TRINE FLOCKHART: Liberal democracy is driving force of NATO

NATO has been playing a crucial role in current interstate relations and is gradually becoming more accessible to the countries of the East. Dr. Trine Flockhart defines the main policy of NATO concerning its basic values and global partners.

Trine Flockhart: Senior researcher, Head of research unit, Research unit on Defence and security, (DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES)

Dear Dr. Flockhart, it is obvious that NATO with aspiration of a global actor needs to have also global partners. Which actors can we identify as global partners that NATO can count on? (states,alliances, organisations)

When you say „to count on“, do you mean in a operational sense or do you mean the oparational sense, because you need to distinguish between them. In terms of a formal sense it is probably the actors that either already are members or have Membership Action Plans with NATO. But the others, and here I think about the global partnership countries or the contact countries like for example Australia, South Korea, Brazil, New Zealand, I think "to count on" would probably be quite a strong word because that would be dependent on what the issue is at stake. Those countries are not interested in signing up for NATO membership or make a commitment to NATO. But they are interested in taking part in NATO operations where they see a moral need for participation or where they have an interest at stake. So will Australia become a member or a global partner of NATO? I doubt it very much. But, Australia plays an important role in Afghanistan, which it would anyway – whether it was a NATO operation or another multilateral operation. They play a role in Afghanistan, because they have an interest in doing so and because they share a concern about Afghanistan. Whether they would do the same in a different operation - I am doubtful.

NATO is structured organism – is it always able to react flexibly and on time to asymmetrical threats? (regarding to a difficulty of consensus)

Well that is what NATO aspires to do, because most of the threats that are regarded as the main threats are asymmetrical. They are for example piracy in The Horn of Africa, terrorist threats, or threats from failing states. And then there are the less obvious threats like for example energy security or cyber defence. So all of those threats are by definition asymmetrical. The days of the Cold War where you had two alliances facing each other in a symmetrical way are gone. So yes, I think that is certainly what NATO is aiming towards being able to do. But even if the threats are asymmetrical, there still is a need for some degree of symmetry in NATO For example if you look at Afghanistan, there is a serious problem there in an asymmetrical sharing of risks. Some countries have national caveats and some countries are pulling a heavier load in Afghanistan. So there is an asymmetry that is unhealthy. I do not know whether this answers your question. Asymmetrical threats are what NATO is dealing with now.

At Young Atlanticists Summits in Budapest you spoke about common values that are driving force of the alliance. In your opinion, what do these values stand for?

Values like that refer to liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is the main value that unites NATO. But you can also talk about some other values like for example human rights, tolerance, and adherence to a market economy. If I had to state precise ones, I think it would be those that are defined in the Copenhagen Criteria, which is not NATO but the EU. It is what defines the core values of the Alliance. So democracy, human rights, respect for fundamental freedoms and adherence to a market economy – those would be my four main values. But there has been a development, this has not always been that clear because, of course, if you go back in NATO’s history and look at the definition of NATO’s values during the Cold War, then it was freedom. It could not be democracy because countries such as Portugal Greece and Turkey were members although they were not exactly democratic. So democracy has become a fundamental value but it is quite new. Before that it was freedom, which basically meant “not being communist”.

What do you expect from the April 2009 NATO summit? Will the Membership Action Plan of Georgia and Ukraine have been solved by then?

I think so – in the sense that one way or another there has to be some clarity. It may be that the events in Georgia have pushed the agenda so that both countries will get a Membership Action Plan. It may also create so much disagreement that actually is impossible to reach any agreement, but at least there will be clarity about that then. But my opinion at the moment is that yes, there will be MAPs forwarded to those two countries and full membership to Croatia and Albania at the same event. But having said that, this is a very important summit because it is the 60th anniversary there is a lot of pressure on NATO to tell a good story. The problems that will not be solved that are “high profile” would be for example the fact that there is a problem about risk sharing for example problems that I was talking about before. If there is a feeling before the summit that there cannot be agreement reached on those Membership Action Plans, then it will somehow be downplayed and disappear into a very large agenda. It will be s very important for NATO to focus on some of the positive things such as the return of France to NATO’s Integrated Military Structure. That will be the major thing, along with the invitation of the new members – Croatia and Albania. Just for the sake of concentrating on something positive. Also the so called Atlantic Declaration will be a big thing. It is the beginning of a process that will be leading to a new strategic concept. NATO will have a document that can explain both internally to the Alliance, but also externally to the European and North American public what it is that NATO does. It is going to be a new strategic concept but also a document that is going to be readable and easy to understand.

What about ESDP? Do you perceive it as an exclusive European rival of NATO?

In some ways I think it is a rival. Not so much in what it does because the ESDP does something completely different. I mean, you cannot compare ESDP and NATO because the ESDP does very small missions. But what is good about doing small missions is that it can claim success. It has taken part in five military missions so far and has been quite successful in them. But NATO’s missions are much bigger and much more demanding – Kosovo and especially Afghanistan are huge and NATO is not able to claim success in the same way that the EU does. Yes, Kosovo was a kind of success but there was no final agreement signed about its status, and that made it impossible to claim success. And regarding Afghanistan, we cannot even say what is a success there. That puts NATO in a weak position compared to the EU, because there is a public perception that the ESDP is dynamic whereas there is a perception that NATO is in a crisis of identity and still cannot recover from the Kosovo and the Iraq crisis. On the other hand, EU has a big problem with the Lisbon Treaty. But on the operational level, the EU is able to tell a more positive story. For example, in the talk we just had where the Swedish ambassador compared the NATO Response Forces with the EU Battle Groups. On the surface they do look quite similar but it is often overlooked that in case of the European Battle Groups we are talking about very small units – about 1500 people, whereas when talking about the NATO Response Force, we are talking about a much larger unit – about 25.000. So that is completely different in terms of scales of operations and it is a little bit unfair to compare them.

Do you think that NATO did enough in the August crisis in Georgia?

What is enough? NATO can never do more than NATO can agree amongst all 26 members and that is what we always have to remember – NATO is an organization based on consensus. So if all 26 can only agree on repeating what was said at the Bucharest Summit, that Georgia and Ukraine “will become members”, then that is as far as NATO can go. So it is difficult to say whether they did enough. And it is also difficult to say if the situation would be different if Georgia had had the Membership Action Plan. Who can tell? It is a rhetorical and a very theoretical question. It may have been. If you look at the analyses, especially of Saakashvili being the kind of person he is, which is not a very predictable kind of person, then he probably should have had a much clearer message from Bucharest and in its aftermath. In the time between the Bucharest and the August crisis he had certain messages particularly from the American administration, which may have led him to overestimate the support that he would get from NATO, thinking that the Americans would decide the agenda more than they actually could.

Can Georgia play a role of a potential partner in the Alliance despite immature action of the Georgian political leader Saakashvili during Russia – Georgia conflict?

Georgia certainly has some work to do. And this is where the dilemma is for NATO, as well as the reason why they were not offered a Membership Action Plan in Bucharest. Obviously, when you start a process of integration of a country such as Georgia into the shared values and practices of NATO, then NATO’s influence will be bigger the longer you can keep the process going before membership is granted. Once membership has been granted to applicant countries their eagerness to comply with the demands of NATO tends to drop significantly. NATO knows that so it prefers a longer process. Georgia has come a long way, but it is certainly not there yet. There is no doubt about that. It has a big potential but also some serious problems that it would need to solve. They will certainly get there but I am afraid that the instability of the region may mean that they will be accepted quicker than would be good for them. It would be better to have a long, slow, relaxed integration process.

What importance is being posed on future of Georgia by European powers, especially France and Germany? Are they willing to sacrifice their more positive attitudes towards Russia?

I think this is difficult to say, I think there is a lot of reevaluation and reflection about Russia going on at the moment , so I am not in the position to say. But you have to be very careful about constructing an idea of Russia as being a threat. We have to have a constructive relationship with Russia. On the other hand, you have to have a relationship that is based on the values that everybody agrees with. As to Germany and France , they are very different and in this instance they have very different interests. Germany is very dependent on energy from Russia so it will be very careful about damaging its relations with it. Other countries are in a more relaxed position regarding energy supplies so they can more freely state what they think. Germany is a very special case. The other thing is of course that Russia is quite “fed up” because if we look at the recent history, their considerations have not been taken into account. Like for example in Kosovo, where Russia did not get their views heard.