NIGHT OWL SESSION 1: EURO: SHIFTING FROM SURVIVAL TO REVIVAL?

NIGHT OWL SESSION 2: STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEWS: CAN WE DO MORE WITH LESS?

NIGHT OWL SESSION 3: ARE WE SECURE IN CYBER SPACE?

NIGHT OWL SESSION 4: SORTING OUT THE NATO - EU COOPERATION

NIGHT OWL SESSION 5: ARAB WORLD UPRISING: WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE WEST?

NIGHT OWL SESSION 6: UKRAINE: HEADING EAST OR WEST?

SESSION 1: BELARUS AFTER THE ELECTIONS: WILL SANCTION WORK?

SESSION 2: EUROPEAN ORDER: ARE WE HEADING TOWARDS A MULTIPOLAR EUROPE?

SESSION 3: TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE ROLE OF CENTRAL EUROPE

SESSION 5: EASTERN PARTNERSHIP 2.0

SESSION 6: TWO YEARS AFTER U.S. - RUSSIA RESET: RETHINK OR CONTINUE?

SESSION 7: NATO AFTER LISBON: WHAT LIES AHEAD?

A/ CLIMATE CHANGE: AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY?

B/ NUCLEAR POLICY OF NATO AND THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

C/ DEFENCE COOPERATION AFTER THE CRISIS

D/ ENERGY SECURITY FROM THE VISEGRAD SECURITY

 

NIGHT OWL SESSION 1: EURO: SHIFTING FROM SURVIVAL TO REVIVAL?

As doubts about the solvency of several European nations mounted during the course of the last year, and the strain in already fragile financial markets grew further, some commentators and academics did not shy away from prophesising the break-up of the Eurozone.

In reality, more than a year after the first jitters about the situation in Greece publicly emerged, the Eurozone is strongly committed to pursuing what Paul Krugman referred to as "toughing it out". Countries and institutions that experienced difficulties in raising money to finance their debt have embarked on a journey of reforms to restore confidence in their long-term financial viability. In return, European policy makers, including those at the ECB, have extended previously unthinkable kinds of assistance to safeguard financial stability in Europe. The overall situation, however, remains rather fragile.

Whilst some see encouraging signs of a revival when looking at private sector performance, on the policy front, questions remain whether the chosen near-term strategy is indeed the right one. Greece and Ireland, for whom concerted European action secured a financial lifeline, will have to wrestle with an immense burden of public debt for many years to come, however successful their austerity programmes and growth-promoting policies turn out to be. Yet, any talk of debt restructuring remains a taboo in policy circles. This, perhaps more than anything else, signals that all may not be well elsewhere in the system several years after the tremors in the financial markets started.

Looking further ahead, the Eurozone's longer-term prospects also depend on whether the correct lessons from the events of the past years are learned, and whether effective institutional changes are put in place to substitute for or to complement the existing architecture of European economic governance. Financial sector oversight has already seen radical shake-up. The rules aimed at promoting fiscal prudence are to be reinforced, new rules to tackle divergences are to be introduced, and Europe's temporary financial assistance facility is to be replaced by a permanent mechanism following 2013. A "comprehensive package" of measures is in the pipeline. Nonetheless, commentators have expressed doubts whether these initiatives are bold enough, address the right issues or do so effectively, and whether they are consistent with a coherent long-term vision for Europe.

Guiding Questions:

 

NIGHT OWL SESSION 2: STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEWS: CAN WE DO MORE WITH LESS?

Strategic Defence Review (SDR) process is a standard tool for evaluating political-military ambition, defence financial framework and development of necessary military capabilities. Usually, this process of review is launched when 2 conditions are met: there are significant changes in the security environment and radical changes in the financial framework. The outcome of an SDR process is laid out in a White Book on Defence which is a document open to the public conveying a clear message with regard to the future vision for the size and structure of the armed forces.

Since 1993, Slovak defence expenditure has been decreasing percentually: this factor was accompanied with unrealistic strategic planning based on unrealistic financial assumptions that opened a gap between the ends and the available means, and to a great extend led to inability of Slovakia to live up to its own political commitments towards NATO (Allies). What is more, from 2007 on the financial crisis has been pushing defence and security to the side track when it comes to the attention of decision makers and looking for sustainable solutions. Nowadays, we have seen the defence spending in Slovakia falling from 2,2% of GDP in 1996 to 1,07 % of GDP this year, an accumulated internal deficit of 1,5 bln EURO (to compare, budget of Slovakia‟s MoD for 2011 is 759 mil. Euro); these figures fully reflect the usual difficulty of Slovak defence planning that is opening scissors between financial reality and political ambitions. Therefore, the SDR has been launched to meet this challenge; it is a task stemming from provisions of chapter on security and defence of the Government‟s program declaration 2010 - 2014.

Nowadays, we have to rationalize our defence spending so that we will be able to stand up to NATO Secretary General Rasmussen‟s principle "Cut fat and build muscles", enshrined in NATO‟s new Strategic Concept adopted by Allied Heads of States and Governments in Lisbon in November last year. The outcome of SDR will reflect the Allied vision for the next decade, as well. We have a unique opportunity to do so: together with the Czechs, who launched their process of working out the White Book of Defence several months earlier and they are about to come up with concrete findings, proposals and visions by the end of January 2011. Therefore, mutual cooperation and communication on lessons learned that has started on the top level of Ministries of Defence in both countries in the autumn of 2010, is as important as findings of SDR‟s themselves.

Guiding Questions:

 

NIGHT OWL SESSION 3: ARE WE SECURE IN CYBER SPACE?

The growing number of cyber attacks that have been carried out in recent years makes cyber security one of the most serious current economic and security threats. As societies have become reliant on information technology, securing one's critical infrastructure, including: financial services, transport intersections, energy source and power supply networks, has to go hand in hand with the protection of cyber space, which is a domain essential to the overall functionality of every state.

The determination to create a more effective and engaged Alliance, which was articulated through NATO‟s new Strategic Concept, is now also reflected in the domain of cyber security. Today, vaguely described emerging threat of cyber attack or cyber terrorism receives as much attention as the proliferation of ballistic missile technology or instability spreading from weak states. However, the strategy of tackling cyber security shortcomings and bringing the vulnerability of cyber space to the lowest possible level means to often confront untraceable attackers equipped with unconventional tools, which require a wise and well adjusted approach.

Given that there are no borders in cyberspace, the defence mechanism has to be tailored accordingly making NATO encounter several challenging aspects. Since cyber attacks cannot be approached in terms of classical military actions, conventional response mechanisms, in the framework of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, is excluded. The NATO Summit in Lisbon did not clarify the appropriate response in such a situation; including whether the application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or Article 51 of the UN Charter would be justified. Providing that the detection of the attackers would be more likely than the actual experience suggest, we hardly ever talk about the perpetrators of state quality but individual actors or groups which means that making states accountable for such a crime is not very probable.

Considering that the equipment required for carrying out a cyber attack of a devastating volume can be purchased for a symbolic amount, with a minimal chance of effective detection, limited resources have to be wisely allocated. Another promising area, where NATO is most likely to become a floor for cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region, is cyber-intelligence sharing. While being aware that the sharing of information among nations can be a delicate issue, the universal mechanism for cyber-intelligence sharing is not expected to be developed at once and without compromise. As often stressed by analysts dealing with cyber security, it is a paradox that creating virtual networks designed to share information among states in order to minimise the potential impact of cyber-attack, makes it an ideal target for such an attack, exposing each state even to more vulnerability.

Another aspect that cannot to be neglected is the exploitation of cyberspace by criminals carrying our conventional crimes and terrorist attacks. As far as their actions are concerned, the distinction has to be made allowing for an adequate response.

The twenty first century brought a whole new set of challenges which need to be addressed with a completely new set of tools and mechanisms, many of which have not been developed yet. No doubt, cyber security is one of them.

Guiding questions:

 

SESSION 1: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN BELARUS

The recent crackdown following the presidential election in Belarus on 19 December 2010 has underlined the urgent need to revise Western policy towards Belarus. Although the EU and the US have tried both isolation and engagement, Alexander Lukashenka has been ruling in Belarus for the last 16 years. The falsified election result in December led 15,000 protesters on the streets of central Minsk. What was supposed to be a peaceful demonstration became a violent protest likely due to instigation of agent-provocateurs. Thousands of Belarusian citizens were beaten and dispersed, more than 600 were arrested, including several presidential candidates, and 33 still remain in prison, facing long sentences.

This is not how it was meant to be. Although a completely free and fair election could not have been expected under the current regime, the campaign was conducted in a relatively liberal atmosphere allowing for the registration of all opposition candidates and enabling them to promote their views on TV or on the radio. However, any previous progress has been undone by the authorities‟ response to the post-election protests.

In addressing the situation in Belarus, the West could and should be principled. The status quo is no longer an option, since Belarus faces difficult challenges on different fronts - the economic crisis and its not particularly warm relations with Russia. Alexander Lukashenka is not necessarily as strong as he seems. However, as the failure of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine showed, a change of leadership does not always lead to a change of the system. Recent months have also shown that undemocratic regimes are all sitting on time bombs and that „eternal‟ presidents cannot forever freeze the status quo in their countries. People are increasingly longing for freedom in all its forms. The civil disobedience the world witnessed in Belarus, or in Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and Albania, cannot be ruled out in other parts of the world. It is time for the West to de-mystify Belarus by looking for a smarter and more consistent policy that be implemented with greater credibility.

Guiding questions:

 

SESSION 2: EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER: ARE WE HEADING TOWARDS A MULTIPOLAR EUROPE?

In 2010, two events took place to discuss the future of Europe‟s security. In November, members of the North Atlantic Alliance met to agree on a new strategic concept for the transatlantic alliance. As one of the outcomes, Russia was invited to broaden missile defence cooperation with NATO members. In December, fifty six states of the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe met in Astana to discuss the organisation‟s role in promoting security in the space from Vancouver to Vladivostok but the member states failed to agree on an action plan to regenerate the organisation. And so despite these two important summits, few responses have been generated to tackle the changing nature of European security.

Twenty years ago, European policy-makers saw the emergence of a NATO-centred and EU-modelled European security order as the natural outcome of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Many thought that American hard power would underpin the spread of European soft power: as the EU enlarged, its eastern and southern flanks would gradually internalise the concepts of the rule of law, mutual interdependence and shared sovereignty, and security would spread outwards. It was expected that even countries that were not prospective members of the two clubs would eventually be transformed into democracies and market economies and make Kant‟s "eternal peace" a reality. The ensuing years have challenged many of these assumptions. While its military power remains unchallenged, the United States has been tested and overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington is also increasingly busy working out its relations with rising Asian powers and is gradually leaving Europe to fend for itself. Meanwhile, the EU seems to have lost the will to enlarge further, causing frustration not only for the Western Balkans, but also Turkey, which is increasingly looking to become a regional actor on its own. Moreover, the financial crisis has undermined the EU‟s soft power abroad and the debate surrounding the Euro zone crisis has put in doubt the key principle of solidarity within the union. Although NATO member states have agreed a new strategic blueprint in November 2010, many argue that prevalent soft consensus and the allies‟ un-coordinated budget cuts may undermine the Alliance‟s role in Europe.

New answers to the challenges are therefore needed to prevent current disagreements and rivalries and the lack of co-operation between the various actors in an increasingly multipolar Europe from further undermining security in the Euro-Atlantic space. How can European states with different normative systems work together to prevent potential conflicts or emergence of a security vacuum?

Guiding questions:

 

SESSION 3: TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE ROLE OF CENTRAL EUROPE

The Cental Europeans have not taken to Barack Obama kindly. The Poles grumbled when the president rewrote George W Bush's missile defence plans. The Balts wondered if the US-Russia reset weakened in any way US commitment to NATO's security guarantees. In 2009, a group of eminent Central Europeans wrote an open letter complaining about the US president's policies for the region.

Fast-forward to 2011 Fast-forward to 2011 and Barack Obama seems to have won over some of his critics. There are fewer of those in Central Europe who fear a 'sell-out' - in large part because the US held numerous military exercises in the Baltic and, at Washington's urging, NATO prepared military plans to defend the region. Central Europeans seem more relaxed about the US-Russia reset, and about Russia in general - Poland is even having somewhat of a reset with Moscow of its own.  So does this mean that all is fine on the US-Central European front?  And what purpose does the relationship serve today, when most threats to the allies come from beyond Europe?

Guiding Questions:

 

NIGHT OWL SESSION 4: SORTING OUT THE NATO-EU COOPERATION

Almost ten years after the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was introduced, both NATO and the EU still seem to be lacking motivation for harmonising cooperation between field work and creating an effective framework. As defence budgets are being cut dramatically, harmonising cooperation between NATO and the EU and eliminating duplication of efforts becomes more important than ever. Representatives of each side need to realise that now is time to shift this issue from tactical convenience to a necessary part of achieving  real strategic partnership.

Currently, twenty-one European countries are keeping capabilities to meet the demands of the EU, NATO and for their national needs. This is unsustainable in the long run. Because of evident overlap in capabilities and possible defence gaps, incentives for a common NATO and EU defence planning process emerged. According to the current state of the EU and NATO relations concerning certain areas, such as the long lasting Turkey-Cyprus problem and the EU´s fear of losing autonomy in this area, these were rather ambitious.

The NATO-EU Capability Group was created as a compromise within the framework of cooperation between NATO and EU.  It meets every four to six weeks in order to discuss the formal coordination of capabilities coordination development. NATO and non-NATO states attend these meetings, often criticised for bringing few applicable results to the field. Again, obstacles are rooted in traditional areas: in this case the problem rests mainly on the different nature of competencies NATO and EU have in this area, absence of a formal agreement between NATO and EDA and Turkey's lack of formal arrangement with EDA. Additionally, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has recently expressed concerns about not involving Turkey more in European issues.

The current reluctance to address the political question of who should guarantee European security does not contribute to the steadfastness of the relationship between NATO and the EU. On the military level and respective capability development, a group of countries led by the UK remains committed to the dominance of NATO in the future. Another group, dominated by France, hopes for the supremacy of the CSDP as well as the development of purely European military capabilities. Today, the need for cooperation and complementary frameworks are more imminent that ever and countries must acknowledge that it prevails over political will. Otherwise, resources gained from constrained defence budgets are wasted and the accountability of both organisations suffers.

Guiding questions:

 

NIGHT OWL SESSION 5: ARAB WORLD UPRISING: WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE WEST?

What started as a local protest in a small but comparatively prosperous Arab country of Tunisia evolved into the most important historical power shift in the Arab World since the decolonization. And it's not finished yet! After a month of protests, Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fell after 23 years of rule. It incited Egyptians to oust one of the most powerful personalities in the Arab world. President Mubarak resigned only after 18 days of street protests. He ruled the country for almost 30 years and as a result Tahrir Square became world-known.

The European Union and the United States found themselves in a difficult dilemma. As the promoters of human rights and civil liberties, they had to support the legitimate demands of the masses while understanding that the consequences could destabilize a fragile Middle East and thus their interests as well. Now, Italy and other countries are uneasy about the situation in Libya. Information that Muammar Quaddafi has been using the country´s military, including snipers and fighter-jets, against the protesters does not necessarily mean that he has the situation under control. Benghazi is in the hands of revolutionaries and the protests have already spread to Tripoli.

To date: Hundreds and thousands have been killed, two regimes are overthrown and another is under heavy attack. This is definitely not the complete picture. Morocco, Jordan, Iran, Yemen and Iraq are also on the list. The Bahrain Shia population is calling for economic and political reform and even for an end of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa rule. In an unprecedented move, Bahrain has started to release political prisoners according to the opposition deputy.

Although this topic was not originally on the agenda, GLOBSEC Bratislava Global Security Forum, as the leading foreign policy and security event in Central Europe, could not neglect the most pressing issue facing the global community. Therefore we have included a Night Owl Session on the agenda at the last moment. Moreover, we have prepared a special GLOBSEC Policy Brief dealing with the situation and the consequences for the region, the West and the World. At the same time the topic will penetrate many of the discussions in the panel sessions and we believe that it will be interesting and inspiring.

Guiding Questions:

 

NIGHT OWL SESSION 6: UKRAINE: HEADING EAST OR WEST?

It was the Orange Revolution in 2004, which, due to mass protests over the falsified results of the presidential elections, suddenly changed the political course of Ukraine. Russia, for a long time keeping a vigilant eye over its historic and strategic interests in its "near abroad", was suddenly challenged by a new counterbalancing force from the West. For a moment, the victory of Mr. Yushchenko was internationally interpreted as a victory of the West over Russia, a victory for liberal democracy, pro-European and transatlantic values. But the evolution of the country's political orientation has been anything but linear.

From the time of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has been touted as a possible member of NATO. It has had gas disputes with Russia. Its governments have fallen apart and reformist forces have bickered between themselves. With President Yanukovich now in charge, relations between Kyiv and Moscow are currently going through significant change, not leaving much in the way of pro-Western orientation for the country.

There is, however, another view. Some say that Ukraine, traditionally torn between East and West, is not necessarily leaning on its realignment with Moscow, but delicately trying to balance between East and West and reassure its ruling cases that its interests are being respected. The question in this case then is what are the interests of Ukraine's ruling classes? The debate boils down to two points of view: the opposition argues against a lack of democracy; the government argues for increased stability.

What kind of strategy and policy towards Ukraine should Western countries adopt given that there is much more at stake than the geopolitical position of Ukraine alone? Looming large also are the issues of security in the neighbourhood, democratisation, free market economics, energy security and the promotion in the region of a corruption free zone.

For the EU, Ukraine is a primary partner country, and EU member states have a fundamental interest in promoting change there. It seems though that both sides have equal and opposite views of how the relationship should be constructed: the EU is interested in gradual economic integration and deepening of political cooperation; Ukraine is interested in deepening economic integration and gradual political cooperation.

Thus, the key challenge is to find not only the right balance between pressure and assistance in the direction of reform but also to diminish the cold war style of mutual communication based on accusations and suspicions. One actor that might contribute to a more constructive relationship is the Visegrad 4 grouping of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. All of the V4 countries have memories of the kind of transition to democratic, law-based market economics of the type that Ukraine aspires to acquire for itself. They are all neighbours or near neighbours of Ukraine and they are all members of the EU, making them ideal intermediaries.

The leaders of the V4 countries have pledged to be active in transferring know-how and assistance to help Ukraine on its way to economic and political stabilization.

Guiding Questions:

BREAK-OUT DINNER SESSIONS

A/ Climate Change: An Issue of National Security?

The purpose of this break-out dinner session is to outline broad security implications of climate change. The multinational security system based on the principle of collectivism cannot hinder the so-called butterfly effect (an intended or unintended environmental policy by one international actor or another may directly affect the environment of half of the hemisphere). The physical effects of climate change (droughts, floods, sea-level rise, lack of drinking water) are likely to not only have substantial social consequences (waves of migration, population disequilibrium), but also economic ones (fight for energy fuels), making many even well developed countries pay heavy costs of sudden inner economic disorders. The discussion also aspires to shed light on climate change implications for violent armed conflicts of a different kind. The political unrest of many African states proves that one cannot deny the capacity of the phenomena such as desertification, ecological degradation and scarcity of resources to generate political tensions. Having mentioned broad security implications of climate change, one would expect to classify cooperation and the international dialogue concerning this topic as a necessity. NATO's new Strategic Concept, as a leading document responding to 21st century security threats, however, deals with environmental issues only marginally and the Kyoto Protocol remains hampered by considerable world economies. Taking into consideration the graveness of the climate change implications, the EU stands today at the forefront of the international efforts to combat climate change. The DG for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) established in February 2010 (taking on a "climate change agenda" previously confided to the DG Environment of the European Commission) continuously seeks to find effective ways to undertake preventive measures, fight consequences and follow international and domestic actions to meet its targets for 2020 as well as to develop and implement the EU Emissions Trading System.

B/ Nuclear Policy of NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Security

As it is explicitly stated in NATO's new Strategic Concept, the Alliance remains committed to the goal of creating conditions for a world without the nuclear weapons - but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. Such a statement, partially questioning the initial drive of President Obama for a multilateral nuclear disarmament, creates an atmosphere of double standards in the eyes of many observers. The first sign of the nuclear duality might be linked to the quest for a safer world in accordance with the goals of the NPT Treaty. However, the parallel existence of nuclear arsenals, decisive global actors still encourage proliferation of nuclear weapons and WMDs, which is very acute in some of the world's most volatile regions. A second aspect not to be underestimated is the deterrent factor of nuclear weapons to which NATO adheres as to its overall strategy. Deterrence itself as a determination to maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces as an inevitable precondition of deterrence is another argument often skilfully used to increase one's armaments. The nuclear disarmament road can only be paved through a common NATO - Russian engagement on the verifiable reduction and consolidation of non-strategic nuclear weapons across Europe. What does it take to find a mutually accepted binding agreement on the future of the ballistic missile defence? Moreover, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons still remain deployed in five NATO countries and NATO's new Strategic Concept leaves the door open for their full removal. Several NATO member countries have called for a review of NATO's nuclear weapons policy or explicitly suggested their withdrawal from Europe. Taking into account the different qualities of the current political climate, there is a necessity to address the question of the justification of these weapons. Today, NATO includes many countries of the former Warsaw Pact, Russia is now an "official" NATO strategic partner and European countries where nuclear weapons are deployed adhere to the NPT Treaty. Last but not least, talking about European space leaves another question unresolved - the retention and updating of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and a way to return Russia to the treaty regime.

C/ Defence Cooperation after the Crisis

The recent economic and financial crisis has hit many countries severely, making them substantially reconsider their budgetary expenses. Defence budgets, of course, have not remained untouched. Indeed, the requirement to make extensive savings implies the necessity substantially to rethink the viability of previous strategies and systems. New limits to spending on public procurement and changes to central defence programmes can be observed in many European countries. The Strategic Defence Review of Great Britain proclaims a reduction in the country's defence budget by eight percent over the next four years. France has announced a four percent defence budget reduction by 2013. Dramatic reform of the armed forces has been announced in Germany. Other NATO European countries who have been failing to allocate two percent of GDP to defence to meet NATO commitments, will next year be struggling to allocate over one percent. The cost cutting measures appear to be even more important given the fact that they are being undertaken at a time when the Alliance is adjusting to its new security environment.

NATO's recently approved new Strategic Concept not only confirmed NATO's essential commitments embodied in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but also strengthened the Alliance's position as security guarantor against modern threats, and formalised its role in crisis management. Greater engagement and the ambitious Lisbon objectives, however, are encountering the double challenge of dealing with defence budget cuts and bolstering the political will to achieve stated objectives. With burden sharing already a concern within the Alliance, further cuts to European defence capability could bring additional strains to both NATO and the transatlantic relationship. However, the budgetary pressure and consequent defence cuts do not necessarily need to have negative implications. The momentum created by the cuts may yet boost the incentives toward collective defense approaches and lead to effective multinational solutions.

D/ Energy Security form the Visegrad Perspective

Recent months have been perhaps the most dynamic time in the history of the energy landscape for Visegrad countries since the 1970s when they had begun their long run for cooperation in this field. This time has brought the push for "green" energy and (at least verbally) nuclear energy, which have created a number of new opportunities and challenges. Political determination has been strong; it pushed for investments into cross-border gas transit infrastructure, created new demand for investment into "green" energy, and the announcement of increasing the capacity of nuclear plants or building new ones. However this has raised a number of questions. The Visegrad countries have formed the most important transit corridor for natural gas from Russia to stable and affluent European customers. In the context of the recent economic downturn, the prices of spot-market gas have undercut long-term take-or pay contracts; which has put Central Europe, with its undeveloped gas market, in a worse position than before. While prices of natural gas have recently been significantly lower in the Western Europe, Eastern EU member states were not able to enjoy the same price saving. The reason, many believe, is the lack of physical interconnectors and alternative suppliers. This explains the recent political pressure to build the so-called "North-South" interconnector, which should play a crucial role in the future. Additionally, the European Commission has started showing its muscle, as evidenced by efforts to catch the missed train of non-implemented legislation by litigation. There certainly is plenty of room to push, not for new legislation, but for implementing the existing one. The spreading of intermittent "green" sources in Central Europe has not only created bizarre sightings of "solar farms" in the north of Carpathian Mountains, windfall profits for (in some countries few and privileged) lucky investors, but also upward pressure on customer prices and worries for grid operators about how to assure a stable supply of electricity, when the wind does not blow, the sun does not shine and people still want to watch their evening reality-show.

SESSION 5: EASTERN PARTENRSHIP 2.0

Lounched in 2009, the Eastern Partnership aims to promote greater political and economic convergence between the European Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. While it may be too early to judge whether the initiative has brought the desired results (given the changes taking place in the region) it is timely to take stock of these developments and look at how the Eastern Partnership can achieve its original objectives within the context of these changes.

For the past seven years, the EU has gained more presence in the region than ever: it is now the biggest trading partner for all eastern neighbours with the exception of Belarus. The Union has deployed teams of advisors to different state institutions and election observers; the EU now helps monitor the border between Ukraine and Moldova and has a monitoring mission in Georgia. However, despite EU's increased presence in the region, the Eastern neighbourhood doesn't look any more like EU now than it did seven years ago. In fact, democracy, freedom of media and freedom of assembly deteriorated.

Compared to three or four years ago, the present situation is different: the democratic momentum in the region has not stopped for good, but it has certainly paused. Positive developments in Moldova have been outweighed by continuing repression of civil society in Belarus or Azerbaijan. Four out of six countries in the region suffer from protracted conflicts (in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia), and the prospect of instability continues to hamper economic growth.

While a few years ago there was much talk of EU's and Russia's competitive neighbourhood, today, the region is witnessing the arrival of more actors including China and Turkey. At the same time, the US has eyes on Afghanistan, Iran and the rise of Asia and increasingly expects the EU to deal with its neighbourhood alone. Against the backdrop of these changes, is the EU's offer for its neighbours, embodied in the Eastern Partnership initiative, still attractive?

Guiding Questions:

SESSION 6: TWO YEARS AFTER U.S. - RUSSIA RESET: RETHINK OR CONTINUE?

In March 2009, US and Russian foreign ministers pushed the reset button together in Moscow. Half a year after the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, both ministers symbolically breathed fresh air into mutual relations. Time was ripe for switching from overload (peregruzka) to reset (perezagruzka) between two prime powers and UN Security Council Permanent Members. Since then, remarkable common ground was found in 2010:

What is more, the warming of US-Russia relationship was strengthened by Russia's change of pace in cooperation with the Alliance. In 2009, Russia agreed to allow the US and NATO to deliver non-lethal supplies through its territory to Afghanistan, and a common NATO-Russia evaluation of security threats was launched at that time. Since 2008, NATO Secretary General, President Barack Obama, Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have all made their way to Russia and talked to Russian elites, opinion makers and university students to explore both common ground and differences.

These discussions helped to unite opinions between American, Russian and European leaders on what the future of the Euro - Atlantic security, with Russia´s inclusion, will look like. Several months earlier, the American and Russian presidents met with Allies on the ground of NAC in Lisbon to launch a review of a joint missile defence, which is to be prepared by June 2011.  Historical participation of Russian President Medvedev at the Alliance's highest forum and discussions with the Alliance's leaders brought fresh incentive to mutual US- Russia and NATO- Russia relations that materialized in NATO - the Russia Joint Statement on November 20, 2010.  One may say that a two- year period of reset was eventually crowned by the approval of the New START Treaty both in the American (House of Representatives and Senate) and Russian (State Duma) legislative bodies by the end of last year.

Despite having bright perspectives, several major issues between the US and Russia remain unsolved. Elites both in the US and Europe still remember Russia's military exercise to simulate a landing and nuclear attack on Poland almost two years ago. US support of NATO enlargement, the lack of agreement between NATO and Russia when it comes to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the nuclear program of Iran, the future of democracy in CIS states and the strengthening of both trade and military cooperation with China and India, will be also be the focal points of both the United States and Russia in the years to come.

Guiding Questions:

SESSION 7: NATO AFTER LISBON: WHAT LIES AHEAD?

The NATO Lisbon Summit took place at a critical time for the Alliance. Not far short of a decade since the beginning of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, NATO is trying to work out the transition to Afghan lead responsibility for security. At the same time, while in a struggle to find a common vision for a new array of threats and while drawing new outlines for NATO-Russia cooperation, president Obama's handling of the relationship with Central and Eastern Europe has caused some allies to question the credibility of the Alliance and its core purpose.

Moreover, a wave of fiscal austerity has swept across Europe, putting enormous pressure on defence budgets. This has put additional strain on NATO, especially over transatlantic solidarity and burden-sharing, thus putting at risk the principle of collective defence - NATO's core mission.

Nevertheless, the NATO Lisbon Summit was a success in many ways. NATO's New Strategic Concept, the first adopted in the new millennium, succeeded in reaffirming the core mission of the Alliance - to serve as a guardian of transatlantic security and to provide a platform for security dialogue no matter what kind of challenges the new non-conventional asymmetric threats might bring.

At the same time, the Alliance committed itself to undertake a wide array of new missions. The Allies decided to develop a new range of capabilities to effectively defend against ballistic missiles and cyber attacks while reaching out to other global players, including Russia, with the prospect of involving some of them (such as Australia, New Zealand or India) in NATO's operational decision-making.

However, in the middle of the so-called "defence depression", the Alliance is met with the challenge of doing more with less. Thus, Secretary General Rasmussen's calls to spend smarter, to focus more on specialization and prioritization and to reduce the inefficiencies in NATO-EU defence collaboration.  This all represents a challenge that cannot be neglected if we are to meet our Lisbon commitments in the years to come.

With an ongoing mission in Afghanistan, a widening gap in the equity of burden sharing, and shrinking defence budgets, the summit, however, has left many questions unanswered. The discussions on cooperation in missile defence with Russia, for example, are expected to bring tensions which will temper the post-Lisbon enthusiasm resulting from NATO-Russia rapprochement. Thus, NATO post-Lisbon is now faced with its biggest challenge yet - how to gather sufficient political will and allocate the limited resources of NATO allies to carry out the missions they have already agreed to take on.

Guiding Questions: