Panel 1: Global Ambitions of Post-Lisbon Europe: Dreams or Reality?

Last year, after a series of long-lasting political debates and focus on internal structural problems, the European Union has finally ratified the Lisbon Treaty. This vote has closed a difficult decade of arguing over the EU's internal organisation structures and functioning. The Lisbon Treaty definitely marks a significant benchmark, which creates institutional preconditions for enhancing common foreign and security policies.

The compromise document has established two new representative posts with key role in the sphere of the EU's foreign and security policy - the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and that of the President of the European Council. The creation of these posts, currently held by Baroness Ashton and Herman van Rompuy, were designed to be the Union's answer to the famous question of Henry Kissinger: "Who should I call when I want to talk to Europe?" The structure is set, time has come to focus on the content.

Given the different political positions of its member states, the European Union has often proved to be unable of reaching a joint position on major foreign-policy and security issues, be it the Union's approach to Russia, energy issues, policy towards China or Middle East, or even its relations to the United States. The lack of flexibility in EU's cooperation was most evident in the context of earthquake-hit Haiti at the beginning of this year.

The Union aims to become a more relevant and flexible player in tackling problems and challenges beyond its frontiers. Will the structures created by the Lisbon Treaty be fuelled by a united strategy, or will the EU's foreign policy become only a bureaucratic foreign service without a clear content? Will it help for the rest of the world to recognize EU as a relevant player? Will these changes make the European Union more readable and clear? And finally, are the Global Ambitions of Post-Lisbon Europe dreams or reality?

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Panel 2: World After the Crisis: Consequences for Global Security and Power Balance

Through the year, there have been some careful signs on the possible recovery of the U.S. and European economies; on the other hand there are analysts that predict the possible backlash of the economic crisis in the upcoming period. The economic crisis may be substituted by the debt crisis, which was most visible in Greece and other European countries. The consequences of the economic crisis remain thus immense and long-lasting. The current crisis takes place in a multipolar and globalized world that is more interdependent than ever before. Not only the crisis itself, but also its consequences can be exported and may have a huge impact on the global economy and security, and the redistribution of power. The movement towards market liberalisation has suffered a serious blow and many governments responded with a new inclination for intervention, reregulation and state protectionism. As global trade and capital flows have declined, the process of globalization itself is negatively affected and the Western economic model is increasingly questioned. In addition, it is feared that the crisis might lead to more poverty, crime, disease, immigration and Third World military conflicts.

This crisis has accelerated the relative decline of the "Western" global leadership which may have broader geopolitical consequences. According to Dennis Blair, Director of U. S. National Intelligence, the economic decline has already produced "low-level instability" in a quarter of the world and the geopolitical implications of the crisis present a priority near-term security concern for the United States. Indeed, the crisis may alter the current distribution of economic, political and military power in different regions as well as in global scope. The world's three largest economies - the United States, the European Union and Japan, are weakened and face a long recovery. Key commodity-centred nations, such as Iran and Russia, rose with the oil and resource boom and flexed their political muscles; now they are coming under severe economic pressure. The crisis also seriously affected most nations' capacity of action within the security sphere due to decreasing defence budgets.

On the other hand, nations with isolated or less globally interconnected financial and economic systems have suffered less economic damage. One may consider China as a clear winner, since its economic growth has slowed down but is still at notably high rates in comparison to the decline of Western countries. Moreover, thanks to China's massive financial reserves, its leadership is able to realize strategic global investments that other states cannot afford. Hand in hand with its economic growth, China is increasing its defence budget annually. In this context and given the current economic situation of other major global actors, the crisis may imply interesting movements in geopolitics.

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Panel 3: Afghanistan at Crossroads: Success or Victory?

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was, is and will remain the most important mission of the NATO for years to come. Many consider ISAF a crucial test of transatlantic partnership, the credibility of the Alliance and its ability to face the security challenges of the 21^st century.

However, one must admit that the security and political situation in Afghanistan have deteriorated over the last year. The Taliban is getting stronger and the number of coalition casualties was the highest since 2001. The insurgency has significantly increased even in regions already controlled by the coalition forces. The Afghan national police and army are incapable of maintaining the control over already safe regions. In addition, proofs of voting fraud in the last presidential election have challenged the legitimacy and authority of president Karzai's government. Despite the recent Pakistani government's military offensive in more or less independent Pakistani tribal regions, which constituted a safe-haven for Taliban and al-Qaeda radicals after their expulsion from Afghanistan, cross-border insurgency continues to pose a core security problem for Afghanistan and ISAF.

Driven by these developments and also as a reaction on the report of General Stanley McChrystal, former Commander of ISAF, released late last year calling for more troops in Afghanistan and change at the ISAF Commander's post, the strategy for Afghanistan has been reviewed several times. The latest approach calculates with a significant temporary boost of troop numbers and increased training activities of the Afghan army and police in order to hasten the assumption of responsibility for security by the country's national security structures and allow the withdrawal of international forces. Besides these goals, the necessity of strengthened civilian assistance was adopted at the London and Kabul International Conferences on Afghanistan in January and July 2010 as well. In accordance with this strategy, Slovakia, alongside with other European countries, has announced a reinforcement of its troops in Afghanistan. On the other hand, there are increasing attempts from the Afghan administration, quietly supported by the international coalition, to negotiate with the Taliban and set up a political solution to end the long-lasting war. What are the prospects of president Karzai's initiative for reconciliation with the Taliban? What should be done to get Afghanistan right? How do we define the success or victory of the ISAF mission? What are the development forecasts in the region? How do we define the exit strategy today?

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Night Owl Session 1: How Will EU Manage Post-Dayton Bosnia?

After fifteen years of intensive international efforts, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the "Prisoner of Dayton", is starting to fracture. In January, Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of the Rebublika Srpska, one of Bosnia- Herzegovina's two constitutive entities, defied strong international warnings and promised to organize a referendum in order to reject the extension of mandates of international staff at the country's Special Department for War Crimes, as decided by the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, Dodik stated that this plebiscite could be a pre-step in the long-standing ambitions of Bosnian Serb leaders to decide whether the RS should remain part of the Bosnian state or not.

As a result of this initiative, the Bosnian Croats have renewed their calls to create a third entity, and the Bosniaks increased their efforts to dominate the state-level institutions.

Dodik's move towards a plebiscite intensified following the failure of the Butmir process of October 2009. Carl Bildt, as chief negotiator, offered the leaders of the three ethnic groups a promise of EU membership under the condition of key constitutional changes that would exclude and effectively close the overarching international presence of the Office of High Representative. Eventually, these negotiations failed, due to the inability of the three leaders to reach the necessary compromises.

In the context of the October 2010 parliamentary and presidential elections, further radicalization of all three ethnic communities may very well lead to a deep crisis at the end of 2010, further delaying any prospects of joining the EU. The situation is rendered even more difficult by the current global economic crisis and dwindling remittances into the country.

Today, the international community, led by the European Union and the U.S., must give Bosnia a strong guarantee that they country, united and decentralized, will survive and has a future within the context of the European Union's enlargement process.

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Night Owl Session 2: Regional Security Integration: Nordic and Visegrad Experience

The 2009 Stoltenberg Report written by foreign policy experts from Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland suggested enhanced regional security integration and coordination in the Nordic region. This should include common defence of the airspace over Iceland, defence of territorial waters, common exercises, training and logistical support of operations, and not least cost sharing in military R&D programs and in acquisitions of new military equipment and technologies. Earlier this year, the Report was endorsed by foreign ministers from the five Nordic countries. The key impetus for tighter integration is the realization that due to the high costs of newest military technologies, only big European countries might have modern and capable military forces in a few years time. Small states need to get together in groupings supporting cost-sharing in acquisition of the newest military technologies.

The Nordic model might be a source of inspiration for other regions in Europe including the V4 countries. There is a paradox, though. While the Nordic countries have formally varying forms of attachment to the two key security frameworks in Europe - the NATO and the EU (Finland and Sweden in the EU, Norway and Iceland in the NATO, Denmark in the EU and the NATO), cooperation and coordination appears to be supported by a set of informal norms and shared expectations. V4 countries are all formally members of NATO and EU, but there appears to be no shared set of informal norms and expectations that would facilitate cooperation and coordination. Also, it seems that the Nordic countries have been more successful in identifying common interests than the V4 countries. Nevertheless, recent changes in governments in the V4 capitals might bring about new incentives for improved cooperation in the Central European region.

In a more general sense, regional integration processes might be a systemic element in the ongoing transformation of NATO. The upshot could be a more flexible Alliance where regional groupings could provide for improved effectiveness in weaponry modernization, command structure and operational capability. On other side, development of integrated regional groupings could undermine the deterrence capability of the Alliance, fragment the command structure and weaken operational interoperability between various NATO forces. The panel will discuss these and other issues related to regional security integration in Europe.

Panel 4: Eastern Europe and Eastern Partnership: Mutual Expectations

The impact of the global economic crisis, European Union enlargement fatigue, lately the US-Russia reset process, cautious discussion about the European security architecture between Russia and Germany, but also shift in gas trade have been altering power relations in Eastern Europe.  These above mentioned factors have been reduced geopolitics in the region, one of the best selling items of the authoritarian Belarus, the democratic Ukraine and the forgotten Moldova toward East and West.

Since its enlargement in 2004 the EU has been learning that democracy (like in Ukraine) is not enough without delivery in governance (such as in Belarus). Moldova, where there is combination of both, is hindered with a frozen conflict, but also lacks resources and until recently the necessary attention. While the EU is sitting in the classroom of Eastern European policy making a more assertive Russia is trying to re-shape its "near abroad" and plant loyal allies. Currently it is challenging the rule of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus for not being loyal enough, but expecting more delivery/concessions from the new Ukrainian leadership. Moldova faces a complicated process of referendum and elections, what may halt its promising early progress in European integration.

The evidence and realization of interdependency of the EU and Russia as well as increase in exploration of alternative gas has weakened the Russian energy weapon toward Europe, but also reduced the role of geopolitics for Eastern Europe. Moreover, the impact of the global economic crisis on the region, the "policy of ignorance" growing from the lack of trust in regional elites in Europe further reduces the usual manoeuvring. However, perhaps there is a time to give up short term politics and opt to develop more independent and long term policies toward both East and West.

To achieve a more loyal allies in its near abroad Russia has opened several fronts, but faces its domestic challenges, such as presidential elections in 2012 and winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014. The EU policy and appeal has weakened by the economic crisis, but also member states keep individual interest first sometimes over common values. Ukraine holds local government elections in October, while Moldova entered a complicated referendum and elections process. It is not the European Neighbourhood policy, but Eastern Europe appears to arrive at crossroads. Quo vadis, Ukraine and Moldova?

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Panel 5: The "Visegrad Four": Energized

With three new governments in place - in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia - Central Europe finds itself in a unique political dynamics. Hungary and Poland are getting ready to assume their subsequent EU presidencies in the upcoming year and Slovakia has taken over the annual presidency of the "Visegrad Four" Group earlier this summer. At the same time, the combined  share of the Visegrad Group in the post-Lisbon Treaty European Council equalized the votes of "European integration engine" Germany and France together. All these facts unveil an entirely new political situation in Central Europe that allows the Visegrad Group to shape the European policies and strategic European and Transatlantic debate at the best possible time. GLOBSEC 2010 will be the first public event and meeting of leading political representatives of V4 after significant changes on the Central European "political map".

The name of the Panel "Visegrad Four: Energized" indicates not only the main topic of the special ministerial panel, but also a new momentum within the Visegrad cooperation. New emphasis on the regional cooperation may significantly manifest itself in the most important politics of the European Union, namely in the upcoming period of negotiations on the financial perspective of the EU and the next EU budget; in shaping the EU's Eastern Partnership program; by attempts in revitalizing the EU enlargement in the Western Balkans; and in the strategic discussion on the EU common energy policy.

The energy security and the vulnerability to energy supply cut-offs is the common Achilles tendon of all the Visegrad countries. So far, despite improvements since 2009 gas crisis, results of decisive or joint actions on the European or regional level have been rare. Necessity of the regional interconnection of the energy routes, higher diversity of energy supplies as well as true common EU energy policy will therefore present the core of the panel discussion. By consulting as well as acting together whenever possible, the Visegrad countries can have a larger impact on future EU energy policies and hence limit overall uncertainties. In particular, creating a functioning single EU electricity market and natural gas market should be in the interest of all V4 countries. After the changes in political representation in three of the four Visegrad countries a new dynamics is likely to be seen.

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Panel 6: New Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture: Values and Interests

More than two years have passed since the Russian president Dmitri Medvedev had proposed that Europe should re-negotiate the framework for security on the European continent. While Moscow's proposals on new European security architecture dangerously over-emphasise hard security and embrace a 19^th-century concept of security based on spheres of influence and the balance of powers, the proposal comes at the time when several lynchpins of the Euro-Atlantic security space are being challenged.

Twenty years ago, European policy-makers saw the emergence of a NATO-centred and EU-modelled European security order as the natural outcome of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Many thought that American hard power would underpin the spread of European soft power: as the EU enlarged, its eastern and southern flanks would gradually internalise the concepts of the rule of law, mutual interdependence and shared sovereignty, and security would spread outwards. It was expected that even countries that were not prospective members of the two clubs would eventually be transformed into democracies and market economies and make Kant's "eternal peace" a reality.

The ensuing years have challenged many of these assumptions. While its military power remains unchallenged, the United States has been tested and overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington is also increasingly busy working out its relations with rising Asian powers and is gradually leaving Europe to fend for itself. Meanwhile, the EU seems to have lost the will to enlarge further. The financial crisis has undermined the EU's soft power abroad and the debate surrounding the Greek bailout has put in doubt the key principle of solidarity within the Union.

It has now become increasingly hard to imagine Europe-wide co-operation based on values such as democracy, rule of law and good governance because such values directly threaten the stability of corrupt regimes in Eastern Europe or South Caucasus. Co-operation between the EU and Russia based on shared interests is also becoming more difficult: while stability and peace in the shared neighbourhood is strategically important for both, their means for promoting security in the region fundamentally differ, which further delays long-overdue solutions to the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. New solutions are therefore needed to prevent current disagreements and rivalries and the lack of co-operation between the various actors in an increasingly multi-polar Europe from further undermining security in the Euro-Atlantic space. How can European states with different normative systems work together to prevent potential conflicts or emergence of a security vacuum? The upcoming NATO and OSCE summits provide an opportunity for allies to discuss whether the present institutional framework for Euro-Atlantic security sufficiently addresses today's challenges.

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Panel 7: The New Strategic Concept of NATO

Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO has undergone substantial changes to adapt to the post-Cold War era: the admission of 12 new members, the creation of a number of partnerships (including the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Partnership for Peace, the Istanbul Initiative, etc.), the launch of a number of operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Active Endeavour, Darfur) and the modernization of its armed forces. Each of these transformative steps was of vital importance for NATO's core mission of collective defence, but in a greatly different security environment.

Given the changes, NATO has reached a point where it needs a new key guiding document - a strategic document that will not only highlight the aim and purpose of the Alliance but also re-assess the security challenges it faces and define the toolbox for answering these challenges. While NATO continues to serve as the bedrock for European and North American security, it does so in a new world of non-conventional asymmetric threats, many of which originate outside the transatlantic area.

At the Strasbourg-Kehl summit in April 2009, NATO allies agreed to start crafting a new Strategic Concept. A group of twelve experts under the chair of Hon. Madeleine Albright provided the building blocks for the future strategy in the form of a report delivered to allies in May 2010. Their analysis and recommendations provide a basis for the Secretary General's draft of the Strategic Concept, due in September 2010.

The discussions on the new concept so far revealed several differences among the Allies. Some member-states want NATO to focus on preparing for out-of-area expeditionary operations tackling non-traditional security threats. Another group, mostly the new member-states but also Norway, worry about threats closer to home. They emphasize the continuing need for strengthening conventional forces and strategies of the Alliance aimed at securing the European area. The new document will need to provide guidance on how to resolve these differences, and to clarify the relationship with Russia, as well as other major actors, including the EU and the UN.

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