New Challenges - Better Capabilities

Pavol Demeš:

Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen,

it is really an honour to welcome all of you in Bratislava. My name is Pavol Demeš and I work for the German Marshall Fund, running in Bratislava office since 2000. For those of you who do not know the place where we are now. Before and shortly after the Velvet revolution this was the main plenary hall of Slovak Parliament. Shortly after we needed bigger one and now parliament is on the hill next to the castle. Also I think that in this very room, several of you probably remember that in 2000 we had a conference organized by Jeff Gadminden. It was just shortly after Slovakia was not included to NATO because of political problems which we had in this country and in 2000 we were dreaming about period that we will catch up with Poland, Czech Republic and Hungarian join alliance, which we did in Big Bang NATO enlargement eventually in Prague. Also in this room in between 2000 and now there were numerous meetings when we were discussing outstanding challenges for this country. But what gives me particular pleasure that we are not discussing Slovakia's issue today here, but the most pressing and challenging issues of transatlantic alliance and I think that being a Slovak, one can not be happier that so many outstanding experts from all over the world came and we are going to discuss challenges ahead. Secondly I am particularly happy that this conference is organized by NGO in cooperation with governmental partners Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Slovakia just shows how long way we went that there is concept of public private partnership which throughout the years evolved as a natural thing in this country. And most of all Slovak Atlantic Commission is run by young people. That is why one can see different format, different energy and I wish that this conference which we are starting with this 1st panel would be a little energizer and probably inspiration for NATO defence Ministers who just starting very serious discussion on future of security architecture in Transatlantic family. Now as far as the 1st panel is concerned, we are going in following format. At the beginning we will have introductory speech by Minister of Defence of Latvia H.E. Imants Liégis, who will give us his views on NATO strategic concepts 60 years on what is today meaning of Article 5. After that we have 3 excellent panellists who will look at this topic from different angles, angles of their perspective since… And we will go in this order, first I will ask Johannes Binnendijk from National Defence University in Washington well known expert who wrote numerous pieces on the topic which we are discussing today and I will ask Hans to frame the debate. Then I would like to ask Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Chairman of the board of Euro-Atlantic Association of Poland, Warsaw. Janusz used to be Defence Minister, parliamentarian well known pre89 Solidarity activist but now with NGO, so if Janusz would give us his perspective on the topic briefly. And last but not least Kim Traavik, Permanent Representative of Norway to NATO. Kim is living in town, when all these debates are now boiled, so if he would than conclude before we will open the floor for your comments, questions and in second part if technology will work we will pick few questions from our young colleagues in various cities. With these I would like to ask Minister of Defence of Latvia if he would be so kind to open up our first panel. Minister, please take the floor.

H.E. Imants Liégis:

Thanks very much. Mr Chairman and dear ministerial colleagues, your Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a real pleasure and I thank the SAC for inviting me to address you today and to make some opening remarks on this first panel that we are having. The last time I was in Bratislava was really in the run up to the Big Bang that the chairman refers to. Because that time we were together with Slovakia and 8 other aspiring members of NATO, we had this group called the Vilnius 10 and we were aspiring to join this great organization and – let us not forget - that the events that have happened since then, our joining the Alliance have in fact been great success and important success for the Alliance itself. Because not least it has quelled the room as of an early demise of the alliance foreign the end of the Cold War. I am particularly pleased to be speaking to non governmental audiences as well because I was involved this. Previously I was Ambassador of Latvia to NATO, the time we were aspiring to join and I helped set up NGO in Latvia, which supported Latvia's integration to the Alliance and during last few weeks I had the privilege to address the Atlantic Council in Washington and the Baltic Defence College in Tartu in Estonia, specifically on his issues relating to the new Strategic Concept and Article 5. So, I would like to perhaps, first of all, focus specifically on the Article 5 question because I think that is the core. Then I will say few words also about the Strategic Concept element of these discussions. We are looking what is today's meaning of Article 5. And I think the starting point for the discussion has to be the event of the 11th September 2001 and the reason I said that because of course on the 12th September 2001 the NAC met in Brussels and subsequently we had the first indication, the first use of Article 5. Article 5 had slept peacefully during 52 years during the Cold War but very unexpectedly it was invoked in circumstances that were not expected at the time of the attack on USA and it was subsequently invoked, so I think this is important to remember and use it as the starting point. When we looked what the Article actually means today. And I think quite clearly when the NAC met on the 12th September it referred in its statements to NATO's commitment to collective self-defence. And here there were 2 elements, there was the success of NATO and collective defence during the Cold War period and then there is a reference to a new risk of the security in particularly terrorism which, of course, had already been referred to in a previous Strategic Concept that was adopted in 1999 and was referred to by the Washington Summit of 1999. But I think this dual interpretation of Article 5 and NATO's raison d’aitre is not necessary mutually exclusive so, I would argue that we still have the importance of the Cold War issues such there and no less the importance of the new threats to security that we face, because we have to remember that regrettably since 11th September we have also had some incidents which lead back to Cold War connotations and when I say that I am thinking of, in particularly, 2 specific incidents. The first of these is Russia’s military attack on a sovereign neighbouring country Georgia in August of last year which was using a pretext of protecting its nationals in Georgia and essentially this event changed the security situation in Europe. It was a heart back to many of us at least in Europe to remind of Cold War period and what is interesting that there wasn’t any accident since that has happened 9.11 which reminds us of this Cold war period. Another incident which just took place few weeks ago was the large military manoeuvres that took place on NATO’s border. They were held between Belarus and Russia - 12500 troops being involved. Quite clearly NATO plays in last month using a highly political scenario. So these 2 incidents in particularly I think this reminds the rational of the Article 5 as we knew it pre 9.11. and still really out there. However they have quite rightly being a focus on the non traditional threats to security since the Article 5 has been invoked and I think that’s right that event of 9.11. helped to clarify the meaning of the Article 5. We have anyhow listened what had Secretary General George Robertson said at the time. He said that the Article 5 was invoked to express political solidarity with US and secondly it was invoked to send a clear message to terrorists that we are prepared to face collectively. So, this solidarity and this collective preparation to face the threat were important clarification of what Article 5 actually meant in practice. When we think about that, this is perhaps exactly going on in Afghanistan today, where we collectively, all members of the Alliance, are dealing with the threats to security that were posed initially by terrorism on the 11th September 2001. So, this shows there are some very practical implications of Article5 and that it hasn’t just been theoretical article. It’s been used in practice; it was used as an element of détente during the Cold War period. Nevertheless I think this is important, right that NATO has done this, continuous to show quality, clarity, ferns and strength these very uncertain times. For Latvia I would say that the importance of the meaning of the Article 5 does relate to the whole question of assurance. We feel more assured by being a member of alliance; we feel that the collective defence aspect of the Alliance is important, the Article 5 is very important. So, it is like really an insurance policy that we help. We can find when the time is… if the time arises to use insurance policy it will be stuck somewhere deep in a drawer and, of course, as I said we hope that we never need to take out the insurance policy. At the same time this insurance policy is quite something that is with any insurance policy self evident, you know it is there in the event that it is needed, and moving from assurance to insurance I want to come to the whole question of reassurance. Because, as we know, reassurance is one of the elements that is being considered in a context of the new Strategic Concept. And perhaps I can just move away a little bit from the Article 5 and say a few words about the Strategic Concept. I must say that at the beginning of my comment that a lot of what I say I owe a debt to Hans Binnendijk, who will be the following speaker because we had a useful discussion when I was in Washington 3 weeks ago about this whole question of various Rs which will appear in a discussion concerning the Strategic Concept. So the first area which is important for us is one of the reassurances that I have mentioned because it’s the reassurance of collective defence in Article 5 that should really be a central part also of the new Strategic Concept. It’s right that the current Strategic Concept already covers these issues in many ways. And I don’t think we need to actually reinvent the wheel. I think it’s very important to remember there is a lot of what should be taken from the current Strategic Concept. They should be carried on into the new one and it’s good starting point in a context. But it’s probably also right that the different member states within the alliance of 28. How different perceptions in whether Slovakia or not will have the same perception about Article 5 and the importance of reassurance would be interesting to see during the debates we are going to have during these couple of days. However we feel that the reassurances through collective defence should be glue with that continuous to hold alliance together. But along with reassurances come responsibilities. This is another R and Minister Lajčák in his opening address stressed the importance of responsibility for all the members of the Alliance. I want to say that, as far as Latvia is concerned, and there is no question that Latvia fulfils its commitments to NATO. We take very seriously the responsibility that comes with the membership in the Alliance. As Minister of Defence I have also to grapple with substantial cuts in the defence budget this year and also moving into 2010. But the government has taken the priorities that I as a Minister of Defence have promoted concerning Latvia’s responsibilities. The first of those is responsibility to continue our engagement in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. At the current level we have 174 troops currently serving in Afghanistan. In the year that’s even when there are going be requests from the USA for the increases in troop contributions, that we are able to continue at a current level. So, that has been very important. What have just also been the cases that commitment to Afghanistan in many ways is an explanation of eternally Latvian rational collective defence and the Article 5. That is the main priority engagement in Afghanistan, our continuing engagement in Afghanistan which was the part of the current government declaration when it took offices in March this year. The second priority that the Minister of Defence has enunciated is developing infrastructures for the allies to help only collective defence issues. Here in our countries, because we don’t have the air policing capability our allies assist us with the air policing of NATO territory in the Baltic states. We are in a process of also using NATO for our support, financial support developing an air field for allies use and as part of infrastructure in the Alliance. The third priority that we have enunciated is providing opportunities for important exercises together with our allies to take place on our territory, so Afghanistan’s infrastructure of an air field and exercises on the territory of Latvia. Those are 3 current priorities that we had lead out in a few of the constructs that we have financially. I know that there will be a separate discussion on the question of reengagement of partners with NATO in particularly reengagement with Russia. Perhaps I could just say that the Strategic Concept should not be a substitute for proper defence plans. It’s very important that there should be equal security for all of the allies. And I then think that it would be appropriate for the Strategic Concept necessarily to be used as a tool or substitute for defence planning for this necessary and an ethical part of the Alliance. We need to recall that NATO is a consensus organization, which in no doubt came out of this discussion. 9.11. showed how the allies are valid to preserve unity even though obligations as such are not an inherit part of Article 5. This political unity and solidarity needs to be carried through new Strategic Concept and the Alliance is quite clearly through the success and enlargement proved that it has a capability to adopt assist grows. So, thank you very much all and I leave the floor to the discussion.

Pavol Demeš:

Thank you very much Minister for laying the ground covering both pictures, but also zooming into country which is closest to your heart - Latvia. I think that it was very useful to see multiplicity dimension of challenges which we are going to discuss. Now I’d like to ask our 3 panellists to do it in 8 minutes each, to look at capabilities, Article 5, if from since all 3 of you deeply engaged involved both as advisors, people who follow for years this topic. We will start with Hans, who is also advising Madeleine Albright now in her new capacity. So Hans if you would look at a sort of macro picture of NATO, its concept, why capabilities in 8 minutes. Please take the floor.

Hans Binnendijk:

Maybe 9. Pavol, thank you very much and Mr. Liégis thank you for your plugging the floor, I appreciate that. I would like to step back in a talk a little bit and talk about the Strategic Concept in general terms and begin by noting that in the 6 decades of the Alliance’s history we have already had 6 previous Strategic Concepts. The first 4 focus very much on military affairs that only the last 2 that have moved to be answer security issues. That is 1991 concept from Rome and 1999 concept from Washington Summit. Look at that last 1999 concept, that’s actually a pretty good document. It did look forward to the last 10 years and got a lot of stuff right, but I think in addition to the fact it was sort of do for another one because 10 years up. There are 2 fundamental reasons why we need a new Strategic Concept. First, the environment has changed and secondly we’ve broken our consensus. The environment has changed in a following way. The Alliance lived through the Cold War, which was a bipolar international system. Then for the next 10 years, basically the years of the 90’s we lived through another international period which was more unipolar in focus. This is what is often called through “black” the better term of the post Cold War era. Now we are in another international system which is more multipolar. Naturally, the poles are of different strengths, but it’s multipolar. So, the environment itself indicates that we need a new Strategic Concept. Secondly, the consensus as we look at that new environment has broken in at least 6 ways. There are differences in opinion about Russia and where Russia is going. You go to Warsaw and get a view from Warsaw and you get one perspective. You’ve got to believe you got a very different perspective and this relates to Russian behaviour, Russian goals and Article 5 as well. Secondly, there are differences of view about Afghanistan. I think we all realize how important it is, but many believe that we have placed an existential threat, an existential bad on the operation in Afghanistan. So, the degree of commitment there is very important and there is also the question, if we will do other capable operation like Afghanistan and if we do have to prepare for them. Third, there are new challenges. We will be talking about many of them later today. These are near Article 5 challenges. It has to do with cyber attacks and it has to do with energy security. It has to do with climate change, even current terrorism, these are close to the Article 5 and we have to figure out how to do with them in our differences. I think the fourth place where the consensus has broken down is on the defence spending. USA spend over 4% of GDP on defence and it’s constant, doesn’t look like they are going to cut that much at least not intend to. You’ve got Europe and the average is about 1,5% of GDP being spent on defence and it’s going down. The fifth - there are differences about an enlargement, in what that process should go, to whom do extend Article 5 commitments. Key issues here are Georgia and Ukraine. The Alliance has agreed that sometimes they will be accepted but there are different stances in conditions when that may happen. Then finally there are differences about what you might call governance. Relationship with partners, can NATO have the ability to make crisis decisions at the time they’re needed. Now if you look back on the history of the Alliance, you will know, that we have been at the other point like this before, where we need to make it breakthrough, there are differences. We have done it before and we can do it again. So, we need a new process and that is the fact what exactly the Alliance has started. And in many ways the process is maybe more important than a final product and this conference is actually like part of that process. There are 4 official seminars that the group of experts will be holding. One has just been held last week in Luxemburg and there will be 3 more, but it will be other visits important from conference like this. That is the first stage which is called the reflection stage, that’s where we are now. And early next year we will be on a consultation stage where the group of experts will visit all 28 NATO’s capitals and begin a consultation process. Later next year will be a drafting stage. And out of there a new Strategic Concept will come, which is intended to be short, elegant and convincing. The bumper sticker there is that it should look more like the 1949 treaty and the 1999 Strategic Concept which was in fact sort of another communication. So, what would this Strategic Concept have to say and here is whatever also like a talk about so called 4 Rs and let me go through for you very quickly. Firstly, it is Reassurance of Article 5, we’ve talked about this already a lot, we have talk about it more. To me this is not expensive, these are things we need to do in terms of contingency planning, exercising,… but these are not things that are particularly expensive. So, the first are the reassurance of the Article 5. The second R is Responsibility and it has to do primarily in my view with, in my call reach, it is mission as strategic distance. These are the Afghanistans of the world. If NAC decides that the Alliance is too eng to strategic distance, so is their responsibility for all allies to participate and this is being tested now in Afghanistan. The third R is Resilience. This is near Article 5 missions. This is what we have mentioned, energy, cyber, etc. it’s the resilience of our society to withstand with these kinds of these attacks of our came over. And the fourth R is Reengagement and this is about Russia, but also about reengaging within the allies. It’s about new ways of consultation, decision making and reengaging with partners. So, these are the 4 Rs that I hope will serve as the basis for a coming together of the Alliance much as that in mid 60’s. My hope is that these 4 Rs or something like them can serve us as place where everybody will find home, everybody will understand that your interest are engaged here. Now 2 other quick points. How do we do this without money? If you haven’t noticed, the Alliance is not broke yet, but we are moving in that direction. There is a real research problem. So, how do we do this? I’d just say 2 things. We need stretch and connect, stretch and connect. We have to stretch the Alliance’s mission of Article 5 and other missions. So, the Alliance itself has to stretch its capabilities. We also have to connect to the other institutions like the EU, UN and OECD. Because they have a role-play, they all have a role-play as well. So, stretch and connect. The second thing is, we need to figure out how to do more with less, more with less and this is about multinational approaches. We have to pool our capabilities. We have to begin having national specialization on certain areas. We have to focus more on common funding. So, I think it is impossible that we do it with no money, but I think we can do it with limit advance. My final point would be about what the capabilities are. This is the conference about new challenges, better capabilities, but I think there are 4 basic capabilities that we need to focus on. And I’ll do this in a minute. The first is the capability needed to deliver Article 5. The second sort of capabilities relate to applicability, sustainability and usability. In my view, if the force is not applicable, it is not useful. Our forces need to be applicable and they have to be sustainable. So, that’s second major focus. The third focus I would say is command and control link to intelligence and surveillance. This to me is the core of the Alliance. It’s the military core of the Alliance. It’s the glue that holds the Alliance together. This is where we need to focus. If nations need a focus on making their forces deployable and sustainable, the Alliance itself needs to focus on C4ISR. And then the nations can come around that central focus. The fourth is called comprehensive approach. We all have heard about this but we have the last 2 or 3 summers talked about the comprehensive approach. We really haven’t done much, we need to move out. The comprehensive approach is about linking military capabilities to survival capabilities and upper ending together. It’s no secret that the only way we can be successful in places like Afghanistan is through this comprehensive approach. We all know that, but for a ray of reasons we have been not able to take the proper steps. So, I’d offer those as the 4 major capabilities, I think the Alliance needs to focus on. Thank you.

Pavol Demeš:

Excellent Hans. Thank you very much for laying grounds for this discussion. I think also that for our colleagues in Banská Bystrica, Brno and Warsaw. This will give us an opportunity to understand our discussion. Also I think that if we have checked the diplomats in audience until Vaclav Klaus sights the Lisbon treaty, don’t tell him that NATO will reach out to EU, because he may ask besides Beneš decree close to do that EU will be not ask by NATO to put money or ask EU to do something more. Now with this ironical comment I would like to ask Janusz , who is coming from the country where they are very busy today, and I understand since Januzs Onyszkiewicz by then apparently is in Warsaw trying to explain some things how USA is seeing new strategy towards our region but I do not want to take these as lead, probably it can be on your mind as well. Janusz Onyczkievicz.    

Janusz Onyczkievicz:

Thank you very much. After this general prologue I feel free to concentrate more directly on just Article 5 and let me remind you that when the Washington treaty was discussed. The commitments of countries to common defence which later became part of Article 5 were most controversial. There were certain precedents because it was not the first common security arrangement which was supposed to be discussed. Certain references during these debates were made to Rio de Janeiro Treaty, where USA together with another 20 American countries committed themselves to common response in case of an attack. That was probably the first time when this 3 musketeer’s principle “One for all, all for one” was actually anchored into the treaty. There was also another good example - the Brussels Treaty. Treaty which established what later became the Western European Union. This Brussels Treaty had Article number 4, which later became number 5, which was quite strong commitment of all countries to come to assistance - including also military side - in case of an armed attack. Well, that finally what has been agreed in Washington was an Article 5, which was lately weaker than the Article 4 of Brussels Treaty. And the result, the reason was that the constitutional construct of particular country was in some way limited. Famous part of the Article 5 says that the action will be taken by particular country; the action which is for this country necessary. That gave the impression that this is up to the desertion of the particular country to the respond in case of an armed attack. But the situation during the Cold War period was rather clear, because what kind of response would be, was totally and clearly stated in contingency plans. It was quite clear what response in case of attack comprised of. At that time it was a massive invasion on the side of Warsaw Pact armies. So, how the attack would be response, was absolutely clear. Situation which developed in Europe after 1989 created new challenges. It was a totally new situation. But let me concentrate on certain lessons, certain questions, which we should race after our experience of 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre. As it was said, already this attack was considered to be an attack on the USA, but Article 5 was invoked in a way which raises certain question, because what Article 5 actually says is that the Alliance has responsibility in a case of an armed attack. And this attack was not really attack by the arm forces, was not the attack using what classically would be considered as weapons. It was the attack where other means were used. So, the first question, which we should actually face is what is the meaning of the armed attack which is so critical for the understanding of the Article 5. Should we actually consider as it was actually done by NATO that armed attack is an attack which causes a major damage? But if so, then this is quite an open question and should be considered as civil cyber attack which could cause a very serious damage as an armed attack. So, the first question I think which we must actually face is to discuss and clarify what we understand under the armed attack. But this is not the only question which I think we should grapple with. The other question is this, no longer and major conflict in Europe is venial, nothing like sort of repetition of the situation, which was with us during the Cold War period. But recently, when we look at various military conflicts we see that basically. Most of the conflicts were of totally definite nature. If we look at what Israel was doing with Arabs, there were air raids. China had a military adventure with Vietnam. But in Abkhazia was a clear preventive action .These conflicts are of a limited scale and of limited duration. So, the question is what would be the response of NATO in case for example attack on one of the member states. What kind of the contingency planning would then be involved, because this attack is useless, because the attack will be probably completed before NATO would have time to respond? Should NATO in contingency planning take into account a possibility of vitalization and if so, what scale and what nature should it have? Well, these are the problems, which I think we should actually grapple with. And there is also the third problem, which is not again a little one. Article 5 is not the only security guarantee, which is in circulation. We still have the Brussels Treaty where is Article 5, which was renamed after the changes. It also gives member countries security guarantees, somehow stronger NATO’s guarantees. We also have a certain security guarantees in Lisbon Treaty. So, the question is how these other security guarantees and arrangements would fit into Article 5. And last question which actually the whole 9.11. situation rises is if the Article 5 was invoked are we committed to carry on the fight against terrorism. Does this open other commitments? Because we cannot declare that we won the war with terrorism. So are we going to live in definitely other Article 5 situation resulting from the decision of NATO following the events in New York and Washington or not? There are many questions. Some of them should be addressed obviously or could be addressed in the new security strategy. Some of them should be addressed in NATO practise in contingency planning. Some of them could be clarified in dialog with the EU, for example. And I think it is good time to actually try to address these issues which I tried to rise. Thank you.

Pavol Demeš:

Thank you very much, Janusz. And last but not least Amb. Kim Traavik. I had a privilege to meet Kim when he was Deputy Foreign Minister of Norway. And just to let you know, that since you have been with us here in Bratislava until Slovakia has joined NATO and EU. And even if Norway is not member of EU, we are getting very substantial, actually the most substantial support from NGO in this country from Norway. EU said we are members but Norway is generous and supports many projects in this country. But we are not going to discuss Norwegian contribution to Slovakia, but if I may ask you Kim if you could conclude this round of introductory remarks from your perspective, being permanent representative for your country in Brussels. When surely these days it’s very busy discussion about the New Concept after the new Secretary General came on stage. Please take a floor.

H.E. Kim Traavik:

Thank you, Pavol. Thank you for that and thank you for inviting me here. This is innocent and sometimes boring panel because we seem to agree about so much and about all. I agree with the most, but not everything that was said by Latvian Minister of Defence and Hans Binnendijk. In framing the discussion about the Strategic Concept and the important part that Article 5 placed in that context. So, I would limit myself like the previous speakers did. A few more so direct concrete points that partly relate to that have been mentioned also by those 2 spoke before me. 3 and half points. The first being half point, because it’s very basic one, very fundamental one that I think we all share. That is that Article 5 remains the tie that binds the Alliance together and that’s the important and the essential part of the work on the Strategic Concept. We need to make sure, that we do not weaken this tie that binds the Alliance together. It is of course an obvious point that it is exactly the fact that the Alliance is built on collective duty to defend against armed attack on members of the alliance that we practise collective defence that we have 24/7 capability for political decision making and consultation. That is the unique feature of the Alliance and it needs to be maintained and strengthened.

And when I say strengthen and that is my half point comes in, I agree largely with the way that Hans described it a moment ago. But I think it is fair to say, that the Article 5 would be the hardest to say that it has slipped from the radars screens all late, but it certainly has been the subject of denied neglect to a certain extent. Not so much among Slovakia and the other 11 countries, that have joined since 1999, but among the older more established members of the Alliance, who has to have a tendency to take the Article 5 for granted, perhaps because there was a tendency to paraphrase Francis Fukuyama that history had ended and arm conflicts no longer arise in the Euro-Atlantic area. So we need to be sure, that we get this right.

My second point, which is perhaps more fundamental point in view, or said it before, also is that we need to get better balance in this alliance between home and away as also Hans referred to in passing. The core function of the Alliance that we have to be focused on is that we must face an exceptionally challenging operation at strategic distance. That has to remain at the top of our priorities of our agenda for the foreseeable future. But we need to be able to focus more at the same time on the challenges that we face closer to home. There are many reasons for that. One of them causes intermediately link to the heavy commitment stand we have undertaken in Afghanistan and that we will presumably in the future continue to undertake in operations and considerable distance from NATO owned territory. That is that, if you want to explain to our public and to our parliaments, why we are undertaking those commitments, we also need to make clear to them, that NATO remains capable. Or undertaking the range of security needs our membership and that very much includes the needs that we have closer to home. And of course, paramount among those is the ability to retain the idea of collectively resisting any attack on the territory integrity of the member states.

My third point relates to how we will deal with the Article 5 set of issues in the context of the new Strategic Concept. Several speakers before me have referred to new challenges. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the climate changes, cyber defence, energy security. And there is the discussion that has already started, about how to deal with this or if we are to deal with this in the context of the Article 5. On this one I think we would plead for certain discussion. The very straight forward language on a Washington Treaty. To make it an all purpose, capture all paragraphs that would in an exhaustive fashion deal with all thinkable challenges, threats to our security.

That it seems to us, ladies and gentlemen, would entitle the risk of not strengthening although that would be a purpose of such exercise but rather of weakening, diluting and making less precise the content of Article 5. It seems to us at the same time of course it would be meaningless to deny, that Article 5 has to be interpreted, and has to be considered against the backward or changing security conditions, a changing security environment. They are all the facts that refer to come in to play. But I would simply leave it at this the question of what falls outside or inside article 5 has to be subject to a concrete evaluation in a concrete situation. It’s like the proverbial duck. If it quacks, if it walks like a duck, if it swims like duck, it probably is a duck and it is a political decision to be made whether not it is.

To the issue of the alliance’s deterrence policy, which also is something, that has a lot of bearing on the creditability on the article 5 and on the collective security, that this alliance is fundamental.

I think here we have to take as a point of the departure that the present wording of the present Strategic Concept speaks about deterrence as being a composed concept. There is a preferable reference to a appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities. And that has to be right. And that is likely to be the situation for long time. Not to extending President Obama speech in Prague few months ago, which we hardly enjoyed. But he also said, of course, that the vision of Global zero is on likely to happen in his lifetime and he is a relatively young man, as we all know. But the point I’m making is that NATO’s convention attendance have been reduced quantitatively, but they have enhanced and strengthened qualitatively. We have extremely strong conventional capabilities and they also are part of deterrence and an essential part of the Alliance’s deterrence policy. Which leads me to the conclusion that this being so and this being likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. We would be in the position of strength to engage constructively in nuclear disarmament in a responsible matter. There is no need to go through this argument to detail. We can get back to in the question of common stage of our panel, but simply to say from our point of view it would be important that NATO too chips in, in terms of making the global Zero vision of president Obama credible by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy as much as possible. And then we have to discuss what that means in actual fact and those discussions, ladies and gentlemen, are going to be a part of the work on the Strategic Concept.

Paul I’ll leave it at that I’ve mentioned my three and half points and if there are others that we need to get in to afterwards, I am ready to do it.

Pavol Demeš:

Thank you very much. Kim has concluded four excellent introductory presentations, which help us to see the broad picture and same really tough issues, which ministers of defence will be dealing with in Bratislava in coming days. We are now having about 30 minutes for the questions, comments from the audience. But in order to satisfy people, who are out there in Warsaw, Banská Bystrica and Brno, so we have three countries groups watching and participating. So if you allow me, I would ask first the Warsaw’s group to ask the question.

Question (Warsaw):

NATO is an organization consisting of 28 countries. NATO proclaims that the doors are open to additional new countries. So which countries and when could became the future NATO members? Thank you.

H.E. Kim Traavik:

There are many ways of responding that. Very, very important question. As we all know in Bucharest last year NATO has to states and government determined, that Ukraine and Georgia will become the members of the Alliance, in addition to know that several countries in the West Balkans are keen to join. Macedonia will join, ones the by-elected issue of the name of their state has been determined and then they will join as they have planned to do at Bucharest already. In addition we have Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, which have main plan to eventually become members. But the formal answer to this question is that this is a performed space process. Countries that have desires and attention to eventually become members of the Alliance need to do their homework, in terms of carrying out political, democratic and defence reforms that will eventually qualify them for the membership in the Alliance.

Hans Binnendijk:

It is hard to answer, to approve his answer. I would simply note, if you look at previous membership procedures and there are things that the nations, which became members, need to do, it is not a good idea to import the reeling security into the Alliance and there are some things, that have to be done to deal with that, there are defence reforms. You have to show degree of national support within your country before becoming a member of the Alliance. So, without getting it to one of the each country cases, I do think it is important for the Alliance to get a sense of what those criteria are that must be made. We are on the record to say that someday Georgia and Ukraine will become members. Question is when and what those criteria are.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz:

I would like to say that there is not much room for enlargement, because, you know, only European country is qualified for the membership, so we cannot even consider in such case, when for example Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan would pass through the final application. Unless there will be a change in Washington Treaty. But I hope, that the countries, which have been already invited to be joined will not share the fate of Turkey, which was been invited to join the European Union in 1964 and is still waiting. That it will not take so long. Obviously this country must sort out the problems; they must be seen as countries, which will contribute to the joint security, and not to diminish the joint security. And I hope that it will happen. Let us keep our fingers crossed.

Pavol Demeš:

Minister, are we bringing Australia to NATO or not?

H.E. Imants Liegis:

Well, NATO is an alliance for the Euro-Atlantic area. So I think the most obviously the importance of partnership with Australia and other partners is very important. I do not think that NATO is yet a global organization and the current members regarded it being a global organization. Certainly I agree with what has already been said about the next stages of enlargement as I mentioned in my address. Let us not forget that enlargement has been a success and it hasn’t hampered the work of the Alliance. Yes, the aspirants need to be responsible future members, as has been just said, and need to contribute to the security of the Alliance. I would  just like to say that vision of Georgia and Ukraine was that we do have the commitment for them to become members of the Alliance. Let us not forget that when we take the next step that some of the current members have came through giving them the Membership Action Plan. I think there should be willingness of looking and remembering the mechanism of the MAP rather than confining it to the declarations of the Bucharest summit. Thank you.

Werner Fasslabend - President of the Austrian sister organization of the Euro-Atlantic Society and at the same time longtime Defence Minister:

I like the four Rs, especially the fourth one which means this strategic aspect also towards Russia. But still I think we need the fifth one, because the problem that was mentioned already, the question about countries not being a member but having the right to develop just sovereign right to build an independents freedom and choice of alliances or memberships. This is something NATO should overtake because otherwise it will lose much of its substance also in the coming years. NATO was the guaranty for the European freedom and it should keep this position. Therefore I suggest a fifth R, which means regard and respond to the sovereign right of the European states and nations to take sovereign decisions for memberships in alliances.

My question is directed mainly to the Ambassador Traavik but I also invite others to comment and it is related to the issue you left opened - the practical measures to diminish to this alliance of nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy. As we all know in the present strategy, the nuclear weapons are not even it the back burner. So when we talk about the changes, two issues are coming to mind immediately. First no first use pledge, second withdrawal of the US tactical nuclear weapons and/or the end of nuclear sharing agreement. So would you see some of these things happening as a consequence of discussion on the new Strategic Concept, and what kind of message would it put to those who claimed that you know nuclear weapons still have a role in the insurance and reassuring the allies about the importance of the Article 5 that in the ultimate scenario nuclear weapons might be used by the allies. Thank you very much.

Milan Ježovica - Foreign policy analyst - M.E.S.A and the Member of the Board of the Slovak Atlantic Commission:

We are I think rightfully talking about the strengthening of the guarantees of the Article 5, but we are doing so at the time when the defence budgets are being cut and when direct economic situation is hitting all our countries and principally I would say that there is another thing which adds to that and that is inability of the political elite to spend the political capital on persuading the public that even in these direct conditions we have to invest more into our defence and into our security. And my question is, where do you think would come the push for this. Will it come from political leadership, and if so, which countries in the Euro-Atlantic area you see the leadership coming from, or in worst case scenario, will it come from the outside? I mean from the threat being translated into more immanent dangerous attack. Thank you very much.

Hans Binnendijk:

I am sure, we have room for many more Rs as well, but I take your basic point, we have the neutrals, European partners working together alternate ways with the Alliance and this also raises a question of Partnership for Peace more broadly and what becomes of it.

But, yes, I take your point on that; let me just quickly respond to the other points. On the nuclear issue, it does seem to me that whatever we do there we don’t do it unilaterally. No one really wants to talk about nuclear weapons in the Alliance very much today, but whatever we do, we need to do this very thoughtfully not unilaterally. We need to get something from Russia out of it as well, because they have a large number of non-strategic systems that we have to deal with. We also have to remember, that we are going to deal with another issue, which is, how to deter Iran, should Iran develop a nuclear capability? We have to put our decisions there in the context of deterring Iran. In front of the economic issue, you know, the USA spent 1,5 trillion dollars  in the last couple of years on economic bill in the stimulus package . And I think, you can see the result of that, removing back in the right correction. I just don’t think that European countries should take this global economic recession as an excuse to cut further. And, because I tell you, US’s patience is not endless and especially in the context of Afghanistan. It is not a warning but I just think we have to be careful now, you’re cutting too deeply.

Janusz  Onyszkiewicz:

I am afraid that the push to increase or to stop decrease in military spending may probably most likely come from outside. I do not think really, that it reveals on political determination, in our political leadership; I mean not in Polish but elsewhere too. To really risk the political capital in our race issue of major military race in military spending. I want to simply draw your attention to the fact that NATO is not only the military alliance. NATO is a whole system of various consultation, various forum, where not only security could be and should be discussed. There is NATO-Russia Council , NATO-Ukraine Committee, there is Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, there are other forums. So I think, that gives a certain opportunity to address issues of mutual concerns or regional concerns and result in Partnership for Peace. So I think that NATO is doing quite a lot. And now the issue of nuclear weapons. Well, I think that what is a bit worrying is the attitude to the potential use of nuclear weapons on the side of Russia. Because Russia decided to depart from a principal that Russia, early Soviet Union, whenever would use the nuclear weapon as the first. Well, the reason why this change was made is the sense of weakness of conventional forces in Russia and then opening the possibility to use nuclear weapons as first. But what is worrying is that information that leaks we can find in the press are true. Russian readiness to use nuclear weapons in local conflicts, in small conflicts, or even as a preventive instrument - this is quite worrying. I think that NATO’s attitude is not to be changed, but let me be absolutely frank. I do not actually think of the situation in which NATO - big alliance of democratic countries can use a lot of nuclear weapon in case of conflict. But let us also touch upon another issue, which I think should be also addressed. But nevertheless, some kind of security guaranties which will be given to Ukraine, when Ukraine was about to give up nuclear capabilities, because in exchange for this resignation, Ukraine was assured , that in case, nuclear weapons would be used as a threat to used nuclear weapons would be applied.   

Well, countries like Russia, United States and United Kingdom, if I’m not mistaken, would actually somehow address this issue. So, we may be involved also as main NATO partners as United States and United Kingdom. In the situation I hope not and there is nothing, which would indicate, this would be realistic scenario very hypothetically we can be involved in certain dilemma. How to respond in case of such scenario not realistic, but simply theoretically possible, what material releases.

H.E. Imants Liegis:

I wanted to touch the nuclear question but I want to make short comment and that is given that “nuclear weapons” doesn’t begin with an R. I do not think it goes into the debate on the Strategic Concept. Fundamentally, I think that we don’t think that it would be helpful if the question of nuclear deterrence weapons should go into the Strategic Concept. These discussions should be left out. I was pleased, that Hans said there is room for many more Rs, however, you know, they were referred by former Minister of Defence of Austria.

I think the important R should be the R of Readibility for the new steady concept. Hans mentioned that it should be based more on the 1949 Washington Treaty than the last Strategic Concept of 1999. I would also mention that I think a lot be said for looking, what the European Union has done to the European Security Strategy, because there is a very readable document and it was an important contribution to drafting of the European Security Strategy and I think  there are lessons to be learned about how the drafting should perceived. The engagement to the several sector nongovernmental organisations, let us make the readable and clear document. Thank you.

H.E. Kim Traavik:

If I may just one word on the question about partnership in the fifth R as it was called. And I think rejuvenating, strengthening our partnership is going to be the key part of the discussion about the Strategic Concept. And I won’t go deeply into that but just to say that, this has to be the prime objective of the process, if only because partners are becoming more and more important to us. It is not only a question what we can do for partners, but what they are doing and can do for us. So that will have to be very important consequence. On the nuclear issue, I don’t think I would like to go into the options that you eluded in a concept. I agree fully with Hans Binnendijk, that this has to be done in a negotiated way and that is what I meant when I telegraphically said a moment ago that it had to be a responsible fashion. And also there are issues related to the fact that Russia has overwhelming majority in nuclear arms in Europe. The number of nuclear arms remaining in the Alliance has been being reduced already. But the issues there, and if you want to show up the empathy regime, if you want to contribute to realization of the vision of Global Zero, you will have to chip in.

Question (Brno):

Could any of the respective participants and panelists, please elaborate their opinions on the future of NATO’s relationship with Georgia and possible admission of this Caucasian republics into NATO’ structures? On the other hand, I would also ask how would this possible admission affect Article 5 in terms of NATO’s relationship with Russia and, of course, specific Russia‘s interest in the Caucasian region? Thank you kindly.

Question (Banská Bystrica):

As we all know, NATO has invoked the Article 5 only once in its history as the result of 9/11, a terrorist attack against the United States. But since 9/11 a lot of new other nontraditional threats appeared on the international scene. So my question is, do you think that such a broad understanding of the Article 5 would allow  allies invoking the Article 5, also in case of the new nontraditional threats? Thank you.

We are talking today and tomorrow about the new challenges, but Russia still remains, one of the main concern for the NATO and it‘s my point of view, there remains several kind of mutual distrust over the Russia and NATO relationship instead of real partnership. And another part of the Alliance perceive Russia not as a such rational actor it in fact might be but rather, you know the score of Cold War respective remains in this environment of new challenges. Do you think it is possible and it is available to try to engage Russia purely on NATO terms, not to take it in the kind of national interest and its interest to build international security structures? And additional question, do you think this may push Russia more towards to cooperation with China, India and Iran and this might enable more security challenge for NATO, when to try to cooperate on really partnership terms? Thank you.

Martin Bútora - Institute for Public Affairs:

The time, when new Strategic Concepts are designed, is always a  time of opening all possible scenarios. Have you ever heard about the recent thinking on the possible role of the Alliance in Middle East? There were in the past some questions over the possible role, especially within a dialog between Israel a Palestine. It is absolutely out of question or other still some strategic, maybe midterm thinking. Thank you.   

H.E. Kim Traavik:

If I may perhaps develop on the question about NATO and Russia, which was very well framed question. I think we are obviously at the point, where we are now troubling with, what it means to reset the relationship. And it is a relationship, which has been very difficult  and always has been a challenging relationship. Particularly in last August it was. Now it’s on the upturn again, but this responds specifically to what you were asking, I would say that, it seems to me that, in the discussion we are having in Brussels at least, there is a tendency to focus upon shared interests, more than on shared values. That does not mean that the founding documents of the NATO-Russia Council have become redundant, or are not involved anymore. But it means, that in NATO, where are the transparent relationships in last few months, last year, I think the idea of Secretary General to restart it first, instead of the basis of practical and political cooperation areas where we have the most able common interest, seems to me to be reasonable way to go about it. And, there are such areas, just to enumerate, we have considerable common interest in regard of Afghanistan, we have or should have the considerable common interest in the area of non-proliferation, the same applies to terrorism and number of other issues. So we have to work with Russians. That’s a pragmatic, practical step-by-step approach, which we hardly enjoy. Our bottom line is that we can’t to regard Russia, you have to engage with them, you have to have a working relationship in order of all possible and positive messages, when either one is required.

Hans Binnendijk:

Three quick points. First on the Article 5. To me the Article 5 is like the Bill of Rights or the Ten Commandments, try to rewrite Bill of Rights or the Ten Commandments now by commitee. It will be very difficult to do.  But in both cases there are differences. And that we need to reinterpret Article 5 and stretch a bit. But I also said, there is a lot of space between the Article 4 consultation and the Article 5 armed attack, and we have to use this space creditably. You don’t have to have Article 5 attack to act as an alliance.

Second point regards Russia. We are looking at the Russia now that was badly weakened in the nineties and it has begun to strengthen. Unfortunately, it’s doing it in such way that is menacing to its neighbors and that is creating this problem, talking about the need to reassurance the Article 5. So, we have to balance the reset and the reassurance very carefully and how we do that would be very critical. I would say pragmatically if I were China, I would not want to alliance with Russia against the West, from the strategic point of view that isn’t wise for China to do that.
Finally on the Middle East and Israel in particular. I can see two situations in which there might be NATO involvement. One of those is truly on Israel-Palestine peace and some kind of force need to be put in the Middle East. Much as the US assigned field mission that one possible role and secondly, if we are truly in the business of deterring Iran, we need to think about, who we are protecting. Is it just the Alliance or the other we need to protect as well, and against what? So I think in the context we need to look at this role, just make a judgement. I don’t know the outcome, but it seems to me a part of the debate.