New Challenges - Better Capabilities

Ladies and gentlemen, excelencies, my name is Tomáš Valášek. I suspect most of you have already seen or heard me, I chaired the panel yesterday. I am the board member od the Slovak Atlantic Commission, in my dayjob I’m in London at the Centre for European Reform.

Bratislava, Slovakia may be seen like an odd place to be discussing nuclear weapons, we haven’t got any. But that does not mean we do not think about them and it does not mean that we don’t think through the consequences of the decisions of the big ones like United States, like France or Britain. We do. So when President Obama announced in April of this year that the United States wants to get rid of its nuclear weapons and would like to see a world free of nuclear weapons that applies to the Chinese, Russians and everybody else, at least four implications came to mind right away.

First: Could this announcement coupled with changes to U.S. missile defense plans which Ambassador Daalder is to speak about help to bring Russia into more constructive relationship with the West and could that help to reduce Russian suspicions of NATO?

Second: Given that American security guarantees are ultimately backed by nuclear weapons, what would disarmament, what would going down to zero mean for NATO’s ability to deter future adversaries?

Third: Could President Obama’s move towards disarmament cause tensions amongst some of the most important allies? For what I gather, France is only keen on disarmament, I suspect if the Nobel peace prize was given away in Paris rather than Oslo, president Obama wouldn’t have got it.

And lastly: What about NATO’s own arsenal of nuclear weapons? Does it mean that NATO should be slowly thinking of getting rid of them altogether?

Now, I have overloaded the agenda but you help us sort things out and to help us untangle all those questions. We have four prominent experts with us and let me introduce them in the order in which they will speak.

First, I have the pleasure to welcome Ambassador Ivo Daalder, the permanent representative of the United States to NATO on my far right. On my immediate right, Nick Pickard, my neighbor in London, although he works for slightly bigger organization than mine, he is the Head of Security Policy at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. On my immediate left Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, think-tank in Paris and of course those who follow nuclear issues know him as an author of an excellent pamphlet on French attitudes on nuclear weapons published recently by the Stimpson Centre. And on my far left, Karl-Heinz Kamp, Research Director of the NATO Defense College in Rome. Karl-Heinz may be known also as the rapporteur who is going to be working with the experts committee on the new NATO Strategic Concept.

Before I turn things over to Ivo, let me make really quickly three procedural points. First, after Ambassador Daalder gives his introductory remarks on nuclear weapons and missile defenses he will have to leave and attend to other duties. We hope he can take one or two questions but he needs to leave at 16.30 which does not leave us much time. After that, though, I will chair debate among the panelists. Contrary to what the program says we do need to rap up a little earlier – 17.20. I’m under strict orders to bring things to close at 17.20, so we will need to leave a little earlier. With that Ambassador Ivo Daalder, could I ask you to get things off with your remarks?

H.E. Ivo Daalder:

Thank you Thomas and let me apologize at the start. I do have to speak and run, unfortunately, so I’ll try not to be controversial. And to the extend I am, I will leave it to my very capable panelists to solve the riddles that I may have created. It is a great pleasure to be here. Just a few brief remarks and I want to talk not just about nuclear weapons because to only  talk about nuclear weapons is not to put the issue in the right context. We need to talk about deterrence and defense in the 21st century. That is what this is about. Nuclear weapons are part of it, but so frankly are active defenses, especially against ballistic missiles attack. And that ballistic missiles attack what I think is the quintessential Article 5 threat of our time. This is what NATO should be thinking about. Threats, armed attacks on NATO territory, that’s what Article 5 is about. Now these are subjects, as some of you may know, that I’ve spent quite a lot of time on as an academic. There are also now subjects that I spend quite a lot of time on as a NATO ambassador and in fact that’s fine to be able to take part of your theory and translate it into practice. Not all of the theory into all of the practice because I have to share decision-making authority with 27 other countries, great countries, wonderful allies but sharing authority is not necessarily the easiest thing to get things done.

Let’s look at where we are today, when it comes to the threats that we face. The nuclear threat is one that we all face together. It’s not one that the United States faces, but it’s all of us united by this threat. The world has changed quite a bit and as we move further into the 21st century, the threats that we face are multiplying and it’s important that when we confront those threats we do so together, that we try to find solutions together. It’s fair to say that we could probably call the period we’re currently living in as “Looking towards global zero”. We know we’ve left behind the arms race of the Cold War and our aspirations of living in a world without nuclear weapons are now clear. But the threat of proliferation by rogue states is growing alarmingly in both the scope and complexity and the urgency to forestall that threat is becoming increasingly high. We now also face the danger of nuclear terrorism. Therefore the consequences of not-acting have become simply unacceptable. President Obama and his administration are determined to act by making clear that we need to make the goal of a world without nuclear weapons our collective goal. And to take concrete steps towards achieving that goal. Of course Mr. President said in his speech in Prague this is a goal that may not happen in his lifetime and I note he is a younger man than I and that it would carry broad implications and responsibilities for the world’s nuclear powers and other states to achieve that goal. In his words we cannot tolerate a world in which nuclear weapons spread to more and more nations, in which the terror of the nuclear holocaust endangers more and more people. And that is why President Obama is determined to take on this challenge today and every day that follows until our goal of a world without nuclear weapons or world of global zero has been achieved. Now, the administration has not just spoken in the past ten months and adequately I should say spoken about it, but it has acted. It has strengthen its nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the one treaty and the three pillars of which are non-proliferation, disarmament and allowing for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. That is the treaty that unites virtually every country of this planet. And it has worked hard, it continues to work hard to strengthen it. It is in the midst of pursuing the ambitious new START agreement with Russia. It is engaging both Iran and North Korea to hold and reverse their nuclear programs. It is moving forward with the ratification of the comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. It will complete a nuclear posture review early next year that opens the door to still deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals and to reducing the role of nuclear weapons. And it will start negotiating in January on a treaty to end the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. A reinvigorated commitment to arms control and non-proliferation is also evidenced by the UN Security Council Summit last month which was chaired by president Obama and led to the passage of the historic UN Resolution no.1887. This reinvigorated commitment is one aspect of the Obama administration’s effort to build a safer world. President’s Obama announcement last month of a new approach to missile defense is a complementary and important other aspect of how to do that. One of the most important dangers as I said that now faces NATO comes from the proliferation of ballistic missiles that can carry chemical, biological and nuclear warhead. This is not a theoretical debate, it’s real. It is here and it’s getting bigger every day. And it will affect not just the United States but it will affect all of us, whether in Europe, given the threat that comes from Iran or in North America, given what’s happening in North Korea.

Now some of the initial reactions in the press and around the world to president Obama’s announcement on missile defense last month focused on what was being scrapped – the old plan. But not what the president proposed to put in its place – a missile defense that in his words is stronger, smarter and swifter. Let me explain. New program will be stronger – it will protect the United States and our NATO allies against the quintessential 21st century threat. Let’s be very clear. President’s decision and the new program have nothing to do with Russia. It is neither directed at Russia nor what’s the decisions based on the desire to carry favor with Russia. Its sole purpose was and is to deal with the serious danger to ourselves, to our forces in Europe and above all to our allies in the North Atlantic Alliance. Indeed those who drafted the North Atlantic Treaty 60 years ago could not have imagined that the armed attack they wrote about in Article 5 would come from rockets that could travel intercontinental distances. But that is the threat that we now face. And the new system proposed by president Obama offers an effective defense against this threat by relying on proven technologies like Aegis radars and ships and standard missiles that can shoot down ballistic missiles before they reach their target. With the president’s decision we have a flexible system that can be based in many different places and it can be part of a NATO system, if the Alliance decides that territorial missile defense is now the kind of Article 5 contingency that this alliance needs to take on. The system we proposed is also smarter than the previous system of ten ground base missiles, interceptors based in Poland and large radar that was to be placed in the Czech Republic. The old plan was calibrated to the threat from Iran’s long range missiles but in fact the more immediate danger is from Iran’s short and medium range missiles. We now know that Iran already has hundreds of ballistic missiles that can threaten its neighbors. And it is actively developing and testing ballistic missiles that can strike further into Europe. We also know that Iran is at the minimum keeping open the option of developing nuclear weapons as well as longer range delivery vehicles. Given the new realities that we now confront the original plan, first put forward in 2006, is simply no longer the smartest option. Its ten interceptors could easily have been overwhelmed by a larger attack. And that system offered no defense of parts of NATO territory in southeastern Europe. Confronting the increased danger from Iran demands a new better option for the defense of all of NATO territory. It also demands a swifter response because the new system relies on existing technologies, the first defenses can be deployed as early as 2011, some five years before the old plan envisaged for deployment. By 2018 all of NATO territory in Europe and North America will be protected against ballistic missiles of all ranges. As I mentioned we’ll start with ship-based Aegis interceptors, their smart adjustable elements with the potential for upgrades and links to other systems, the ideas to deploy these new defenses in four phases as the network expanse to include land and air-base sensors and more capable interceptors in response to an evolving threat. Agile, tested, flexible – this is a drive before you by plan using proven technology. The new network will be able to integrate with the existing systems and will adapt to new threats as they emerge. If NATO agrees these new defenses could be fully integrated into NATO’s command and control back-bone and fully achieve the mission of territorial defense against ballistic missile attack. The merit of this plan, what makes it different from the old plan, is that all 28 alliance members, not just some, will have the opportunity if they so decide, to plug their systems into NATO command and control back-bone, to be part of a program that defenses every member’s territory which is what NATO’s core commitment of Article 5 is all about. The path forward on missile defense, on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament is clear. As Secretary Clinton said yesterday in her address on a non-proliferation at the U.S. Institute of Peace “we stand at the new crossroads as we look to a world without nuclear weapons. At this key moment in history we must meet this challenge by acting boldly, wisely and in concert with other nations.” Thank you very much. 

Tomáš Valášek:

Thank you very much, Ambassador. Does it leave us time for one or two quick follow-ups? “Quick ones.” Fantastic. Can I kick things off when give others chance to think of their question. Let me again very quickly. Irrespective, Ambassador, of what motivations let to the decision to change missile defense plans, it is a fact that Russia did not like the original plans. In a fact it linked missile defenses to prefer the progress on nuclear arms reductions under the START II framework. Have you seen a positive reaction from Russia in a framework of the nuclear reduction talks to the decision to change the missile defense architecture or conversely is a potential for a negative decisions, one on a negative bounceback the once Russia realizes in fact two bases in central Europe are being replaced with potentially four or more bases in central and eastern Europe? What was the spill-over effect if any of your talk with Russia?

Question (Audience):

Mr. Ambassador, do you have any initial announcements as to what would be the future of the U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the nuclear posture review? This is the question which is important for the NATO context but is also important for the Japan and Korea in this context.

H.E. Ivo Daalder:

Very briefly on the sub-strategic - the answer is we are in the middle of a nuclear posture review. Any changes that will be made will be made in very close consultation with our allies, we’re not there yet and that’s as much as I can say.

On Russia and missile defense: Let us remember two important dates: 1 April, 2009, the President of the United States and President of Russia agreed to a framework on negotiations for the START follow-on treaty and agreed very importantly that there was no link on that negotiation and missile defense. Ever since, there has been no link in the negotiations on missile defense with START. And indeed most of the important breakthroughs on START were made at the time of the summit in Moscow in July. The numbers, the basic framework was all agreed all before the president made his announcement. So in that sense there has been a movement and there has been continuing movement to have a progress on the strategic arms control negotiations, irrespective of what the president decided with regard to missile defense. And as I said in my speech Russia was not a factor, this was driven by three things: the changing nature of the threat, the changing appreciation of what technology could do to deal with that threat and third and very importantly a belief that missile defense in Europe was something we did with Europeans rather that by ourselves with one or two other countries and that we had to do that within the NATO context. So far, I can see that Russia’s reaction has been neither negative nor positive. We have heard some positive words but in terms of the negotiations the negotiations have continued in the same pace, that are moving towards an end face we have another six weeks in order to flow negotiations by March survey December 5th and I think the fact that this missile defense system was made has neither a positive nor a negative effect, it is just moving forward and the negotiations are moving forward in the best possible way.

Tomáš Valášek:

I have just been told what the question from Banská Bystrica was and it is a simple one, one we have heard before. Is it realistic to expect to go down to zero?

H.E. Ivo Daalder:

Is it realistic? Yes, it is realistic. I wrote an article about it in Foreign Affairs called the Logic of Zero. It tells you a couple of steps you need to take in order to get there. So rather than repeating that I think it is possible to read the article – I think it was in the September/October issue of 2008 in Foreign Affairs and lays out the rationale for why you need to think about zero and how you may get there one day. It is very important, I believe it is vitally important, for the United States and other nuclear powers but starting with the United States - as the president said the only country that actually used nuclear weapons - to move forward and make the absolute goal of zero, a fundamental driving force of his nuclear weapons policy. That is what the president has put on the table in Prague and that is what he is doing each and every day. It may take a long time to get there but the process is at least as important as the end result.   

Tomáš Valášek:

Excellent Ambassador Daalder, we will let you go with that. Thank you much for your thoughts.

H.E. Ivo Daalder:

Thomas, thanks very much. I appreciate it, I apologize I’ve got to run but I hope I at least gave the panelists a little foot for thaughts. Thanks.

Tomáš Valášek:

Gentlemen, you are familiar with the format by now, I will ask you for quick introductory brief thoughts for a few minutes. You know the issues before us. Is it realistic, is it feasible and is it desirable to try to go down to zero? I understand there are differences on a subject between perhaps France and United States, perhaps even between the United Kingdom and France or am I wrong? Who do we start with? Bruno, would you like to take that on?

Bruno Tertrais:

OK, the answers are no, no and no. I mean, I’m sorry that Ambassador Daalder had to go. I’m sure we would have had a very lively debate but I can understand why the legacy of Hiroshima, the original sin of Hiroshima – so to say, has left the deep mark in American strategic culture and there’s always been this idealism of going back to the pre-nuclear age. That’s only desirability, on the feasibility the United States is of course the biggest conventional power in the world and will remain so for a long time despite the reinvestment and defense capabilities by Russia and despite the constant investment in asymmetrical capabilities by China for instance. So in a sense as Secretary of Defense Les Aspen said in 1993, a world without nuclear weapons would not be a disadvantage of United States. That’s part of the arguments and I can understand why this vision – the “vision thing” as president Bush I said – as it comes alive now due Obama, I think it’s fair also to recognize that other countries have completely different perspective and it’s actually funny to see this sort of a role reversal between France and the United States, where according to the French, the idealism of those with the grandiose schemes, the grand ambition are the Americans and those who allegedly have their feet on the ground and look at the real world are the French. This is so interesting. And poor Obama each time he talks about the abolition of nuclear weapons the real world signals its existence. During the Prague speech it was the North Korean ICBM Test, at the time of the UN Security Council meeting in September which by the way gave an extremely important and very good resolution, but at the same time there was the discovery of the Qom enrichment facilities. So every time Obama speaks about the abolition, the real world signals its existence. This is not to say that abolition is completely unthinkable, in fact I think the French should participate in the broader discussion on how to create the conditions for non-nuclear world but the issue is not so much nuclear or non-nuclear, the issue is security. We all want the safer world. We might diverge on what a safer world is, but it’s certainly true that for most of French and certainly for me, if the nuclear weapons were to disappear by magic tomorrow, I don’t think we would have a safer world. I think we would have an unsafer world. So it’s fair to say that there is a different perspective between the United States and France on these matters. This is not to say that there is an irreconcilable great gap. We can bridge that gap and as far as I’m aware there have already been three attempts to bridge that gap. First of all among the Europeans in December 2008, there was a joint position by all EU countries on issues of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. This was not widely noticed but there’s a common EU text on these matters. The second occasion to bridge the gap was of course the G8 Summit – there’s a very important sentence in the G8 - L’Aquila statement which says the conditions for safer world etc… so in a sense at least from the standpoint of a very broad position that gap has been bridged already and I would see Resolution 1887, again a very important resolution I believe and also very practical one, also as an attempt to bridge the gap what remains indeed two very different visions.

So no peace prize from Paris. Nick, Her Majesty’s Government seems to have taken a slightly different approach. Prime Minister Gordon Brown has offered to host a conference on disarmament and most recently he has actually offered the idea of cutting of the Trident submarines, one of the four planned submarines, cutting it down to three as a gesture towards nuclear disarmament. Shall I interpret that as an agreement with the overall goal going down to zero – would it be on the French or the US side of the argument?  (Tertrais: No, don’t ask that question.)

Nick Pickard:

I wanted to bring out three links that I think are worth bring out. Ivo talked about there was no link between START and missile defense but I think there are three important links we do need to think about. The first is the link between the disarmament and non-proliferation. The reason the UK Government takes such a forward leaning starts on disarmament is not just because it believes it is a good thing to have world without nuclear weapons, but because it believes it is a very good thing to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that it is critical to the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the non-proliferation regime to demonstrate disarmament on behalf of the nuclear weapon states. And that is not about convincing Iran or North Korea, we don’t think by us disarming, Iran or North Korea will turn around to disarm, but it is about denuding Iran or North Korea of the arguments they use far too successfully with other countries than non-align movement in particular about our record on disarmament. And in that respect NATO has a direct interest because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a direct threat to NATO territory and therefore the disarmament is definitely in NATO’s interests. The second link is between nuclear and conventional, the fact that a number of countries hold nuclear weapons against conventional threats, against having conventionally insuperior forces and the posture which countries take depends on that as well. Indeed it is in NATO’s current Strategic Concept – it talks about aggression of any kind and as nuclear weapons decrease, conventional arms control and conventional deterrence becomes more and more important and relevant.

And finally the link between deterrence and disarmament is not inconsistent to do both. Indeed we have been doing both for quite a long time, ever since that treaty first came into place. It is quite consistent to say that you want in the future a world without nuclear weapons but it is a long path and that until you get there, it is important to deter existing nuclear threats. And that is indeed what president Obama said in his Prague speech. People have focused very much on the first half of his sentence, people in the D.O.D. (Department of Defense) I’ve met focused very much on the second half of his sentence talking about the credible deterrence and the two are very much part of one thought.

Tomáš Valášek:

Thank you. I do want to go to Karl-Heinz and ask about NATO’s nuclear weapons, but before I do, let me throw one of Nick’s points back at Bruno, because Nick had one very prudent point. One of reasons going down to zero is to frankly regain the moral high ground with regard to Iran, North Korea and others. It is a reality that in our talks with Iran, North Korea and others we run into the same problem over and over again. When we talk to them and we say they shall not develop or buy nuclear weapons, they throw it right back at us and they say you, United States, United Kingdom, France are obligated by the same nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which are you waving at us to disarm, to take credible steps towards disarmament and you haven’t done so. Is president Obama not right to try to regain the moral high ground, is he not right to try to set the goal of zero and would that not be helpful with regard to Iran and North Korea. And given that those are the most pressing threats, should that not override some of the other reasons against going down to zero which you have mentioned?

Bruno Tertrais:

It is very fine for president Obama to try to regain the moral high ground, I think nobody has any problem with that but frankly, talking about moral high ground with Iran is something that I’m not sure appropriately characterize the sort of discussion we’re having with them right now. When they fight back at us with words that Non-Proliferation Treaty is fair for you too, I’m not sure they are of good faith because I think it would stretch the argument to the point of breaking if you were to say that on the one hand there are the real violations of the NPT by Iran and on the other violations, which I don’t think are violations, by the five of their disarmament commitments. I think the five or at least four of them – the last one being China of course – are seriously implementing Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but the most important thing is that if we suddenly gave up on nuclear weapons tomorrow I think the Iranians would actually be even more encouraged to have nuclear weapons. And today the nuclear weapons are outlawed, only outlaws would have nuclear weapons.

Tomáš Valášek:

That is very true but they would still leave the United States in the position of overwhelming conventional superiority. But that’s perhaps something we can get to later. I do want to bring Karl-Heinz and NATO to the debate. We’ve heard from Ambassador Daalder few minutes ago the nuclear posture review in the United States is still under way, there are no earlier results, but clearly if the world moves down to zero that means that NATO would have to give up its tactical weapons based in Europe as well. And if that’s the case, have the debates on the subject started in the Alliance, have they been devising and what are the allies, who do rely on ultimately America’s nuclear weapons to provide the security guarantee, what are they saying to the United States? Do you sense fierce from some perhaps in central and eastern Europe or perhaps elsewhere that if America would give up their weapons, including NATO’s tactical weapons in Europe, that it will make it more difficult to deter other adversaries from attacking NATO?

Karl-Heinz Kamp:

Thank you. There are some good news and some bad news. Good news is that the idea of global zero has brought the question of nuclear deterrence back into the land light. It is not by chance. This is one of the first NATO conferences for years where on a prominent panel you have NATO nuclear problems discussed. That didn’t happen, so NATO for years avoided any discussions about nuclear weapons. The good news is we now start thinking about how to preserve deterrence in the future. The bad news is, the beauty of the vision of the nuclear free world cannot just hide the fact that it is not going to happen. Bruno has spoken about it. It is a fact, leaving all of the arguments you’ve mentioned already alone, it’s a sheer fact – like it or not – that some countries just don’t want to give up their nuclear weapons. Israel does not want to give up its weapons, France, China, I think India, but certainly Russia does not want to give it up because they see it as a compensation for the capabilities. So what we’re talking about is deep reductions which are necessary and possible but global zero is not. Now you might ask why cannot we live with the nice vision? Policy always needs nice visions so what about the problem with this vision? Problem with this vision is that the idea of global zero delegitimizes deterrence. If zero is the goal, the moral high ground goal, than anything above zero, to preserve deterrence in the meantime, is bad by definition. If zero is the goal, the moral highground goal, then anything above zero, to preserve deterrence in the meantime, is bad by definition. So the problem what we have is twofold: First, we raise in our public completely unrealistic expectations and we will pay for this, And second, we erode the strategy, deterrence, which we might need for a long long time. All the global zero-guys say: well it might not happen in my lifetime. If this is the case, I should think about what about deterrence in your lifetime. So actually, the origin question is, how NATO can preserve deterrence under changed circumstances. Deterrence against terrorists, against non-state actors, against failed states and so on and so forth. This is something NATO hasn’t done. The United States, a little bit the UK, little bit France have evolved nuclear deterrence in their thinking, in their concept. We did not say anything about it. So basically NATO starts at nil with the debate. Whether for instance we still have US nuclear weapons on European soil. I am a supporter of nuclear deterrence but I would not be able to explain you a credible contingency for which you would need these weapons. I just cannot do it. Of course I see, the concerns of other countries to say we need credible nuclear guarantee. So what does today make for Poland, for other countries the nuclear umbrella credible? These are the key questions and these are the questions we should focus on and not on unrealistic scenarios.

Tomáš Valášek:

Karl-Heinz, I understand the logic of the argument but in the real world would the presence of nuclear weapons whether we‘ve frown up on them or whether we plan to get rid of them or not, would the presence of nuclear weapons not have a deterrent effect on Russia?

Karl-Heinz Kamp:

Well, this is the question, I mean, we had in Germany a long debate in the 80s’ about intermediate nuclear systems. And the question was, well the Germans, or the Europeans, did not believe, there is the US nuclear guarantee over Europe. But is it credible? What if the Russians attack? Will the Americans risk the security of San Francisco to save Frankfurt, Cologne or Berlin? No one knows. So we were believing that certain technical regulations make it possible if we have intermediate nuclear weapons on our soil, which can reach Russia, then they might... You can believe it or not. It is little bit like nuclear theology. So whether you really need weapons on your soil. The question is, whether the US, country under the umbrella, believe in the commitments of the country who provides your nuclear umbrella. Whether you want to have nuclear forces on your soil that depends on the relationship. There are countries in NATO who don’t have a problem not having nuclear weapons on their soil and they still believe in the nuclear umbrella and others don’t. But this is the question we have to define individually.

Tomáš Valášek:

Great. I have many more questions, but I do want to throw up things open for the audience and our students and participants from Warschau, Brno and Banská Bystrica. We have about 20 minutes for questions, so what I’d like to do is to take them in clusters in the interest of time and see if we can get through them all in the next 20 minutes. So, do we have questions from the audience?

Petr Suchý, Masaryk University, Brno:

I would like to react to the points made by Mr. Valášek. You mentioned couple of times the fact that the United States have no competitor when conventional forces are concerned in these days. On the other hand, I really doubt that provided the United States go to zero, they would be capable of deterring by conventional means only various actors especially in the Middle East. We can see that this superiority in conventional arms still didn’t lead to a way, to a situation where the United States would win two conflicts, limited conflicts, in the Middle East. And I really doubt that they would be able to deter, by the outcomes we can see in these days, effectively various opponents, especially at that area. Thank you.

Tomáš Valášek:

I didn’t say the United States would not have a conventional competitor, I said, it would have a conventional superiority. And that’s a slightly different thing. But you haven’t come here to listen to me, so I wanna turn this into a question for the panel. I can turn it into a question for you, Nick. You’re in the somewhat unenviable situation on being on the somewhat different side of the argument, perhaps from Bruno and Karl-Heinz. Would we not lose our ability to deter, if we actually get rid of nuclear weapons? Are we not shooting ourselfs in the foot?

Nick Pickard:

Well, I mentioned the link between nuclear and conventional which, I think, is very important and therefore I agree with Bruno that this is actually about, the security conditions and creating the security conditions. And that I wrote the sentence in the G8. The seek of a safer world under created conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is burned on my brain. But it is a very useful word which brings us all together. Yes, it’s a very long road since we are trying to put the logic of zero, place the logic of zero on the world of today, it doesn’t fit, you’re quite right. But the fact that this is a long and difficult path is not an argument for not starting down that path. It’s a strong argument for starting down that path. It is a strong argument for looking ahead what might be able to happen, in what conditions you might find yourself into on the way of anticipating those. In the same way as when you’re driving down the road. You don’t know exactly how to get to the final destination but as you turn the corner the view comes into sight and it becomes that much more easy.

Tomáš Valášek:

Great. Bruno?

Bruno Tertrais:

If we’ve come to the idea of starting down that path, it depends exactly on what you mean by that. If it’s about lowering the importance of nuclear weapons, you know, different policies, I think, we‘ve already done that. The problem is, that the situation is very different from smaller countries such as the UK or France, which have really minimum deterrence, I mean, and the United States and Russia, which have oversized deterrence to say. It’s much easier for Washington and Moscow actually to reduce their arsenals, which are still inherited from the Cold War and give the impression they are going to zero, while in fact, they will be moving towards the posture which all things equal will be the sort of equivalent of minimum deterrence but, of course, in relation to their size and importance. It’s much more difficult for countries such as France and the UK because starting down that path in terms of reductions would actually not only delegitimitize nuclear deterrence as Karl-Heinz said, but also question the very operational efficiency of the deterrence simply put. I can’t speak for France, because I’m not an official, but I have some idea how things are constructed but Nick will speak for the UK and it’s sure that we’ve really calibrated, I believe, respected the deterrence and its ways which make it very difficult if the context does not change. If the context does not change, for us to really further reduce our forces without questioning the very credibility of our deterrence. And don’t get me wrong Nick, but one day Gordon Brown says that the UN that maybe the UK could go to a three submarine posture This would not be disarmament, I assume. Of course, we can also assume for the future, that it would mean probably the same number of missiles and weapons, but at least, provided the conditions are right. But no countries such as France and the UK, I think, would just simply decide to cut down the force, if there’s no reassessment of the credibility of deterrence.

Tomáš Valášek:

Even if Gordon Brown didn’t say he was to go down to zero next year, he’s taking steps consistent with President Obama and taking gradual steps which could be interpreted as such… I wanna give Karl-Heinz a chance, cause…

But why? Why would it be? If it’s the same, if you just have the same number of missiles and warheads. Why would it be?

Tomáš Valášek:

Is that the just of the decision, would there be fewer submarines by the same number of warheads. Even when down from four to three.

Nick Pickard:

The announcement, the Prime Minister made, which I mean in fact, and I study and launched 2006 (whether we can do four or three submarines. Why on earth you would want to do something with four if you can do it with three at less expense. Cost is a relevant factor in this as well. But if it provides the perception of disarmament if it provides a good momentum and we’re talking again about the audience, the non-aligned movements and that perceptions of how the nuclear weapons states are disarming. If that helps that process then it has to be a good thing. Provided, as Bruno says that a credible deterrent now remains very important and that is why we’re doing this…

Bruno Tertrais:

The challenge for all of us is in fact to create the perception of deterrence and create the perception of disarmament at the same time.

Tomáš Valášek:

Bruno, hold the thought I’ve more questions from the audience but I do wanna give the word to Karl-Heinz first.

Karl-Heinz Kamp:

I just wanna to take issue of just common on this point, on the conventional deterrence. We should be very careful in knowing what we mean by deterrence. Is really the use of nuclear weapon the only thing we want to deter? Or put the other way question around, why do countries want to have nuclear weapons? Why the hell, go they through so many pain and spend so much money to get them? Perhaps status, yes, but certainly because if you are a nuclear power, you cannot be militarily sanctioned anymore. Which means your spectrum of political freedom increases. If Milosevic would have been nuclear power, NATO had not attacked them because of the Kosovans, regardless what he had done with the Kosovans. If, for instance, Iraq had been a nuclear power in ‘91, the Americans had not liberated Kuwait, regardless what he has done to the Kuwaitis. Which means, you need the capability or the idea to prevent countries from getting nuclear weapons is to prevent that they can “do what they want” in region which is extremely vital to us. And this is also about deterrence and this you cannot do with conventional means.

Tomáš Valášek:

Great. Next question from Malcolm Chambers in the front row, from the Royal United Services Institute in London. Malcolm...

I love a good theological debate with the British and the French but I’ll desist from that. One remark I made here in Karl-Heinz’s comment is that historical unit credibility nuclear weapons states have been attacked. We were attacked in the Falklands even though we owned nuclear weapons and Argentina did not. Because we didn’t have a credible signal that we would respond, so nuclear weapons are not enough for deterrence. The question I really wanted to ask is that up on to 2000-2001 we found progress in strategic arms control, also required limits on defensive systems. And that vanished with the ABM Treaty. But as Ambassador Daalder made very clear over the next decade, we’re going to have increasing deployment of defensive systems in relation to threats from Middle East. What do the panellists think, are the prospects of coming much further down with the defensive systems for the US and Russia but also bringing China and others who have concerns about defensive systems without also having arms controls, some sort of limitation on deployment of strategic defense systems

Tomáš Valášek:

Great. Karl-Heinz would you like to take that on?

Karl-Heinz Kamp:

Yes, please, because I’ve never understood why strategic defences, in today’s world still need to be controlled. That was the old logic of the ABM Treaty that both sides have to remain vulnerable to make deterrence work. I would like to live in a different world. I would like to live in a world where, if we have threats coming, for instance by nuclear states or by the danger of some kind of ballistic missiles tipped with chemical or biological weapons, I think you need three layers of defence. The first layer always is diplomacy in arms control. If you can negotiate the threat away, that’s the best to you can happen. If this doesn’t work, I would like to have the second layer, which is deterrence. Conventional, nuclear, whatever, to signal to the attacker: You better don’t do it, because if you are in trouble. If this doesn’t work, for whatever reason, intentionally or unintentionally, I would like to have a third layer, which is defence. Missile defence. To intercept, assume it’s technically feasible, to intercept a missile, which is shot at me be it in anger, be it by chance. So I just don’t understand, why still the idea is that missile defence is something destabilizing. That was in the Cold War but they can hardly transfer this thought to today’s realities.

Bruno Tertrais:

It gets both ways, really and remember Reykjavík. Reykjavík was the moment when it was realized very clearly by both, Reagan and Gorbatschow that for one country missile defence was the solution for abolition and for the other country missile defence was the problem for abolition. Even though, as Karl-Heinz says, the context is very different. You can have two very different visions of looking on the relationship between missile defence and abolition. It could be an obstacle or it could be actually a solution. Can I take a quick shot at the first part of your question? You use the example of the Falklands. I appraise it differently. There has never been a state military attack against the homeland of a nuclear armed country. That includes the Falklands, which were not part of the “homeland”, it was an overseas dependant territory, wasn’t it? Like people sometimes say, Egypt attacked Israel in ’73. No, the Egyptians knew very well where the red line was. And the red line was 1949 armistice agreement line. Also you can say that there’s never been a chemical weapons attack on a nuclear armed country. I mean, you can play with it little bit. My short point on this is that I think, there’s good historical evidence that nuclear deterrence seems to work. That’s all I can say because one can never prove it negative as you know.

Tomáš Valášek:

I want to bring this theological debate, before I take a further question, back down to the practical political level. The reason, we have some extraordinary audience, because Ministerial is starting, we have meeting of the defence ministers beginning later today and tomorrow. Three questions flowing from that: What do you expect at Ministerial to be said on the subject? If anything, at all. Second, all three of you are veterans of this debate, you are in regular contact on the subject with others, what do you hear from the smaller states in Central/East Europe or bigger states, like Poland, on the subject? Are they worried about Obama steps? And third question, how much of a bad blood is this causing within NATO? Bruno I will cite an unnamed senior French foreign policy official who once told me: “Nuclear disarmament could easily become the most serious bilateral issue in US-French relations.” Is this, translating into bad blood, between the allies? Let me, perhaps, give you chance to answer those questions first before I turn to the audience.

Bruno Tertrais:

Bad blood? Well, I don’t know when that person made that statement but I think, there is an attempt by both countries to avoid it being, you know. If anything creates bad blood,  it won’t be nuclear abolition, it won’t be theology, it will be the real world.

By the way, on the NATO issue, can I say just one word on NATO issue? Because you know, Because you know my country does not participate in the arrangements, I think, when you look at the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe, I don’t think we should not reason as if they were not there, we were deciding to deploy them and I think the question for Alliance members is: Where do we gain and where do we lose if we withdraw them? And I think, Ivo Daalder said it very wisely, the United States is going to make its own national decisions and then there will be a debate within the Alliance but they will not make any unilateral decision and that’s good. The question for all Alliance members is really, you know, take several scenarios: you keep them, you withdraw them and then make a rational cost-and-benefits calculation in terms of deterrence, non-proliferation, relationship with Russia, everything. I have no theological position on this matter; I would just say that I think it’s a healthy thing in an alliance that non-nuclear members are involved, one way or another, in a debate which is one of the most important tools for the security of the Alliance. I personally would feel very much more comfortable if non-nuclear allies were involved in this debate and that’s the reason why I support nuclear sharing it’s a way for non-nuclear countries to be involved in nuclear possibility debate. And I think, in a real alliance, you know, it means something…

Tomáš Valášek:

Speaking of non-nuclear allies, Nick and Karl-Heinz, what do you hear from others? What do others, besides the circle of the three countries, represented here say and think on the subject? And what do you expect the NATO Ministerial tomorrow and tonight to say on the subject?

Nick Pickard:

I don’t expect the NATO Ministerial to say very much about the subject, but I agree completely with Bruno actually on this issue. Deterrence is all about credibility a therefore if we are going to be serious about NATO being a nuclear alliance we have to be credible, we have to discuss these issues. I get nervous when I hear some people saying I’d rather not the Strategy concept don’t touch nuclear deterrence. It has to be absolutely in there and all allies, non-nuclear and nuclear allies have to recognize the nuclear role, if it has to be credible. Now you can argue whether the tactical, the weapons in Europe have a military credible role, but they have a political role. I agree with Karl-Heinz. I don’t see them deterring very much but they do have this political role as a symbol of extended deterrence. Now you can do extended deterrence without the deployment of weapons, Japan and South Korea are two good examples of that. But what we have to decide is what’s right for NATO and what’s right in further perceptions of extended deterrence in NATO and for that matter in Japan if they saw the US withdrawing such weapons. And we have to decide what other ways, if there are other ways, to this deployment of weapons, to that extended deterrence and that nuclear sharing, those two political tools these weapons provide could be achieved and only in that stage could you look at renegotiation of those weapons in Europe. From non-nuclear allies I hear concerns about the US extended deterrence, from some I hear concerns about the weapons in Europe, it’s clearly a really important discussion to be held as part of the Strategic Concept on this issue.

Tomáš Valášek:

Concerns and concerns. Doesn’t sound like much support. What do you hear, Karl-Heinz?

Karl-Heinz Kamp:

Well, the ministers will not say anything about this or not say anything new about this because they can’t even if they wanted to. There is no new development. What are others saying, in Eastern Europe the missile defence decision as it was made was not a good sign on have to get allies on board on this. You change a project which was right for many many years, by saying: a) the threat has changed – what the hell has happened in the last half year that the threat has changed? Second, you’re saying now we have a system, which is much better and the ambassador said it and useable and so on and so on. Why wasn’t it brought before? So this way of whether you need missile defence or not is a completely different question. We can discuss about this for hours, but you cannot change the conditions immediately and then be surprised that your allies say, well, we don’t know on what key issue they are changing, the key conditions next time. So this is something and when we talk about nuclear weapons, this is very delicate issue. Where you have national pride, huge number of theology in it, so you have to be very careful. And by the way, the Strategic Concept cannot solve these problems so we will not have a new nuclear strategy by the new Strategic Concept next year. But the Strategic Concept can ignite a debate in NATO, where there is no right and wrong at the current moment of time. So it might take one or two years or three years to have a nuclear posture which is credible for all 28 NATO allies.

Tomáš Valášek:

Great. We have just enough time for one last question from the audience. I saw a hand on the right.

Silas Walton, Youth Atlantic Council, United Kingdom:

If I can ask the panellists, staying away from the theological level, to what extent do they feel that the Russian Federation’s positive steps on the matter genuine or to rephrase how long will this positivity on the part of the Russians last, if the détente between the United States and Russia doesn’t carry on for many months further.

Tomáš Valášek:

Who would like to take it on? With in the five minutes remaining?

Nick Pickard:

I think, the Russian opposition is serious and is positive and I think, it’s one of these reasons I’m convinced that the START, follower on START Treaty will hit its deadline because President Medvedev as well as President Obama is absolutely determined to achieve that. And I think, coming back to my first link, which was between disarmament and non-proliferation, the Russians do care about non-proliferation, they do care about the preservation of the non-proliferation treaty, they do care about the unity of the nuclear weapons states working together because of how they perceive the non-proliferation treaty. And, I think, that’s very important. The point I would make on that. If the audience is the non-aligned movement and you are trying to break away Iran and North Korea, from the non-aligned movement. If you read resolutions tabled again and again in the United Nations that they are doing at the moment now, they seem much more interested in doctrine, in changes of doctrine than about the reductions and that’s perhaps an area on what NATO can focus.

Tomáš Valášek:

For obvious reasons, Ambassador Daalder didn’t want to go into Russian response to missile defences and disarmament plans, but perhaps you can help him and say, what he couldn’t say. Is it the positive bounce back?

Bruno Tertrais:

I can’t speak for Ivo, I think, there was one positive dimension is that, some of the Russian concerns were genuine, I mean, sometimes paranoid people have genuine concerns, it were both technical and strategic parameters which have changed with the new missile defence plan, but at the same time, at height, there is a Russian uneasiness with the, what they see as the expansion of the western military “camp” as they call it, because they are in the Cold War. We’ve passed the Cold War, they have not. And to go back to your question, I would say that unfortunately it seems to me that, what you call a détente, is tactical matter whereas the strategic matter, it seems to me, that the broad policy orientation that Putin has taken especially since 2003-2004, is not confrontation, but you know, opposition. Opposition with the “West”, what they call the “West”, and especially with the United States. And this is a regime which actually feeds on this opposition with the West. So I’m afraid, that even though there will be moments of agreement, you know like the next START agreement, will be signed, I have no doubt, the next one, let’s make a bet, the next one will not be signed. There won’t be a far one to the one which will be signed in December. And unfortunately, as long as the political on strategic culture in Russia is where it is right now, I don’t see prospect for real completely peaceful coexistence between NATO and Russia. I’m sorry to be pessimistic, but rather be called pessimistic than idealist American.

Tomáš Valášek:

Karl-Heinz, is Russia serious or are the Americans being fooled?

Karl-Heinz Kamp:

I can take the point of Bruno back on NATO itself. This is a bilateral agreement between the two countries. It does not solve the major problem in NATO which is how to deal with the country Russia, which is important on the one hand but not user-friendly on the other. So, there is still the fact that number of NATO members regards Russia as a threat in a variety of issues: as a threat directly, as a danger, instability, what have you and this is not going to change. Some people in Brussels say that the issue of Russia has probably the same divisive potential as Iraq for the Alliance’s internal discussions which is now covered and it cannot be done by bumper sticker approaches like the Strategic Partnership. Because so far no one could really explain to me, what actually Strategic Partnership is in comparison to a special partnership or a normal partnership or an intensive partnership or what have you. So it doesn’t solve our problem.

Tomáš Valášek:

Excellent. I shall not try to summarize the debate, mostly because there isn’t one single view. Obviously what we have is a good spirited, I hate to call it an argument, perhaps let’s call it a creative difference, so perhaps to be continued next time? Please join me in thanking the panellists for their thoughts to our three guests as well as Ambassador Daalder.