedev was elected he emerged as somebody who had absolutely no political base. He was just a „creature“ of Prime Minister Putin. I think that the situation has changed profoundly as a result of this crisis. There are two profound visions emerging now in Kremlin and in the White House about how to deal with the crisis. We have seen latest opinion polls which are indicating that popularity of Putin has been declining quite fast. We have seen a number of social protest now all around Russia. And the opposition parties are now offering increasingly constructive proposals rather than just challenging the authorities. I think there is a wind of opportunity now emerging; a sort of schism within the part of power, which I think is very productive, not in terms of creating a pluralist system but in terms of creating a competition of ideas. The problem of Russia during Putin’s presidency was a sort of centralization of power. There had been absolutely no competition of ideas within the decision-making process. As a result of that, Russia made a number of really bad mistakes in the domestic and in the foreign policy. Now, when we are slowly emerging from that situation, at least in the economy sphere and, to a certain degree in the foreign policy, the space is opening up. I personally think that we will see that trend developing further. Getting back to my opening remarks – now it is the time to start engaging people in discussing some foreign policy issues, for example, there is now an opportunity to open a new dialogue in Russia–EU relationship.
Borys Tarasyuk
Who is right, who is wrong? I would like to refer to the statement and decision made yesterday by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which recognized Russia an occupying power and condemned Russia for the consequences of the war against Georgia. So this is partly the answer to that question. EU and, in particular, president Sarkozy played a very important role in reaching a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia. I would like to warn all of you. There is one lacking, very important element in this agreement. The recognition of territorial integrity. Is this the beginning of de facto recognition of the partition of Georgia? And one more comment concerning gas crisis. I do not understand how one can refer to a country which, using its own resource subsidizing countries of the European union, secured that transit of the Russian export gas to these countries for the first sic day of this year. So how can one refer to this country? Was it Ukraine, who cut off the gas export to the EU? Or Russia? I disagree with this assertion. Ukraine was the same victim of the Russian pressure using gas as the countries of the EU and its people were. Last, very important, point is that in this panel, almost four speakers are Ukrainian. Dmitrij was born in Ukraine, Oksana has a typical Ukrainian name, not talking about Boris, and James also has some ancestors in Ukraine.
Ortwin Hennig
I welcome you all to this panel discussion on Europe Divided? Dealing with a Resurgent Russia. Indeed, everyone has rediscovered Russia, Russia polarizes, Russia splits Europe as well. In the 90’s European integration and economic reform seemed irreversible and Europe seemed to be on its way to become world democratic power. Today, Europe can hardly unite on anything, neither on energy policy vis-à-vis Russia, nor on NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia, nor on ballistic missile defense. So the Europeans can give the impression of being pushed around by Russia. Russia indeed is back in the game. It is Russia that no longer thinks ideologically, but capitalistically. It is Russia that place growing political and military confidence as well as economic cloud. Russia’s two decades of geopolitical decline have obviously come to a hold. This recovery is due to a number of reasons but it is real. How real is it?
Like in Soviet times Russian power rests on fragile bases, its economy lacks sufficient investments, technology updates and infrastructure expansion. It is little to export beyond gas, oil, metals and arms. We need to have a clear appraisal of Russia as a country that is a key partner for Europe and the US for that matter on a whole series of issues: Iran, terrorism, non-proliferation, local conflicts, global warming, energy security and of course trade. How do we overcome disillusionment, misunderstandings and frustration that now characterize our relationship? Do we consider isolating Russia sustainable long range policy? If not, how do we rebuild strategic trust and engage constructive living with each other? How can the EU member countries strengthen their most powerful tool for dealing with Russia, mainly unity? And what should be the guiding principles for the European Union and developing strategic approach towards Russia and vice-versa? These and other questions will be dealt within the next 90 minutes or so and I am happy to welcome four distinguished personalities and experts on European and Russian affairs.
Let me start out with Mr. Borys Tarasyuk who is a Member of Ukrainian Parliament, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Committee on European Integration. He used to be an ambassador in Brussels, representing his country to the BENELUX, NATO and the Western European Union. He used to be Deputy Foreign Minister and he served two terms as a Foreign Minister. He is chairman of the party "People's movement of Ukraine" since May 2003, member of the political leadership of Our Ukraine Block. Borys Tarasyuk is the Founder and Director of the Institute of the Euro-Atlantic cooperation, which is an independent analytical center and a think-tank. And I am happy to say that he is also an old standing friend of this West institute and a former Board Director. Sitting next to me is Oksana Antonenko. Ms. Antonenko is a graduate of Moscow State University and J.F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She worked on a research project on Russian-US relations and co-edited the book Russia and the European Union: Prospects for a New Relationship. She facilitated track two meetings between Georgian and South Ossetian senior officials and experts with the aim of promoting conflict resolution in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. Currently, she works as a senior researcher of the Russia and Eurasia program in the International Institute for Strategic Studies on number of projects. James Sherr is a Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London. He is a Senior Visiting Fellow the Defence Academy and in January 2008 he published a book Russia and the West: A Reassessment. Since 1993, Mr. Sherr has also been a member of the Faculty of Social Studies of Oxford University. He has been a consultant to NATO on Ukraine and regularly advises the British government and parliament about Russia as well as security problems in the Black Sea region. I understand you hold both British and US citizenship. And our last panelist is Dmitriy Talanov, he is a Russian-Korean diplomat, right now is Senior Counsellor at the Head of NATO Section, Department of All European Cooperation at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Borys Tarasyuk
I am very glad to participate in this very important conference which has got together lot of my friends. I would like to commend the Slovak Atlantic Commission for initiating this conference, this is very interesting and important gathering. So I listened with great interest to the other speakers from the previous panels and I enjoyed very much the level, the high level of presentations and the discussion. I will begin with following words and guess whose words are those: Russia has returned to the world or global stage as a strong state, I will stress this is a strong state with the position on which many other countries are taking interest. Well, this is the message which was send by former President of Russia, currently Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. So I would like to draw your attention to two major elements of this message: strong state and the state views of which other countries are taking into consideration. Nothing bad but how this message is being translated into the real politics? By the way, in one of his remarkable comments, my good friend Pavol Demeš expressed and used such a phrase. Russia - we will discuss on the other panel Russia - Ukraine and other challenges to us. Let me disagree because Ukraine is not challenge to the European Union. Ukraine is a contributor to the common European security and common European values unlike other challenge. With this introduction I would continue.
What have we seen in January this year? Well, I mean Ukraine and the European Union – majority of the countries of the European Union felt upon themselves the new quality of Russia, the monopolist of gas supply. It was said in the previous panel that for all in the European Union what happened the gas crisis between Ukraine and Russia was taken as a wake-up call. But let me remind you that this similar wake-up call was sent to you three years ago, in January 2006. Have you learnt any lessons? No. Do we have a common energy security strategy for the European Union? No. So, are you going to wait for another lesson, for another wake-up call? And I would like to say that Russia has a quiet since the beginning of 2006 a new quality using the monopolism on gas supply to the united Europe as an instrument of their geopolitical aims to use this instrument as a pressure as an instrument of pursuing its own strategic global quest. And what happened in August last year? August last year, Russia demonstrated another new - forgotten by the democratic Europe - quality as an aggressor against the neighboring country - Georgia.
Divide and rule, this is relevant to Russian policy and this with regard to united Europe and with regard to certain countries Ukraine including. Former Soviet Union tried to divide united Europe using different methods, remember Pershing missiles. And Russians are now trying to do the same. The instruments for dividing Europe are numerous: Iraq, antimissile defense, Kosovo, energy supply, enlargement of NATO, so called new European Security System, war in Georgia and we may continue this list. So these are the major issues which Russia is being using to divide Europe, to divide Europe and the United States to damage transatlantic links. I would like to say that my good friend Adam Daniel Rotfeld referred to the necessity of keeping transatlantic links because this is not only the asset of the post war Europe, this is the asset of today as well. What to do in this situation? I think that we need Russia economically prosperous, we need - I mean Ukraine first of all and the rest of Europe - Russia politically stable, democratic a cooperative. These are the qualities which current Russia is lacking, unfortunately. And it is not the case, so that is something we have to encourage Russia to behave itself in such a manner which we expect. We need Europe to be united with common foreign and security policy, European security and defense policy and common energy security policy. Is it the case? No. This is not the case, unfortunately. So this is the answer, indirect answer to what has to be done. And finally, I would like to say that for us - Ukraine and rest of Europe - we have a lot of challenges and we have to cope with those challenges together, so one of the challenges is the energy security. And I think that we have to establish a mechanism of settling these challenges. This is only to unite together the supplies, the transistors and the consumers. That is Russia, Ukraine and the European Union.
Ortwin Hennig
Borys you have given us a statement that contains a lot of thoughts for discussion later on. Key words how strong Russia really is in the light of independence on the exports of raw materials and declining population, maybe this can be discussed later on. Lessons learned, would not it be naive from us to expect that Russia might not want to make use of the oil and gas to promote foreign policy? Objectively other major powers in the world do pretty much the same. Then you called Russia an aggressor and so on. There are lots of interesting questions for the discussion.
Oksana Antonenko
When I am usually asked to talk about Russia, I very much like to quote George Robertson who usually gives this anecdote about his meeting with Boris Jelcin, the former President of Russia. When Jelcin was asked: Can you say how is Russian economy doing in one word? And of course it was in 90’s when the economy was doing really badly and Jelcin said: Good. And Robertson said, well, this is very impecunious. Can you say it in two words? And he said: Not good. I think when we talk about relationship within Russia and NATO, Russia and the European Union I think this is very similar story here. I think on the surface everything is good. We have Strategic Partnership between Russia and the European Union, between Russia and NATO, well, with a sort of small glitch over Georgian war, there is Russia-NATO Council, there are multitudes of varies working groups and we are no longer seeing each other as enemies. But I think when we look in the detail, unfortunately, I have to say that the relationships are not good.
And then let me focus on five main points. First of all, I want to deconstruct this term “Resurgent Russia”, so what kind of Russia are we dealing with today? The second point I want to look at, what in my view went wrong in relationship within Russia and NATO and Russia and the EU. Then I will propose some ideas how I see those relationships developing in the future and what I think need to be done. And finally I just want to say few words about the current financial crisis, what kind of opportunities it offers for changing the relationship.
So first of all, what does the Resurgent Russia really means? I think, you know, everyone depending, I would say - mostly from what generation we all come from - put very different meaning in words Resurgent Russia. For some Resurgent Russia means Russia reemerging as a threat, for some Resurgent Russia really means nothing much, I mean Russia - as the previous speaker said - is being very weak and stating it is about its power, but not really. For some it is Russia which they cannot simply understand and that is particularly Russian’s neighbors. But I think, if you look objectively at what Russia today is, I think, it is important to emphasize, first of all that Russia is not the Soviet Union. Secondly, that it is not moving in a direction of becoming anything assembling the Soviet Union, nor that it is capable of developing into inadversary which A) offers a coherent ideology which is competing to the one of the West and B) possesses the capabilities and resources which is able to present a real threat or challenge to Europe and Transatlantic Alliance. Secondly, there is a big discussion - is Russia a new imperialist or is it post imperialist? I think there is no doubt in my mind and I spent lot of time traveling in post Soviet region that Russia has not come to terms with its recent history and it will take long time, probably several generations until the memories of Soviet Union are really not any longer decisive factor in the way Russia looks at its neighbors. But it seems to me that Russia is not demonstrating any real capacity or intention to build a new empire but it is post, I think it is post imperial and its transition in post imperial direction is very difficult, indeed.
Secondly, I believe that Russia has an ambition of becoming an important player, as Borys has just mentioned. It has remained to be an extremely weak player, particularly on the international scene. Russia has no allies and very few partners that can rely on. I watched almost every minute of the UN Security Council discussions after Georgia crisis, not a single member of the Security Council, including non-permanent members supported Russia’s position in these discussions. I think this is very much an indication what real diplomatic way Russia has at the moment. It has very limited military capabilities, of course at one the war with Georgia but I think we all know how much it exposed, the real limitations that Russia’s armed forces now have to conduct expeditional operations and I think the type of profound reforms which were pronounced by President Medvedev in aftermath after Georgia war really indicates that Russia is now accepting the fact that it still needs a fundamental overhaul of its military to be able to operate even on very limited military campaign.
And finally I would say that Russia remains still kind of marginal player in addressing key fundamental global issues starting from climate change to health issues, to many others that we have now been struggling with civilization. And, unfortunately, I do not see Russia in the future being able to take a lead in addressing any of those issues. Therefore, even if we are talking about Resurgent Russia, we have to put it very much in perspective what Russia really is today.
The second, very brief point about the history of the EU-Russia and Russia-NATO relations. In the case of Russia-NATO relations, I think we have fallen into a trap of creating a myth a kind of what I often call “Potemkin villages” of the relationship. Where we have a multitude of institutions of working groups there is something at some point, there was something like 45 different groups meeting under the ages of the Russia-NATO Council relationship and creating Russia-NATO Council and the rest and believing that the more conversation we have between Russia and NATO the better this relationship is going to be. Well, the bad news is it has not happened. And I think many of those working groups and formats etc. only contributed to create mutual disappointment, new mistrust and missed opportunities. I think on Russian side I was fortunately the part of the group which meets with Russian leaders every year. And every year we hear from Putin, from Medvedev last year that NATO did not fulfill its commitment to Russia, that Putin was promised that Russia-NATO Council has been formed that everybody will sit around the table in their own capacity while now NATO comes to the table with united position and then face Russia in kind of challenge and lecture Russia. Of course from my point of view and anybody’s point of view who knows how NATO operates it is not realistic to imagine that Russia-NATO Council can provide a platform in which no NATO coordination can take place because being member of the Alliance is completely different quality then simply being part of the OAC for example. But I think it is very difficult to explain to Russia which is not at the moment, or in fact has never been member of the Alliance which has that type of dynamic. On NATO side, there is also feeling that there has been disappointment because again there has been expectation that Russia-NATO Council will produce some sort of approximation of the perceptions between Russia and NATO. Their logic was more or less following: if only we are going to repeat to the Russians hundred times that NATO enlargement is good for Russia, finally, they should get it. They simply do not get it, the Russians, you know, they do not understand that NATO enlargement is good for them. So let’s just meet again and again and explain to them again and again that NATO enlargement is good for them. Unfortunately, it did not work out. Russians still believe that NATO enlargement is not good for them and that is not predicated on the numbers of meetings we have, it is just the perception that Russia has and this fundamental perception in none of these fundamental perceptions to change. We do not need meetings and councils, we need totally different relationship between NATO and Russia. On the EU side the history was to some degree similar but somewhat different. I think for some time - Borys mentioned that Russia was dividing Europe - I think for a long time Russia simply did not recognize, very much similar to the United States by the way, that European institutions such as European Commission or Solana’s Office really matter. They believe in realism, they believe about speaking to the big member states and that is what they did, they spoke to the French, they spoke to the Germans, they spoke to the Italians and the rest and they never paid attention to the European institutions. And again it created the situation where, on one hand, there was a huge frustration in the relationship on the kind of working level and on the political level there were divisions. I think, things have changed to large degree during the Georgia conflict. For Russia the intervention by Sarkozy on behalf of the EU during the August events has been a really wake-up call. I have heard from the number of very senior people in Russia saying that this is the first time we have really discovered EU as a political and security player. And the fact that you have managed to deploy 200 strong-observer mission in Georgia so quickly, that the EU is able to follow through both negotiating process under the very difficult cease fire agreement negotiations but also now is able to pull off something which was extremely difficult - Geneva meetings which followed the Georgia conflict. Really has emphasized to Russia that they need to engage with the European institutions as well and I think this is now going to be different type of relationship. And I am very glad that this has happened.
The second issue is of course also that falling the gas crisis this time around which is very different to some extend to the previous crisis, you know, Russia also now wants the European Union to be more involved and I think this is again very different from the previous one and this is also potential area where the EU and Russia can cooperate. Now as the time is running out, just a few words about financial crisis and what opportunities it presents. There is no doubt that the financial crisis had hit Russia very hard. The Russian leadership has been denying for a number of months - you all heard statements coming from both Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev that Russia is a land of stability in the ocean of a storm but now of course things have changed, Russian’s stock market has declined 75%, Rouble depreciated almost 30% and will continue to decline. Russia has spent almost 400 billion of its reserves, 400 billion still left, but if the crisis goes on for another two years I think Russia could be in fundamentally problematic position. So I think this is now a new window opportunity for us to start talking to Russia about forming a different type of strategic relationship. This is the time when Russia is no longer in the position of grand standing and it understands, finally, that interdependency is not just a word, interdependency is a reality which could have and is already having a strategic impact on the prospect of Russia’s own development. And unfortunately of course now everyone is preoccupied just like in 90’s when we made a huge mistake of not developing a separate strategic towards bringing Russia closer to Europe but in that time everyone was busy with NATO enlargement and the EU enlargement. Now when the EU enlargement and NATO enlargement happened and we have the crisis, now is the time to try to draw Russia together with China into the global system and try to draw Russia also closer to the Western values and principles. And here - something that I mentioned before - G 20 could be very effective mechanism in which I believe both the European Union and the United States should make an effort to give Russia a role and also responsibility, including in the area of energy security which could produce a new relationship. I believe that as a post Soviet generation is emerging in Russia and the middle-class is emerging, Russia is changing and in 20 years time it will be completely new Russia.
Just final joke closing my remarks, I do not know how many of you have watched the recent BBC documentary about Russia but there was very interesting episode for me as someone who was born in Russia. There was a BBC journalist interviewing one of the teenagers in one of the Russian regions standing next to the statue of Lenin and asking him who is this man and no one could answer, not a single person. So I think we are facing now a new post Soviet generation of people who could potentially look at the relationship with the West in completely different way and we should not waste this opportunity.
Ortwin Hennig
We should not make a mistake of equating Russia with the former Soviet Union. I could not agree more to this statement. I understand that we have to make a plea towards to acknowledge that Europeans and Americans have not always been sensitive to how the world looks from Moscow. From my own personal perspective I get the feeling that yes, indeed, when talking about Moscow and new resurgent certainness of Moscow we are not dealing here with aggressive military giant but with Russia hurt and humiliated that we have really assertive and boat only vis-à-vis the former Soviet Republic.
James Sherr
As we all know this panel takes place and entire discussion in the shadow of the gas crisis and I just want to make two direct comments about that, one at the very beginning and one at the end. In the recent crisis the Russian Federation conspicuously behaved like a country which is not a member of the Euro Atlantic community and has no wish to be part of it. Ukraine on the other hand conspicuously failed to behave like a country that does wish to be part of it. And that must be the starting point for examining of where we are at the moment.
Is it wise to isolate Russia? The problem today is that Russia’s leadership and much of the leaders of the country are isolated despite our attempts not to isolate Russia. And increasingly what is happening is that narrow circle of people who share similar premises, prejudices, resentments and very clever but distorted views of the outside world and people thinking of breathing one another’s oxygen to the point that there is very little oxygen left in the room and making decisions there are more and more disturbing to others and which in my view will sooner or rather than later prove to be very much damaging to Russia itself. And that is to large extent our fault. It is not because we have tried to isolate Russian but because we have lost the ability to communicate effectively. And if we are going to restore it, than we have to try to restore two things. The first always very difficult for us is clarity, particularly important in communicating with Russia. I do not mean clarity about our priorities or even our principles or even about areas of common interest we think or we have we would like to have. Clarity about our differences and why they are there as far as possible what we propose to do about them or what we will not do about them. And the second thing is - restore respect. Russia is profoundly irately with the EU today but I believe for all sorts of reasons I would not go into that Russia does not have the respect for the European Union today. And the result of this is what we see. Again and again repeating Stalin’s refrain all the time, we have heard it once already: Whole world is against us. Very unhealthy.
If we are going to regain respect and if we are going to be able to act effectively in our own interest, the first thing we need to understand what has happened and why. It was not at Munich Conference in February 2007, it was in 1991 for the first time that you have in the most authority people: Russia must be leader of stability and security through our former Soviet space. Nothing has changed except that sentiments have hardened. Oksana is perfectly right that today Russia is without coherently ideology but what it has is very powerful sentiment and that sentiment is nationalism and that sentiment has hardened. And one reason we have ignored it is because of our own ideological illusions based on liberal universalism, based on a faith that more prosperous Russia became, the trade developed, the more investments there was, the more self-confident Russia became, the more middle-classed develop, all of these ideas about security sphere and influence belong in the pre 1914 world would resist and the gap of thinking and values would resist as well. Well, the first set of things has happened and what sort of Russia do we have. And the second reason we were not paying attention was simply because we used few words being formulated that Russia was weak. And so we did not have to and today, I am afraid, we have and we are dealing with a country which is motivated both by very strong sense of injury and insult and a sense that now they can do something about. And that is where we are.
So let me come back to the energy issue again because we have very little time. If we are going to begin to do something about this, several things are important for the EU to understand to do. Firstly, the EU has to understand that the separation between the commercial, the political and the geopolitical aspects of kind of disputes we have seen is simply impossible. Secondly, we have to understand that to separate artificially Russia, Ukraine, and the EU gas relationship is also impossible and thirdly we have to understand that Ukraine and Russia are simply incapable of solving any significant disputes between them on their own. Finally and I think most importantly those who make policy in the EU and those who matter in the EU need to, we need people in the European Union who are able both to recognize and address the political dimension of the problem we face, not just the business, the commercial, the technocratic and the technical and the procedural and the legal but the political dimension and who are able to develop the tools to influence it in Europe’s interest.
And my last point is that until we show the willingness and the capacity to implement our own policy about energy matters and other things and implement our own principles here, we will not have the credibility and the authority we need to do so elsewhere. Today the danger is not that we are failing to spread Western models of accountability and transparency to the East. What we are progressively seeing even in this country is the spread of post Soviet models of opacity and convert behavior in business and politics to the West. On that chapter I will end.
Ortwin Hennig
Two things that you focused on: communicate with Russia with guarantee and you talked about restoration of respect. The problem for Europe in the dealing with Russia is not simply a question of leadership but one of profoundly different historical and cultural experiences and political and economic dependencies on part of the EU member countries. So this remains to be difficult thing.
Dmitriy N. Talanov
We discuss rather critical issues here. I would like to speak on another one, inter Russian relations. Actually, our relations with NATO are at crossroads. Last year after the meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministry on August, the Alliance has taken decision to freeze cooperation with Russia at the framework of the NATO-Russia Council. Responding rigorously without constructive flexibility on Russian military actions in the caucuses NATO has made a mistake. The political dialect was stopped right in the eve of the plan visit to Moscow by the NATO Secretary General. Mechanisms of the anarchy, well on bodyful consultations on security issues were not activated. We have not lived in such a situation in our relationship with NATO from the period of Kosovo crises in 1999 but we established the anarchy format in 2002 in order to avoid such situations to discuss issues including those that divide Russia and the Alliance and to take mutual accepted decisions.
There is a feeling that the Alliance is seeking to forget the wrong declaration. Hence, last year in August, NATO has thrown off the cooperation with Russia, yes back, particularly in military field. It raises questions regarding the most of achievements we worked out jointly from the Cold war period. In Euro-Atlantic politics after the caucuses’ crises, it obviously will not be possible to carry on as if nothing happened. We have recently restored a formal dialogue with NATO in Brussels on Ambassador Level and constructive conversation has taken place. But honest conversation and discussions I had regarding critical issues for Russia, crisis in relations to the CF, plans to deploy elements of US global antimissile system in Eastern Europe and agreeing to uniform standards in approaches to conflict settlement. So we should adopt a constructive agenda of our relations. And recently the NATO Secretary General Scheffer mentioned also that we need constructive agenda. Beyond our current situation with NATO we are doing it, actually, I am responsible for practical cooperation and, actually, we try to activate our arrangements on Afghanistan transit. And I do understand that it is one of issues that could be in future agenda. Of course, we would like to propose old questions to our partners, enlargement is not excluded. The result of post NATO continues to enlargement. From the interest of our security and regional security in Europe, enlargement is crucial problem in our relations with the Alliance. It is very old problem. And now, especially, process of drawing Ukraine and Georgia in NATO. It is extremely sensitive issue for us. And no advantages of the further expansion to these can outweigh the related risk of destabilization, lack of trust and confidence and shared goals. We are in favor of strengthening confidence in our relations and against drawing year declines in Euro. On the whole, we have entered into very responsible, critical period on transformation of the international system.
A few more thoughts in this connection, last year we made our proposals how to regularize the process of this transformation. Our President suggested concluding European Security Treaty judging from our context with key partners, we feel growing understanding of binding rules of behaving for all. And doing so, we are not trying to drive an edge in transatlantic relations. We suggest expanding these transatlantic relations in compass all the branches of European civilization: Russia, the European Union and the United States. On the based on the enlargement and practical application of the key principle of unserviceable security is possible today to conduct discussions on stability and the Euro-Atlantic space and as a world as a whole.
Ortwinn Henning
It is provocative, but maybe not so provocative question for you, for all of us. Can you think of Russia being a NATO member in the next 15-20 years? Maybe it is a provocative question, maybe it is not. Because Russia, EU and American interests are more aligned, speaking strategically. This is question to discussion. Are there any questions addressed to the panelists?
Rastislav Káčer
After sixteen years spent in Slovak diplomatic service I am still puzzled. In the year 2000, in our NATO pre-accession era, I visited Moscow in my capacity as a State Secretary of Defence. I wanted to explain that we want to get reintegrated into the transatlantic concept, because we want to join the stability zone. And all my experience from Moscow, when I met Mr. President Putin’s advisor. This was all very positive experience. It took me about twenty minutes to explain all the rational reasons. I was stopped after twenty minutes. Then my partner said, „Mr. State Secretary, do not join NATO, because if you join NATO, we will put you on the list of enemies.“ It knocked me off for a couple of seconds, I did not know what to respond. The only thing that came on my mind was that I said to him, „Mr. Advisor let ME assure you that when we join NATO we will not put YOU on the list of enemies.“ Several years have passed since then. I have been to several intimate discussions about various NATO bodies from the highest to the lowest expert level, of various formats – bilateral, multilateral. And I never met among these people anybody labeling Russia enemy. Honestly, believe me, I am not fantasizing. Maybe I was in the wrong places, but I have been to those. There is still one thing that puzzles me and I would like to hear your explanation. To me, the Cold War was not the war of Russians against Americans, or Germans or French, or anybody else. It was the war, in my opinion, the war of ideology, of concepts - of concept of freedom of choice and the concept of the dictate of choice. I always believed that the end of the Cold War was the good news for the people who wanted freedom of choice. I am puzzled now. Maybe because I am getting older. I would therefore like to know, what is the opinion of our distinguished speakers.
James Sherr
Rhetorical question: Can you imagine a vegetarian lion? No. For the same reason I would suggest that the Russian military establishment cannot imagine NATO which is not intrinsically anti-Russian. This is Russia founding, defining purpose of NATO. And I agree with Oksana, much as we can talk about transformation not only of its purpose but culture. This message does not get through. And so my answer now to the chairman’s question. Is for what the chairman was talking about to be possible would require revolutionary thinking. But let us just bear one thing in mind – NATO stands or falls as a community based on common interest, common values and collective capacity. To say that we, by virtue of our position, should have a seat at the top table of NATO, but you have to respect that our interests in some respects are special and our values are different, is something that alliance cannot accept and still remain an alliance.
Dmitriy N. Talanov
From early nineties, the question if Russia can ever join the Alliance is opened. To be more practical and to answer more clearly, NATO is a military organization that was established to keep Russia outside Europe. If you asked me if Russia would like to join it, I would answer that it is unthinkable. If one day NATO became another kind of organization, we would reconsider it. One other remark, my personal experience of NATO from 1997 is that we have serious problem with each other, because we have not reached mutual understanding. This is also what former NATO Secretary General used to repeat. And we still have not achieved it. It is a big deal, an important task, that one day we come closer to it. Today the Alliance trains Russia to be ready for any crisis we can imagine. If we proceed this way, I cannot imagine that Russia can think about this in fifteen or twenty years. Recently this question was asked by one German official. And I would like to state that we treat this question as a provocative one. Let us be realistic. Now I would like to speak about establishing our common agenda with NATO. It is very hard for the Alliance. It was not our initiative to stop the political dialogue. It has a very important role in our relations. Now it is the Alliance who should restore this dialogue. It is now in a very complicated position.
Borys Tarasyuk
Whether it is possible and considerable that Russia joins NATO, I think that two conditions should be made. First, either NATO would abandon its values, commitments and principles it is based on – then Russia may join it. Or Russia has to leave, according to the values and standards which are the conditions for each country to join the Alliance. I do not see any other possibility. Talking about the possibility of Russia joining NATO, let me that the former Soviet Union in the mid fifties sent an application to join NATO. Of course, it was done with propagandistic purposes, but it was done. And, according to my knowledge, it was repeated during the independent Russia in 1992. The letter expressing interest was sent by Jelzin. In both cases, Russia was playing with the Alliance. So Russia has not an intention to join the Alliance with the appropriate commitments. As to the other issues rose relevant to NATO and Russia. Our colleague said that Russia is deeply preoccupied with Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. I remember the Munich conference of February 1999 where the Russian representative was saying that „the former Soviet Union is the red line. Do not dare to thing about accepting any of the former Soviet countries to the Alliance.“ Three Baltic countries joined the Alliance. What happened? Nothing. As to the issue of NATO as an enemy. For me it is very strange to hear that Russian leader consider NATO enemy. Or the country that is daring to join this alliance as the object of a threat. This is exactly the case of Ukraine and Georgia. Let me remind you that the Russian leader assumed commitment not to consider NATO enemy. It was an agreement of mid-nineties. Is this commitment of Russia valid no more? Russian leaders even threatened Ukraine. If Ukraine joins NATO or if NATO bases – which is nonsense as well - emerge on Ukrainian territory, they will consider using their nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which is also nonsense. This is something that Russian leaders have to be very careful about. And the last issue. European security treaty was mentioned. Russian idea. Do we need another treaty? Or we have to expect Russia to implement their commitments under the OEEC documents, which is not the case with regard to Moldova, which is not the case with regard to Georgia. The idea is not to create a new document about the imaginable European security. We have to play according the rules of the game.
Oksana Antonenko
I would like to say that it was not only Jelzin, but also Putin when he was asked, he said that why not, about the prospects of the NATO membership. I agree here with Boris that in the current state there is no possibility at all for them to join NATO. We have to be realistic and realize that in the next ten years there will be fundamental changes happening in NATO and in Russia. So when talking about the ten year perspective, it is very hard to judge. We have to be open-minded not in terms of bringing Russia to the Alliance, but in terms of identifying the motto in NATO-Russia relationship. It should be: „Less is more.“ Creating numerous groups of working groups etc. is in my opinion completely useless. We have to identify, one, two or three areas which NATO and Russia can really cooperate in. What we need to is to develop a habit for the open relationship. I agree completely with James. We cannot change mentality and perceptions that have been in people for so many years. It may be rational for you that many Russian consider NATO a threat, but that is how they perceived NATO in their whole life. We will need a generational change here. We have seen in Balkans and Bosnia, when Russia and NATO operated side by side for the first time. We have spoken to many Russian officers who went through that time serving along with NATO soldiers and officers. Their perception has changed completely. We need more of that. There are at least three opportunities for that. First, Russia has just sent a ship of their coast for the antipiracy operation. This is the opportunity to try to cooperate side by side in the naval operation. In Afghanistan again, there is a very opened discussion now opening the northern logistical route. But I think beyond that, there is a very serious discussion now of engaging NATO troops in fighting drug trafficking and drug production. And this is where Russia has clearly articulated that it feels this is an interest that it sees it is very important for it. Because Russia suffers a lot of it. We need to develop an operational dimension of that sort of relationship. And finally the third area – the tactical missile defense. Also here has been a lot of progress done. I hope that nowadays discussion about it is going to be cooled a little bit. We can still make a progress in a tactical missile defense issue. On a very practical level. I submit to you that we need to make changes not through diplomatic channels, but through very operational, very concrete. And we need to be very patient and wait for a new generation. I am sure that in ten years from now, nobody is going to say that NATO is a threat if they know what NATO really is.
Alex Hersi
My name is Alex Hersi, currently working for the newly established National Centre for European and Global Studies at the University of Economics. Since Oksana has just answered my question of how to fix or address a lack of trust between both sides, between the West and Russia. My second question is – Do you agree that the current financial crisis unfolds it will likely impact also political development in Russia, both within Russia through a challenged relationship between society and authorities and political elites and outside or abroad when it comes to geopolitical ambitions of Russia at stake.
Pavol Demeš
I would like to ask something our Russian colleague, because you are the only one from Russia and Russia was articulated and discussed all day. Two questions for you. You saw in the first and in the second panel that by both EU and NATO citizens it is viewed that we are having serious problems, even without Russia. And we are naming them, trying to find out how to deal with the security threats, how to strengthen transatlantic relations, how to be better in what we are doing. Could you name any issues in the Russian debate where you feel that you are not doing so well? When it comes to relations with the EU and the US. Are there any, where you are having serious difficulties similar to ours? We do not have unified energy policy, we do not have consensus on Afghanistan. Do you have anything that your public thinks that Russia is not doing so well? And the second. Are you happy with recognition – I am not going to ask about Georgia, whether it is right or wrong – question that I would like to ask you, since you are a diplomat. Are you happy with recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia if nobody else somehow follows your pattern?
Tomáš Valášek
Question originally for ambassador Talanov, but I see you have a lot of agenda, so I pose it broadly to everybody else. One of the popular theories that one hears in London, Berlin and Paris, perhaps because of the Russian opposition to NATO enlargement we try to anchor Ukraine, Georgia and other countries through enlarging the EU. Then we should stop trying expanding NATO. That poses to me two questions. Do NATO and EU memberships have the same value in terms of anchoring countries of the East to the West? Or are they really interchangeable? What are Russia’s views on EU enlargement? We heard about opposition to NATO enlargement. But what are Russia’s views on EU enlargement. I understand that the EU is not about to offer Ukraine a membership. But if that was likely to happen, what sort of reaction could we expect from Russia? Would it look upon it favorably or as at a civilizational zero-sum game in which Ukraine would be ceased to be a part of the Russian orbit and therefore Russia would not view EU enlargement favorably?
Martin Bútora
Two very short questions. One for James Sherr and one for ambassador Talanov. James you mentioned that we should not consider this gas crisis as purely technical problem as it has an evident political dimension. Could you elaborate a bit here, sitting here in Bratislava, just neighboring Czech capital Prague, what you were having in your mind or perhaps what was the behavior of Slovak, Czechs and some other Center European countries in this regard? And, ambassador Talanov, could you tell us – Oksana said that Russia almost does not have any allies – can you tell us a bit more about it? Whom do you consider Russia’s ally?
Dmitrij Talanov
Six questions. I am going to answer them as I feel. First two. I begin from the second. Yes, I am happy about those two states being independent. It was a very good solution of this old conflict. First question. You mean I should be critical to myself or to my government? It is an amusing question for me. I am Professional, so it is very hard for me to answer it. I can be critical to myself, but not to the official politics. Many questions have been about enlargement of the EU and the Alliance. These two are very different processes with very different impacts. I am convinced that everybody in this audience knows the difference between them. NATO is a military organization – not political – and the EU, economical and political organization with some power in defense and foreign policy, which does not have a military body but is preparing to have one in future. Regarding to the enlargement of the EU as such, it is not our problem, it is the problem of Europe. It is a very complicated process, but if you would like to understand our feeling about Ukraine and its accession to the EU and NATO, you should know that we have two different attitudes. Because of the differences between these two organizations. My personal opinion on future accession of Ukraine to the EU is that Ukraine wants to be a member of the EU, of course. But it is much more complicated process than to become a NATO member. But I cannot explain why it is so and what purposes are for that. Speaking about Russia’s allies. If I should answer this question in terms who NATO allies are - Member countries of course. We are a member of something similar, but not quite the same kind of organization. I mean the Organization for Collective Defence, which has six members. We also have an economic alliance. But maybe you would like to know if we have some friends. Could you answer my question? Can you have friends in politics? But this is just my way to answer this question. I apologize if I have not answered your question.
James Sherr
With an eye on the clock, let me be disciplined and not talk about several issues I would like to talk about. But first very direct question about the political dimension, just confined to us, not Ukraine and Russia and their dimension. The structures of the European Union, its internal structure has for a long time, and to some extent continues, to be one that approaches problems in a generic, a political and rather a historical way. You would hear in the EU circles that Russia and Ukraine have similar level of economic development so they should be integrated together. Well forgive me; Great Britain and Germany have similar level of economic development, both before 1914 and before 1939. People who think politically or geopolitically do not think like that. My concern is that now the whole political generation of people in Central Europe have jumped headlong into this culture and have been so deeply socialized so determined to shut the door of the past behind them and their own history memory that they are acting like a parody of the views I just described.
Oksana Antonenko
I think it is unfair to ask diplomat to criticize the government. The interesting thing about Russia is their public debate about the important foreign policy issues. And I would say that this public debate does exist. Of course it is in no way as profound as it is in the West. We have seen, particularly in recent years, very interesting development in Russia. For example during the Georgia war, there has been general consensus about the use of force. And even the most liberal parties, including Union of Right Forces, have supported Russia using force. But there was a huge debate about recognition. I would say 50:50, or even a majority of experts saying that Russia had made a big mistake by recognizing early, by recognizing the way they recognized etc. So I mean there were lots of debates. In terms of the relationship with the West, there is a big debate now going on, not that much about the relationship with NATO, but about the relationship with the EU. There are very many views expressed. Some people from the expert community are saying that Russia should strive towards integration. That means approximating their legislation towards EU standards etc.
Some advocate special energy union between EU and Russia. This is very popular view for example at the Institute of Economy. And there is a view that says Russia does not have to do anything with the EU at all. There is a debate. Unfortunately over the last eight years the system has emerged where this public debate is not so much influencing the policy making process. I think that with president Medvedev the things are changing. There are a number of think-tanks and expert groups that are regularly speaking with Kremlin officials and there is a demand for expertise. For example, just a few weeks ago Medvedev had a real economic council to debate what the government is doing about the economic crisis program. The people who were invited, even some prominent members of the opposition, were listened to. Even a document was drafted afterwards, which was then sent to the Prime Minister Putin. Things are changing, although very slowly. But you cannot say that there is no debate at all.
The last thing I want to say is about the economic crisis. In term of the Russian domestic political picture, the economic crisis has changed situation a lot. In April/May last year when president Medvedev was elected he emerged as somebody who had absolutely no political base. He was just a „creature“ of Prime Minister Putin. I think that the situation has changed profoundly as a result of this crisis. There are two profound visions emerging now in Kremlin and in the White House about how to deal with the crisis. We have seen latest opinion polls which are indicating that popularity of Putin has been declining quite fast. We have seen a number of social protest now all around Russia. And the opposition parties are now offering increasingly constructive proposals rather than just challenging the authorities. I think there is a wind of opportunity now emerging; a sort of schism within the part of power, which I think is very productive, not in terms of creating a pluralist system but in terms of creating a competition of ideas. The problem of Russia during Putin’s presidency was a sort of centralization of power. There had been absolutely no competition of ideas within the decision-making process. As a result of that, Russia made a number of really bad mistakes in the domestic and in the foreign policy. Now, when we are slowly emerging from that situation, at least in the economy sphere and, to a certain degree in the foreign policy, the space is opening up. I personally think that we will see that trend developing further. Getting back to my opening remarks – now it is the time to start engaging people in discussing some foreign policy issues, for example, there is now an opportunity to open a new dialogue in Russia–EU relationship.
Borys Tarasyuk
Who is right, who is wrong? I would like to refer to the statement and decision made yesterday by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which recognized Russia an occupying power and condemned Russia for the consequences of the war against Georgia. So this is partly the answer to that question. EU and, in particular, president Sarkozy played a very important role in reaching a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia. I would like to warn all of you. There is one lacking, very important element in this agreement. The recognition of territorial integrity. Is this the beginning of de facto recognition of the partition of Georgia? And one more comment concerning gas crisis. I do not understand how one can refer to a country which, using its own resource subsidizing countries of the European union, secured that transit of the Russian export gas to these countries for the first sic day of this year. So how can one refer to this country? Was it Ukraine, who cut off the gas export to the EU? Or Russia? I disagree with this assertion. Ukraine was the same victim of the Russian pressure using gas as the countries of the EU and its people were. Last, very important, point is that in this panel, almost four speakers are Ukrainian. Dmitrij was born in Ukraine, Oksana has a typical Ukrainian name, not talking about Boris, and James also has some ancestors in Ukraine.
Closing remarks
Róbert Vass
Before I invite you to the reception, let me sum up the conference. I would like to thank all panelists and all moderators who contributed to the excellent discussion today. We have experienced three very good discussions. The first panel – NATO at Sixty, which was chaired by Tomáš Valášek came to the conclusion that NATO needs a new strategic concept. This statement was supported by all panelists. But there are two key issues that need to be considered. First is the financial crisis, which will have a serious impact on how the new strategic concept will be adopted or if. And the second is whether we are able to agree on threats as we can see that the NATO members are divided in opinions on what the threats are. A key question will also be the Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations and the balance between them. The second panel. I would just like to say that there are huge expectations from Obama administration. The good news is that Obama would like to cooperate more with Europe, with the world. I think that the message of the panel is that if Europeans want to be onboard, they have to commit. Because a good partnership comes with commitments, not words. I am not going to conclude last panel, I will just repeat Oksana’s words that we need cooperation with Russia, we cannot isolate it. But less is sometimes more. With these words let me invite you to the reception and let me thank all organizers of this conference - Slovak Atlantic Commission and my young team who set this conference up, Euro-Atlantic Center, German Marshall Fund and Pavol Demeš, who was a great help for us, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister Ján Kubiš and Juraj Podhorský, who is the head of the Security Department. And, of course, European Commission, our exclusive partner BAE Systems and other partners as Ardaco, Mercedes, PQM and media partners. Without them, this conference would not have taken place. I hope that next year GLOBSEC will be even better; we will see even more people sitting here and watching this discussion. Thank you very much.
Róbert Vass
Before I invite you to the reception, let me sum up the conference. I would like to thank all panelists and all moderators who contributed to the excellent discussion today. We have experienced three very good discussions. The first panel – NATO at Sixty, which was chaired by Tomáš Valášek came to the conclusion that NATO needs a new strategic concept. This statement was supported by all panelists. But there are two key issues that need to be considered. First is the financial crisis, which will have a serious impact on how the new strategic concept will be adopted or if. And the second is whether we are able to agree on threats as we can see that the NATO members are divided in opinions on what the threats are. A key question will also be the Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations and the balance between them. The second panel. I would just like to say that there are huge expectations from Obama administration. The good news is that Obama would like to cooperate more with Europe, with the world. I think that the message of the panel is that if Europeans want to be onboard, they have to commit. Because a good partnership comes with commitments, not words. I am not going to conclude last panel, I will just repeat Oksana’s words that we need cooperation with Russia, we cannot isolate it. But less is sometimes more. With these words let me invite you to the reception and let me thank all organizers of this conference - Slovak Atlantic Commission and my young team who set this conference up, Euro-Atlantic Center, German Marshall Fund and Pavol Demeš, who was a great help for us, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister Ján Kubiš and Juraj Podhorský, who is the head of the Security Department. And, of course, European Commission, our exclusive partner BAE Systems and other partners as Ardaco, Mercedes, PQM and media partners. Without them, this conference would not have taken place. I hope that next year GLOBSEC will be even better; we will see even more people sitting here and watching this discussion. Thank you very much.
